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Abstract 
Betrayal is proposed in this dissertation as a concept that is informed by 
political theory and by curatorial concepts. Betrayal is conceptualized here 
as an entanglement of antagonistic relations. It is proposed as an 
engagement with an antagonism while withdrawing from its underlying logic. 
Betrayal is presented as a variety of approaches through a set of proposals 
which include exhaustion, anachronism, fictionalism, demonstration and 
acting.  
Written in the context of curatorial work in Israel-Palestine, this dissertation 
proposes several qualities of the field of the curatorial and applies them to 
political theory. Betrayal is considered operational through the field of the 
curatorial as the curatorial provides a setting for activating potentialities. In 
the three chapters of this dissertation, Betrayal is developed through an 
active reading of the lives and work of several figures as method: Alcibiades 
son of Cleinias, a fifth century BC Athenian politician; the last book published 
by Sigmund Freud during his lifetime Moses and Monotheism; and Bertolt 
Brecht’s notion of Acting in relation to Hannah Arendt’s political Action.  
Informed by the curatorial ability to articulate connectedness and activating 
potentialities, this dissertation deploys Betrayal as a set of strategies that 
include formation, narrative and agency. The way these entangle 
antagonisms involves different ways of articulating practices that can move 
inside-out, can destabilize inwards and can shift the site of articulation of 
politics itself. The curatorial and Betrayal are thus the centre of this 
dissertation as it aims to provide a tool for operating in politics. 
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One cannot avoid the negative connotation of the term Betrayal. It has come 
to carry the meaning of an individual act of abusing trust. Betrayal is widely 
used in stories of espionage in its meaning as treason, and many times in 
fiction, it is the key element that drives the plot of either disintegration or 
restoration. This setting relies on an antagonistic structure by which the 
traitor moves from one side to the other, or playing both sides at the same 
time. This mapping of power relations and possible actions in them, will here 
be called treason and not Betrayal.1  
Betrayal, as developed in this dissertation, addresses firstly the abusive 
nature of the trust that is demanded from all parties along the antagonistic 
setting. My aim here would be to use this term as a political tool which 
enables the emergence of new collective subjectivities. Betrayal’s negative 
meaning is suggested here to be an engagement with oppositions through a 
withdrawal from their logic, for the opening up of new positions and 
alignments. As much as it is a personal analytical tool, Betrayal aims to 
provide political mappings to be formulated as new categories and gestures 
come into the political and operate in politics. 
                                                          
1 Despite this antagonistic framing, on some level it is never really possible to narrow it down 
to this either/or setting. For example, the charges that Julian Assange, founder of 
Wikileaks, could be facing follow the logic of treason as he is accused of being 
unauthorized to publish the documents Wikileaks has obtained through whistle-
blowers. Assange has named himself a “Spy for the People,” revealing state secrets in 
the name of the general public. He proposes himself as an agent of an open form of 
spying, not concealing but revealing. His form of espionage does not entail only 
changing sides between rivalling governments but between every government and 
its citizens. In its narrow sense, we could say that his form of treason might still 
engage with a direct changing of sides (treason), but it performs something else – 
and that thing is a loyalty to a horizon of new subjectivities – an open society of 
knowledgeable citizens actively participating in freeing information. 
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The motivation for instigating an investigation of Betrayal is informed by my 
continuous work in various fields of cultural and political production – 
organizing and collaborating on curated exhibitions, editing and publishing 
literary works and producing and putting together films and film screenings, 
staging political documents, organizing and participating in poetry readings 
and demonstrations. Betrayal is used here in a political sense. This is done 
through an exploration of the field of the curatorial and its qualities of 
articulation, demonstration, narration and making relations sensible. For this 
dissertation I am also taking from my practice, therefore, suggesting Betrayal 
as taxonomy of strategies, tactics and performances that can be developed 
and demonstrated through the curatorial and proposed for acting in politics.  
In this dissertation, Betrayal is proposed as a political tool of engagement. 
My aim is to describe and experiment with this political tool through different 
concepts, fictions, gestures and materials. The conceptual framework of 
Betrayal does not operate so much as a mere tool for the analysis of these 
materials, fictions and gestures, but rather Betrayal comes together through 
them. Betrayal is proposed in this dissertation as a way of problematizing a 
set of notions that define the given situation. Betrayal is an entanglement 
that allows to think with the situation while operating against it. Betrayal 
operates between positions and oppositions. It is a gesture of enacting 
refusal by the plurality of negations that are available already by a defined 
conflict. Betrayal here stems from the contexts from which it is written. 
Working mainly in Israel-Palestine, the selected materials I present here 
offer a variety of trajectories through which to open up the withering setting 
that is Israel-Palestine.  
Betrayal will be outlined in this dissertation through a set of modes that 
involve activating histories, deploying strategies of entanglement, inhabiting 
fictions and embodying narratives. All these generate a move from politics to 
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culture and the political and then back to politics. These modes are all 
informed by the curatorial, and the way a practice can produce concepts that 
can then be used outside of it. This roaming of meaning between fields, 
between practice and concept, invites the curatorial to operate between 
politics and the political. 
This movement of inside-outside, push-pull, changing of sides, leaving the 
scene and reappearing in another form, can be found in Chantal Mouffe’s 
critique of Paolo Virno’s notion of exodus which he put forward in his A 
Grammar of the Multitude.2 Mouffe suggests her and Ernesto Laclau’s 
description of antagonism in their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy3 as 
a way to distinguish between two approaches. One would be that put 
forward by Virno which entails “Critique as Withdrawal From” and the other, 
her and Laclau’s, entails “Critiques as Engagement With.” For the strategy of 
exodus supposes the possibility of “a redemptive leap into a society, beyond 
politics and sovereignty, where the Multitude would be able to immediately 
rule itself and act in concert without the need of law or the state and where 
antagonism would have disappeared.” This she contrasts with her and 
Laclau’s approach of the hegemonic strategy which recognizes “a fully 
                                                          
2 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, 
Trans.: Isabella Bertoletti, James Cascaito and Andrea Casson, Semiotext(e), 2004  
3 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, London and New York: Verso, 1985 
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inclusive consensus and an absolute democracy are never available.”4 
Mouffe’s own methodology is performed in this text which highlights 
antagonism and contrast.  
Betrayal does not only conflate terms. Betrayal would be located between 
“Withdrawal From” and “Engagement With.” It opens up and densifies the 
contrast that Mouffe is describing. Betrayal here is a contingent becoming 
that is potentially in any antagonism. It is a re-alignment, a shifting of the 
lines and the search for another setting – it is a modification of the conditions 
while engaging with the antagonisms at hand.  Working with exodus and 
antagonism Betrayal oscillates between “Engagement With” an antagonistic 
setting or situation and a “Withdrawal From” its paradigms and formations. 
Betrayal’s methodology is therefore, an entanglement – a withdrawal from 
the assumed objectivity of the antagonism and an engagement with it from 
another perspective. The notion of Betrayal allows to think an antagonism 
against itself. It offers politics a form of interrogation that the curatorial 
formulates and elaborates. 
On some level, the deployment of arguments in this dissertation performs 
this move as claims are made with trajectories that cut through an 
antagonism in other points than the linear and direct ones this antagonism is 
narrated through. The curatorial involves setting up relations between ideas, 
                                                          
4 Chantal Mouffe, “Critique as Counter-Hegemonic Intervention”, in: transversal: The Art of 
Critique, EIPCP, June 2008: www.eipcp.net/stransversal/0808/mouffe/en. Exodus is 
actually conceptualized by Virno as political engagement. For example when he 
writes: “Nothing is less passive than the act of fleeing, of exiting. Defection modifies 
the conditions within which the struggle takes place, rather than presupposing those 
conditions to be an unalterable horizon; it modifies the context within which a 
problem has arisen, rather than facing this problem by opting for one or the other of 
the provided alternatives. In short, exit consists of unrestrained invention which 
alters the rules of the game and throws the adversary completely off balance.” Paolo 
Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, Semiotext(e), 2004, p. 70. Betrayal also aims for 
this unconstrained off-balancing invention.  
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this informs this dissertation as the methodology used here is not of reading 
a text or a narrative through another one. It is not analysis in the sense of an 
object on which critical tools are applied. Following this logic of the 
curatorial, it is the bringing together of ideas and the setting up of relations 
between them that provides the driving force for the way this dissertation is 
written. As the curatorial entails orchestrating polyphony as polyphony, it 
lends itself to Betrayal a multiplicity of compositional strategies that can be 
further elaborated in politics. 
 
Politics and the Political 
“Alors, Comment agir sur un instrument qui vous echappe, qui vous 
est adverse même?” 
Trotskyist Michel Grandville to German refugee  
Erna Wolfgang in Alain Resnais’ film Stavisky, 1974  
How do you operate a device that escapes you, that resists you? This is the 
question the French Trotskyist poses outside Leon Trotsky’s temporary 
residence in France. Trotsky just exiled from the USSR and was still looking 
for a way to take over the communist international. But how could he control 
a party that was no longer subjected to his authority? 
The question of power and agency holds many dilemmas and reflections. In 
a way, the ones we are faced with today revolve around the recognition that 
we are powerless and lack access to any influential agency. With this, recent 
projects have emerged attempting to find ways to work with these devices 
that escape us. This is a sensibility that has informed many dissident 
projects in the past and found its way into contemporary art practices. The 
wave of re-enactment and simulation works of the previous decade can give 
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an account for the array of strategies developed in order to work within this 
melancholic mood. 
The dissertation here articulates Betrayal as a term to work with when 
‘writing with a pen that is not in your hand.’ The preface to this dissertation 
will include a basic introduction to Betrayal and the curatorial and their 
interrelations, and will include the contexts, practices and materials the 
dissertation engages with. The project that Betrayal suggests is further 
elaborated in this introduction through a brief description of the chapters that 
make up the dissertation. 
The chapters of this dissertation revolve around a traitor, Alcibiades of 
Athens, exiles such as Sigmund Freud and Bertolt Brecht, and Hannah 
Arendt who developed a whole discourse of the political in relation to 
refugees. These chapters circle around the different ways they themselves 
or their writing can help us conceptualize power as a question – where is it 
and how does it operate? These chapters explore the potentialities of 
betrayal in art, cinema, literature and theatre, politics and history. The 
proposal of Betrayal here relates to the question of power and agency in a 
moment dominated by a sense of powerlessness. Circulation and withdrawal 
are the two strategies we see in activism and autonomism that have 
proliferated in recent years in the left. These present use with limits as they 
delineate the ways we can and cannot access politics and history as we 
constantly experience through them a conversion of politics and history into 
dilemmas of morality. Under right wing political domination, until recently, 
one could observe how many political projects did not find a place to operate 
in politics, and therefore found refuge in art and academia. Now that 
austerity policies are also closing in on them in these fields of practice, we 
notice many cultural and political projects are invested in “engagement 
through withdrawal” – from the autonomist leadership of the Occupy 
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movement in the US to cultural boycotts. These present a very early form of 
association around an exit from the circulation of evils (by states, 
corporations etc.).  
But to make it political, any movement has to enable new subjectivities to 
appear. For it to politicize, this emerging phenomenon can be organized 
around the question of the French Trotskyist in “Stavisky.” ‘How do you write 
with a pen that you are not holding?’ would be a way to paraphrase this.  
In Mouffe and Laclau’s Gramscian vocabulary we would say that most of 
these movements for social justice around the world were not able to 
produce a historical bloc. As the dissertation will discuss further Mouffe’s 
and Laclau’s proposition, what will be developed here is a critique of the 
setting they propose as it also proved to operate in a contradictory way than 
they have envisioned. A counter use of their notion of chain-of-equivalence 
appeared in real existing politics, wherein hegemony feeds off the variety of 
struggles that make society. 
Curating provides a practice from which to examine this operation-in-
uncertainty (navigating through authorship, institution, market, canonization 
etc.). Betrayal would be a move between the political and politics in the form 
of “withdrawal through engagement,” meaning that the concrete reality 
(politics) is being addressed through renegotiation/re-articulation of the 
concept that inform it (the political). By oscillating between different levels by 
“engagement with the situation” and “withdrawal from paradigms” Betrayal 
offers new ones. 
‘Writing with a pen that is not in your hand,’ invites a critique of hegemony as 
much as it proposes a form of exit, it develops a concrete setting while 
proposing a speculated reality. This proposes an analysis that is also an 
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account of the state of affairs. It recognizes antagonistic conditions of conflict 
and works parallel and in between its inscription.  
 
The Curatorial and Curating 
This dissertation is written in the framework of a practice that is trying to 
understand its own concepts. The curatorial has been developed to propose 
a space of knowledge production that has been achieved through curatorial 
practice, but is not limited to the field of visual art solely. With the curatorial, 
practices of articulation, actualization, contextualization and editing, are 
expanded into a field that is not limited to the event or narrative of the 
exhibition or artworks. The curatorial proposes these practices as they are 
elaborated and enacted outside the field of visual art and activated on 
philosophical, political, social and historical levels. 
It might sound unfair to describe curation as the art of working with other 
people’s ideas, on a limited budget and a nonexistent audience. But this 
somewhat derogatory definition of curating as a managerial practice, might 
explain the current crave for a one-stop-shop curation – mega-shows and 
biennials engage curators who operate as agencies responsible for the total 
look and marketing (employing art magazine editors, designers, artists or 
online promoters to produce the whole package: concept, artists list, design, 
online presence, commentary, etc.). This form of curation reduces the 
unpredictable elements we always encounter, and seduces us into 
envisioning an exhibition as a dynamic search for ideas, funding and people. 
But this perception can be read differently – making curating not a 
managerial practice, but rather a structural one of organizing; constantly 
negotiating the material and intangible meanings that are at stake, devising 
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new resources by reconsidering the value of things, and all this for people 
who are missing: those yet to come and those who are forever absent.  
So curation as an organizational practice involves political acting rather than 
asset management, education rather than public relations, history rather 
than market analysis. It is a practice that is attempting to understand its own 
concepts – coming from different contradictory fields that include art history 
and management, critical theory and the development of control 
apparatuses. This setting of curating makes clear its direct link to value and 
history, forms of articulation and contextualization, which can be either 
administrated or organized. 
In something of a discursive vacuum, which curating is in, the curatorial 
provides a methodology of constellations. These are performed by the 
different actors, human and non-human, that take part in the scripted and 
unscripted setting that the curatorial provides. The curatorial comes into 
being by the overlapping and contesting features of its reference materials. It 
offers its own use of ‘inside-out’ knowledge – bringing materials from outside 
the field, examining them with the tools we have (induction, deduction, de/re-
contextualisation etc.) and then rearticulating them to then reactivate them 
outside the field. While curating mainly considers the exhibition or the event 
of display, the curatorial as knowledge involves a set of contingent actual 
things moving towards a notion or gesture, and in turn grouped, charged and 
performed by it. Display, as one of the basic gestures of curating, can be 
seen as a moment of actualizing potentialities, by which a portal opens for 
the infinite histories that are not present. Through display the curatorial is 
actualizing potentialities.  
In this dissertation, I will follow this methodology and will propose Betrayal, 
as it evolves from the potentialities the curatorial offers. The dissertation is 
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therefore informed by the projects I have been involved with as well as with 
those of peers from the region, whose work I see relates to Betrayal.   
Coming back to the lived experience that informs my notion of the curatorial, 
I can mention several entry points which led me to take interest in this form 
of critical theory and visual cultures. One such entry point which I can give 
an account of was a modest publication made by Israeli artists, curators, 
journalists, poets, critics and writers in memory of a ten year old Palestinian 
boy, Hilmi Shusha, who was killed by an Israeli settler.5 At the time when the 
book came out, the trial was still taking place. My encounter with the 
publication was during that time, and in retrospect, this encounter had a 
huge impact on me. It was not only that the facts of the case unveiled for me 
the reality I was living in. This modest compilation of texts and images 
shifted the lines of alliance and loyalty, it elaborated and expended the 
practice of judgment beyond the jurisdiction of the court, it did not debate 
solely the evidence of the case, but proposed a politicized mode of 
investigation – interrogating the conditions that enabled for such an event to 
occur, it named names and most significantly, gave a face and a name to 
one of countless victims of the Israeli military rule over the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories – Hilmi Shusha. Re-charting a map, re-aligning the 
loyalties, criminalizing the political setting that enabled for the individual’s 
                                                          
5 “Hilmi Shusha was ten years old in 1996 when he found his death (my italics),” was literally 
the description by the Israeli district court that acquitted Nachum Korman, a Jewish 
settler who clubbed the Palestinian child to death with a rifle butt. Reports from the 
trial proved that Korman, the chief of security at the Hadar Beitar settlement, 
descended on Shusha's West Bank village in October 1996 to hunt down a group of 
children who had been allegedly pelting Jewish cars with stones. Cousins of Shusha, 
who saw the assault, said Korman pinned him down with his foot before delivering 
the fatal blow. Korman claimed he never intended to kill the child, and said he tried 
to revive him. After an appeal by the state, the Israeli Supreme Court found Korman 
guilty of man slaughter by negligence and sentenced him to six months' community 
service. See: Ariella Azoulay and Aïm Deüelle Lüski (Eds.), Hilmi Shusha – the Silver 
Platter, Self-published, Tel Aviv-Jaffa,  1997 [in Hebrew] 
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actions, providing a platform for solidarity – all these were the achievements 
of this modest publication. For a brief moment, this publication allowed 
Israelis to grieve over him. It demonstrated a relation, made it sensible, while 
operating through engagement with the antagonism and a withdrawal from 
its premise.  
The ability to articulate such a moment is one of the qualities of the 
curatorial; this is not a universalist-liberal guilt, but a politicized emotion. This 
moment might have been limited in time but it holds much more as it 
resonates with me as well as with others, since. It does so because of the 
space it opened for feeling, thinking and acting. This publication negotiated 
the specificities of the context from which it came out, and politicized them 
through the model of the event, the lived experience and their reflection. 
Many notions of the curatorial are bundled in this brief moment; a series of 
acts that the book performed, have informed my understanding of the 
possibilities the curatorial enables for. As a publication, the book constituted, 
even for a brief moment, new subjectivities, as it proposed to betray the 
denial of connectedness that is at the heart of the conflict. It since became a 
point of reference that since has been developed by the participating 
authors. It entails a different political project in Israel-Palestine than that of 
separating the two communities. It involves affinities and trajectories that 
provide long distance solidarities. These solidarities challenge the allegiance 
that an antagonism would demand of us.  
This book is just one example of a project that not only poses a problem, but 
engages in observing its conditions. Therefore, it is not engaged in solution 
making but in problematisations. Betrayal is proposed exactly as a 
deployment of problematisations that we face; these include the ways we 
can and cannot access politics and history as we constantly experience a 
conversion into moral and conscience dilemmas. The potentiality in this 
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mode of interrogation through deploying the problematics can help us break 
through the extremely limited mode of contemporary progressive politics 
which is manifested mainly through reasonable achievements gained by 
temporary partnerships of individuals. This problem needs to be observed 
and interrogated in relation to economic, political, social and psychological 
conditions that dominate our ability to conceptualize the problem to begin 
with.  
 
Betrayal 
 
“Intellectuals and politicians rush back and forth across the stage while the 
political and economic structures crumble beneath them,” explains Susan 
Buck-Morss in the afterword to her book Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The 
Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West.6 Buck-Morss’s afterword focuses 
on the conditions which lead to the writing of her book which took place 
during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Applying Marx’s 18th of Brumaire of 
Louis Napoleon observations on the post-Soviet condition from which she 
wrote the book, Buck-Morss concludes that: 
“History structures human action even if it lacks a rational purpose; 
humans chose freely even when they do not control the meaning of 
their acts. In the history told here, actors seized the chance, but 
missed their lines”.7  
                                                          
6 Susan Buck-Morss,  Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and 
West, MA: MIT Press, 2000 
7 Ibid., p. 213 
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The tragic tensions between the scripted and the performed, between acts 
and lines, between purpose and meaning, seem appropriate descriptions for 
the setting of what is proposed in this dissertation as Betrayal.  
Buck-Morss adds in her afterword that it was written in order to: “demystify 
the book as knowledge-production by exposing the lived experience behind 
its pages.”8 Following this proposal made by Buck-Morss, in this PhD 
dissertation I take the lived experience of curatorial practice in Israel-
Palestine, present it and debate it, not only in order to demystify the proposal 
here as knowledge-production. I do so in order to present what conceptual 
moves are possible and what ones are needed within the constraints of the 
political and social reality. With this I hope to explore the various positions 
that emerge: the potentialities present already within the horrific context of 
this lived experience; the conceptual frameworks under which claims are 
made, the positions from which these claims are articulated, the actions that 
are made in support or against these claims; the new collective subjectivities 
and additional entry and exit points that might present themselves as 
potentialities to be further explored.  
The terms and contexts which this dissertation works with, the materials it 
involves and the project it is invested in, the embodied and enacted histories 
which inform it are varied. On the one hand, they find their way into this 
dissertation in the form of narrative that performs tensions experienced 
within the logic of Israel-Palestine. On the other hand, they are evaluated 
and studied as trajectories that help undo this current moment and specific 
space of Israel-Palestine. A way to introduce the contexts, perspectives and 
imaginary this dissertation proposes would be to discuss a bit the times and 
places in which my father, Eliav Simon lived in. My father was a 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
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Jerusalemite of Jewish descent who was born in 1913 and died in 1990. He 
lived most of his life in Tel Aviv-Jaffa and for the most part was a foreign 
correspondent involved in journalistic work in Israel (among other things, he 
served as chief bureau for a US news agency, United Press International). 
During his lifetime, the piece of land he lived in changed hands several 
hands – from the Ottoman Empire, to British rule, to the state of Israel and 
Jordanian Kingdom. My father himself travelled the region extensively as 
long as it was possible. He went to study in the American University in Beirut 
in the 1930s, although the Hebrew University, one of Zionism’s great 
achievements of the time, was already established in Jerusalem in 1925. My 
father’s lifetime years correspond almost perfectly with Eric Hobsbawm’s 
“short twentieth century” (1914-1989).9 And therefore, his life story can be 
somehow useful in describing this period and its effects on Palestine – the 
land where he lived, between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. 
My father’s lifetime hence corresponds with the time of modernization, of 
nation building, but also a time in which Arab urban life was under constant 
attack (from the British destruction of Gaza in WWI, to the British 1936 
dissection of Jaffa, the Palestinian Nakba in 1948, the occupation of 
Palestinian territories since 1967, and the recent yearly Israeli attacks on the 
biggest refugee camp in the world – the Gaza Strip).10   
                                                          
9 See: Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991, Vintage 
Books, 1994. The term Hobsbawm uses refers mainly to the history of Europe, but a 
shift of the territory opens new meanings for an investigation of the history of the 
twentieth century. In this dissertation, I look for the way the application of one 
structure of knowledge can inform another.  
10 In this context, the US wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003), and the destruction of ancient Syrian 
cities since the civil war began in 2011, show an intensification of urbicide patterns 
throughout the region, patterns that seem to have begun parallel to the discovery of 
oil in the Persian Gulf in 1911.  
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I allow myself to mention my father’s biography as an entry point to this 
dissertation which proposes the notion of Betrayal, so it will help to chart the 
spatial and temporal long distance solidarities that Betrayal allows for. With 
this embodied narrative, different inhabited fictions present themselves, 
fictions that work with and against those fictions that came to narrate the 
region. One of these, is the seemingly impossible identity of a Palestinian-
Jew.  
In his investigation of the construction of enmity between Jews and Arabs, 
Gil Anidjar poses the question:  
“Beyond the horridly all too familiar and inescapable ‘cycle of 
violence,’ what is it that maintains the distance and kindles the enmity 
between the Arab and the Jew? What purposes are served by, what 
are the reasons for, the naturalization of this distance, the 
naturalization of the opposition, of the enmity between Arab and Jew, 
one that, as prominent narratives would have us believe, goes back to 
ancient biblical times, the ineluctable legacy of ‘the Middle East,’ a 
region and a land eternally ravaged by war and conflict? How did the 
ostensible markers of Arab (an ‘ethnic’ marker) and Jew (a ‘religious’ 
one) come to inscribe themselves so forcefully on modern discourses 
of the most varied kind – political, religious, cultural, and so forth – 
even when accompanying distinct or even opposed political agendas, 
caveats and sophisticated critiques and debunkings?”11 
                                                          
11 Gil Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy, Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 
xiii. Anidjar extends on this enmity in a long footnote in which he provides a 
genealogy of the dichotomy. He explains that in Israel, nationality (‘Arab’ or ‘Jew’) is 
a category distinguished from citizenry (‘Israeli’) – both Arab and Jew are divorced 
from religious meaning here and come to denote an ethnicity. See: Anidjar, pp. 163-
164.  
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Eliav Simon’s story, therefore, is but one example that provides a 
perspective on how exactly under conditions previous to the nation-state, a 
much richer and contaminated array of potential identities was available in 
this land. Under these conditions, the logic of ‘partition’ of land or 
‘separation’ of communities, which dominates contemporary discourse – 
from Apartheid policies to Two State solution proposals – was not something 
to consider; many sides were touched constantly and this proximity and 
contact created new (and old) identities that now seem contradictory to the 
extent that they negate each other.  
When we think of a French Jew, an American Jew, and a Jew who lives in 
Israel-Palestine (an Israeli) as different kinds of Jews (as religion, but also 
recognized as ethnicity), we also think of Canadian-Palestinians, 
Palestinians in the West Bank, and Palestinian citizens of Israel as different 
kinds of Palestinians (not as a religion but as a nationality that cannot be 
expressed fully). Therefore, we can propose that being an Israeli is actually 
a process of becoming Palestinian; this Israeli may be in denial of the fact 
that he or she are a kind of a Palestinian, or he or she may not understand 
the fact that they are Palestinians, but they nevertheless are Palestinians. 
The connectedness and inter-dependence that defines the situation shows 
how these identities entail constellations of relatedness, affinity and 
proximity. In this respect, being anti-Palestinian is being anti-Israeli.  
Israel is not in-dependent. It is part of a process of “becoming” as Gilles 
Deleuze suggests the term – “One and the same becoming. A single bloc of 
becoming.”12 To give an example from anther context, we usually accept that 
                                                          
12 "The wasp and the orchid provide the example. The orchid seems to form a wasp image, 
but in fact there is a wasp-becoming of the orchid, an orchid-becoming of the wasp, 
a double capture since ‘what’ each becomes changes no less than what ‘that which’ 
becomes.” Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, Trans.: Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 2 
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Algerian is a kind of French (think of Zinedine Zidane, for example). It is 
obvious that Algeria changed with the French rule and also after it ended. 
But at the same time France of course changed, too, by occupying and 
holding Algeria; and it changed again when it withdrew from it – the French 
changed their political system and formed the Fifth Republic because of 
Algeria. So we can also say that French is a kind of Algerian. Therefore, the 
question “Who is French?” can be converted to the question “Who is 
Algerian?” and now we can consider someone like Le Pen as a self-hating 
Algerian.”13 
In these constellations of affinities and connectedness, there is no France 
without Algeria, and there is no Algeria without France. The notion of 
becoming here unbalances the political, economic and cultural scales of 
domination and power that we were used to when approaching the question 
of France/Algeria. With regards to Israel-Palestine, becoming enables for an 
existence of an Israeli-Palestinian that cannot be defined exclusively as 
nationality, nor as religion or ethnicity – categories through which the conflict 
understands itself – but through the expression of connectedness. In a way, 
one can already observe how the longer Israel exists through and with its 
connectedness to Palestine the more it finds the need to deny this fact. So 
an Israeli today would be a self-denying Palestinian. Someone who rejects 
the affinity and blocs the proximity he or she already has to becoming 
Palestinian. 
Betrayal will be suggested in this dissertation as a way to engage with 
formations such as these. Betrayal will be the invitation to betray the denial 
of becoming. Betrayal follows the curatorial in that it actualizes potentialities. 
It does not actualize one potential by merely executing it, but rather enables 
                                                          
13 See Joshua Simon, “Introduction,” in: Joshua Simon (Ed.), Solution 196-213: United States of 
Palestine-Israel, Sternberg Press, 2011, pp. 15-16  
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potentialities to present themselves. To bring forth new horizons by way of 
reconstituting them and constructing them. In this, Betrayal offers long-
distance and sometimes retroactive solidarities. This is makes Betrayal a 
strategy through which to enact the curatorial and its knowledges for new 
collective subjectivities to emerge. 
For the Middle Eastern context for example, Betrayal would mean a self-
regioning. The last decade saw the emergence of work and projects from 
artists from the region which address parallel histories of communism and 
nation building, pan-Arabism and pre-Muslim identities, as an attempt for a 
kind of self-duration – to be in histories that are unattainable to us today. 
This variety of projects that have taken place in relation to the Middle East in 
recent years within the field of contemporary art include the work of 
Palestinian, Lebanese and Israeli writers, artists and curators like Roee 
Rosen, Emily Jacir, Yossi Atia and Itamar Rose, Yael Bartana, Scandar 
Copti, Walid Raad, Rabih Mroue, Ariella Azoulay and others (some of whom 
I had the privilege of working with). Their work has formed my understanding 
of Betrayal as a project of self-regioning while turning from the antagonistic 
situation. By self-regioning, I mean that Betrayal entails a shift of the 
positions and orientations – inside and outside, back and forth – without 
being chained to the scripted positions of the various religious, economic, 
national and ethnic conflicts. These projects propose Betrayal as a possible 
field of inquiry which in these projects seems to circle around a project of 
self-regioning.  
Through the process of writing this dissertation, I came to realize how 
different notions and practices of Betrayal are being articulated by 
colleagues and peers throughout the region. My dissertation therefore, might 
use different terms than projects such as Jack Persikian’s “Exhaustion,” 
exhibition at the Jerusalem Show IV (2010), Rasha Salti’s “Plot for a 
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Biennial” for the Sharjah Biennial 10 (2011) and Murtaza Vali’s “Manual for 
Treason” project for this same biennial, but it shares these recent projects’ 
drive for charting new lines and alliances, surpassing the ones already given 
to use here in the Middle East. Looking at these projects now, it seems that 
while proposing different histories of the Middle East, they were putting 
forward an urgency that they have sensed, but only now becomes clear to 
us – that the Middle East is actually ceasing to exist in front of our very eyes. 
These artists’ projects form a re-constitution of horizons. These are 
perspectives that have been lost and seemed unattainable as potentials. 
Sometimes, these perspectives were never attainable, and therefore have to 
be also fictionalized. It is imperative to explain that the use of horizon here 
does not aim to depict a goal that constantly escapes us, one that we thrive 
for but can never reach. Horizon denotes an organizing perspective which 
provides a point of reference that enables for things to be seen, to appear 
and be present.  
The practices I refer to here give a somewhat provisional working definition 
of betrayal, as they show how it allows us to think through reality with 
concepts that betray this reality. These projects might in themselves not be 
so explicitly about Betrayal but they enable me to think of Betrayal in a 
political and historical context. A variety of emplotment strategies for 
example are present in the works of Rosen, Jacir, Atia and Rose, Bartana, 
Copti, Raad, Mroue and Azoulay. They enable the injecting of counter-
speculations, inventions and plots as a critical tactic of Betrayal for 
destabilizing identities aligned along an antagonism. In this dissertation, I will 
present a tapestry of Betrayals, a series of tactics by which histories are re-
charged and injected with fictions providing leaps to the unimaginable to be 
proposed. Betrayal, therefore, offers different ways of imagining vantage 
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points that are either not-yet or no-longer available for us at a present 
antagonistic political setting. 
The template of proposals for Betrayal in this dissertation suggests temporal 
maps to perceive the way the powers are aligned and offers the possibility 
for new alliances to form. By this, not only a shift from a spatial 
conceptualization to a temporal one takes place, but also a move from set 
antagonisms that produce political meaning to evolving and shifting alliances 
takes place. A move from us/them to a constellation of us becoming 
everything that could be otherwise seems to better describe the political 
mapping of Betrayal, this at a moment which seems to have defeated any 
notion of the future as an emancipatory project.  
Betrayal therefore, would be a tool to use in problematizing a set of notions 
that define the given antagonistic condition. Betrayal allows to think with 
rather than only against. What the antagonism presents as an objectivity of 
“what there is” is a denial of connectedness and rejection of becoming. 
Betrayal is a way to work from within becoming vis-à-vis the antagonism. 
 
The Chapters of the Dissertation 
The chapters of this dissertation revolve around notions of Betrayal that can 
be developed through the actions and writing of several figures. The two 
authors and the historical figure I am focusing on – Sigmund Freud, Bertolt 
Brecht and Alcibiades – provide various strategies of entanglement. Each 
one has found his own way to activate history by acting in it, enacting it and 
inhabiting counter-currents in it. These characters perform Betrayal as a re-
entry into the political through various ways: exhaustion of antagonisms, 
fictionalizing political traumas, surfacing of “dead-ideas” that are either not-
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yet or no-longer available to us (i.e. anachronisms), and shifting the site of 
politics.  
These chapters focus on instances of Betrayal which unfold this concept as 
one which provides further possibilities for political potentialities. Through 
recurring consideration of the curatorial and the tools it provides, these 
chapters frame Betrayal in relation to formation, narration and agency. The 
curatorial informs these chapters as they propose an operative concept for 
Betrayal as an extreme form of politics. 
The first chapter of this dissertation “Betrayal and Treason – Alcibicades,” is 
dedicated to Betrayal as it is performed through crossing the lines outward. 
Using Mouffe and Laclau’s deployment of the antagonism and hegemony, 
Betrayal is presented as an entanglement of these. Focusing on Alcibiades 
son of Cleinias, who time and again performed treasons, Betrayal is 
proposed in relation to exhaustion. Betrayal is proposed in this chapter as a 
category which differs from treason or desertion. While these two legal and 
military terms (treason, desertion) refer to a changing of sides within an 
antagonistic situation or conflict, Betrayal would be a turning from the 
antagonistic situation. While treason and desertion are still loyal to the 
antagonistic situation itself (although desertion does not entail a reunion with 
the other side, it still operates within the polarity), Betrayal betrays the trust 
that this situation asks from those on conflicted sides. Being situated in a 
conflict, it is constituted in a series of agreements between the antagonistic 
sides. Committing treason and changing sides follows a spatial 
understanding of the political which still leaves us within the logic of the said 
conflict. In this way it would simply reaffirm it. Betrayal of the conflict opens 
up new and different ways for operating. By this, and here lies the 
entanglement of Mouffe and Laclau’s proposal, Betrayal proposes an 
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engagement with the conflict, while withdrawing from its self-perpetuating 
logic.  
Alcibiades is proposed as method for Betrayal through a spatial positioning, 
in which unity is exhausted by moving from one side to the other. His 
Betrayal would be therefore considered as loyalty to Athens as an open 
ended question. The story of the fifth century BC Athenian politician and 
pupil of Socrates, Alcibiades, provides the possibility to propose a form of 
Betrayal – one that commits serial treasons. Alcibiades has changed sides 
from the Athenian camp to the Spartan to the Persian and back to the 
Athenian, all in one conflict – the Peloponnesian War. His serial treasons 
exhausted the available antagonisms of his time, to the extent that they 
performed a Betrayal, offering a new formation for the alliances and 
antagonisms to emerge. Grounding one form of Betrayal, that of exhausting 
antagonisms through serial treasons, on the model of Alcibiades, suggests it 
as a loyalty that is not expedient and does not submit to mere protocols of 
allegiance – a loyalty that is Betrayal. 
The second chapter of this dissertation “Anachronism and Fictionalism – 
Freud,” It presents Betrayal through the examination of emplotments and the 
political currency they hold for Betrayal. Fictionalism comes to play through 
Sigmund Freud’s formulation of the story of Moses in Moses and 
Monotheism (1936); its relation to the moment it was published and the 
genealogy which stems from it, with the debates and traditions it has formed. 
In this book, the last to be published in his lifetime, Freud is proposing that 
the biblical character of Moses, the forefather of the Jews and of 
monotheism, was not Jewish but an Egyptian prince, following a tradition of 
proto-Monotheism that pre-dates Judaism.  
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As it is concerned with narration and history, this chapter includes 
contemporary discussions of conspiracy and transparency, reenactment and 
parafictions. Being that narration calls for a process of editing, a certain form 
of editing, namely montage, will be emphasized, by looking into structures 
that move from transparency/collision to addition/repetition. With the aim to 
further develop the notion of Betrayal, this chapter includes an application of 
Jean-Luc Godard’s late montage methods and their articulation by Gilles 
Deleuze, to propose a form for narrating Betrayal. In addition, a set of 
contemporary proposals for operation beyond a given antagonism is 
explored through Ariella Azoulay’s ongoing pursuit of potential histories that 
suggest a fruitful use of anachronism and fiction through photography.14 In 
both Freud’s and Azoulay’s proposals, new alliances emerge as other are 
dismantled. This is done directly in relation to both thinkers’ contemporary 
political reality, through a narration of histories that seemed unavailable. In 
this chapter Betrayal is performed through a consideration of Freud’s Moses 
as a way of destabilizing a division inwards. Freud is proposed as a method 
for Betrayal by making structures of destabilization, in which a dichotomy is 
destabilized by unsettling one of its components. The metaphor of the 
pyramid, as a structure that is a collapse, will be developed as a reference to 
Freud’s Betrayal as loyalty to Jewishness as an open ended question. 
The third chapter aims at addressing actual acting in politics by considering 
Hannah Arendt’s notion of Action in The Human Condition (1958) with 
Bertolt Brecht’s concept of Acting (both in his learning plays and Epic 
theatre). This conflates Betrayal as an operative notion of external and 
internal, public agency and secret agency, aimed to be performed in the 
realm of politics. Through Brecht’s proposal of demonstration rather than 
                                                          
14 See for example: Ariella Azoulay, Civil Imagination: A Political Ontology of Photography, 
London and New York: Verso, 2012 
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representation, Betrayal is performed here through expanding political action 
onto acting in politics. Brecht is proposed as method for Betrayal as acting 
by moving from the political back to politics and constructing it outside the 
arena or the scene. Here Arendt’s formulation of spaces of appearance as a 
site that is created by people equally sharing words and deeds, creating a 
political sphere by their own terms, is replaced by sites of articulation, where 
this coming together of people is orchestrated and performed as it 
demonstrates the power relations that exist already and works its way 
through them. The Betrayal Brecht brings forth is considered as loyalty to 
acting as an open ended question.  
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CHAPTER ONE: BETRAYAL AND TREASON - 
ALCIBIADES 
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Introduction 
 
The introduction to this dissertation deploys a template of proposals for 
Betrayal through critical tactics for destabilizing identities aligned along an 
antagonism though emplotments, counter-speculations and acting. Betrayal 
therefore is proposed not as a negative concept but as the contingent 
becoming that is potentially available in any antagonism, against its own 
logic. It is a re-alignment, a shifting of the lines and the search for another 
setting – it is a modification of the conditions while engaging with the 
antagonisms at hand. 
One method of Betrayal is discussed in this chapter through the actions of 
Alcibiades, son of Cleinias. Alcibiades problematizes the setting of the 
problem at hand. By observing the way one form of Betrayal performs itself 
through his series of re-positionings, we will try to better understand the 
relations between political antagonism and Betrayal. While Alcibiades’s 
motivations are less of an interest for this dissertation, their effects, ripples 
and the movement they chart are the focus here. Alcibiades was an 
Athenian who brought Athens to its knees. Nevertheless, his continuous 
movement from one side to the other in an antagonistic setting such as the 
Greek and Persian worlds of the fifth century BC, portrays Betrayal as loyalty 
to Athens as an open ended question. 
The Betrayal Alcibiades proposes is performed through the exhaustion of 
territorial leaps between inside and outside. As proposed in this chapter, 
moving from one side to the other within an antagonism would be treason, 
but doing so a number of times, the lines of antagonism ever-changing, 
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already constitutes Betrayal. This is Alcibiades’s method as presented in this 
chapter. 
In order to elaborate and investigate this method of Betrayal, this chapter 
incorporates the discussion around antagonisms as developed by Chantal 
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, in addition to references using knowledge from 
artistic practice and curatorial work in the Middle East and especially Israel-
Palestine. 
Betrayal will be explored here as an engagement with politics while it is a 
withdrawal from a given antagonism. Betrayal is both a moment and a 
movement that has no one subject through which it comes into play, but 
rather it is a mode of action, being enacted by the various parties implicated 
in the event. The political drive at the heart of this investigation could be 
summed up by the statement: “Everything can be otherwise”. To this, 
Betrayal provides an actualization. By this I mean that Betrayal enables the 
potential for “Everything to be otherwise” to appear. Of course everything 
can also “remain the same”, and the powers that be are as they are (and 
producing constant change exactly for that), yet with Betrayal the potentiality 
for everything to be otherwise is actualized. The potential to have potential 
for “Everything to be otherwise” opens with Betrayal. Betrayal, therefore, 
provides an actualization of potentiality.  
This might seem paradoxical, yet by actualizing potentiality I do not mean 
capitalizing on a certain potential (something shows potential and comes to 
be a reality by following this potential to the end – these all refer to 
maximizing value). Actualizing potentialities in the plural, is the enabling of 
potentialities to appear – the “can be” in “Everything can be otherwise”. The 
actualization of potentialities appears through Betrayal. As will be elaborated 
in this chapter, the curatorial is of key importance for proposing Betrayal 
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especially because of its ability to individuate a plurality, neither by reducing 
it to a quantitative divisibility, nor by leaving it in a qualitative homogeneity. In 
the following pages of this chapter, I will aim at emphasizing the offer of 
Betrayal as one of positionality. A mode of acting politically through political 
antagonisms, which provides a re-orientation in relation to them, altering 
them by moving away from them.  
This chapter follows some of the key concepts developed by Mouffe and 
Laclau, namely hegemony, antagonism and articulation. Through the story of 
Alcibiades and his actions, which is synthesized through various sources, 
Betrayal emerges as a set of serial treasons. Betrayal exhausts the 
antagonisms as it engages with them while withdrawing from the logic that 
contains them. Alcibiades’s form of Betrayal as exhaustion of antagonisms is 
discussed as a method in this chapter, suggesting the curatorial as a 
technique of articulation through the exhaustion of antagonisms. 
 
Betrayal and the Curatorial  
What the curatorial enables, and this will be further discussed in the 
upcoming chapters as well, is a format for demonstration rather than 
representation. The curatorial can be conceived as political engagement and 
strategy on the level of a model. This is not so much a scale issue as with 
the use of models in architecture or planning. Rather it is a model in the 
sense that provides a setting to explore and trace interrelations. The 
curatorial operates as a model as it makes relations sensible, demonstrating 
them, not representing them. 
The most immediate (but in no way exclusive) curatorial gesture is the 
exhibition. The exhibition provides a model that can be used for the relation 
between the concrete and the abstract, the circumstantial and the 
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conceptual, the political and politics. It includes a syntax of induction, 
deduction, multi-stable oscillation, and other polyphonies that are 
orchestrated.  
With politics moving more and more towards the administration of society 
through policing, when we discuss politics, it has come to carry very little 
political meaning. While the political has to be constantly invented, 
engineered and produced, politics has come to mean the exact opposite, 
especially under real existing democratic regimes. And so, politics has 
become a narrow field of meaning, separate from life (for example, the 
common phrases of not “going into politics” as if one is not already in it when 
speaking, when using language, when voicing an utterance).  
Today, we can see how so many contemporary proposals that deal directly 
with politics find their place of articulation outside politics, seeking refuge 
elsewhere. With the decline of politics as a political sphere,15 the curatorial 
finds itself hosting more and more political projects. As it operates within a 
larger aesthetic economy of appearances, the joy of the political which the 
curatorial offers has invited in recent decades many projects which aim 
unequivocally at politics. In this sense, the curatorial offers itself as an 
exceptional practice for the joy of the political.  
To the drive that runs through the curatorial’s mode of expanding what is to 
be negotiated and articulated, we can call this Betrayal. The curatorial is 
both a process through which a conceptual framework arises from specific 
instances, and the project that weaves different singularities together. It 
combines induction and deduction and operates through continuous 
                                                          
15 With this I am thinking of Claude Lefort’s idea of modern democracies separating out 
politics from other fields of social life, making them prone to totalitarianism. See: 
Claude Lefort, “On Modern Democracy”, in: Democracy and Political Theory, Trans.: 
David Macey, Polity Press, 1988, pp. 9-44 
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transduction. In addition to this somewhat mechanistic portrayal, the 
curatorial has an abductive logic that runs through it – allowing for intuition 
and charisma to play in the syntax of the exhibition. While the narrative of 
the exhibition might demand a consolidation of meaning, the event of the 
exhibition operates separately, allowing for affinities to be staged. 
Returning to the exhibition as the basic curatorial gesture, it is characterized 
by a suspended duration of being among objects. And as a retinal and non-
retinal viewing mechanism, the exhibition as a way of looking but also as a 
much wider aesthetic experience allows us to consider display as a moment 
and a movement which opens trajectories, traces and horizons which entail 
the potentiality for everything to be otherwise. The curatorial as a practice of 
conceptualizing singularities, produces for the exhibits the viewing tools 
through which to be seen. Betrayal is the drive that runs through the 
curatorial as it actualizes potentiality.  
Beyond the relative quality of the exhibition as narrative (I see one thing in 
this while you see another thing in it), and the relational nature of the event 
of the exhibition (by which there are scripted and unscripted relations 
between the various authors of a piece, the worlds it connects, and the ones 
of the space and its context, the curated syntax and that which the viewers 
bring forth) – within the context of the curatorial, Betrayal occurs first and 
foremost through display. It is the apparently definite claim of the displayed 
exhibit which provides this. Of course it is not the exhibit that is definite, nor 
its authorship, neither is the web of meanings it carries and readings it calls 
for. It is through its definite appearance, that the claim for everything to be 
otherwise is displayed.  
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Betrayal and Treason 
Alcibiades’s Betrayal as a model demonstrates a different relation than mere 
treason or desertion. To make the use of the term Betrayal more clear, this 
chapter suggests Betrayal as differing from treason or desertion. While both 
desertion and treason refer to a change of sides within an antagonistic 
situation or conflict, Betrayal does not answer to the spatial 
conceptualization of “us/them” or “here/there.” Betrayal leaves these 
questions for another positioning – that of conceptualizing the story from a 
speculative perspective at the end or at the beginning, involving historical 
fictionalization and political imagination. As an antagonistic setting demands 
from those on opposite sides to bestow their trust in it, treason and desertion 
do so by their acceptance of the constitutive element of the antagonism – 
‘that there is an “other side”’. Even when one is deserting from the ranks 
without collaboration with the proclaimed enemy, he or she would be 
considered deserters according to their relations with the dichotomous logic 
of the antagonism.  
For conceptualizing Betrayal we need to accept that the trust the antagonism 
demands from the different antagonistic sides has to be disposed with. 
Betrayal offers various tactics to do that while engaging with politics. As 
desertion and treason are still true to the antagonism and to the setting it 
provides (both “us” and “them” are trusted by the antagonism to keep it 
going), Betrayal literally betrays the trust of the antagonism.  
Treason and desertion define a change of sides within an 
antagonism/conflict, but they still follow the logic of the antagonism/conflict. 
As the antagonism/conflict constitutes our identities, it constantly demands 
us to trust in it – our vocabulary and gestures, our imagination and 
motivations are all operated through it, perpetuating it through belief and 
resistance, solutions and dissent. In this sense, treason and desertion 
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remain faithful to the conflict, as they still operate within the logic of its 
antagonisms – they appear as a mere changing of sides within an 
antagonism. Betrayal enables a way for things to be otherwise – beyond the 
antagonisms and the realities they are offered through.16  
 
Betrayal and Politics 
Before delving into what Alcibiades did and what was done to him, we would 
need to figure out exactly on what field his actions are proposed as Betrayal. 
The political vocabulary developed by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau 
around notions of antagonism and hegemony, the multiplicity of struggles 
and chains of equivalence, as they call it, is where we will locate this 
discussion. These authors propose an inherent potential for political 
emancipation in the inability to achieve objectivity and totality of society. 
Their work, as Mouffe has described it in a later text, envisioned the activity 
of ‘critique as engagement with,’ the political.17  
The work of Chantal Mouffe on politics and the political and her definitions of 
antagonism and agonism, beginning with her book together with Ernesto 
Laclau Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (1985)18, and in her The Return of The Political (1993)19 and The 
                                                          
16 The horizon of “Everything can be otherwise” helps in shift from a solely spatial argument 
to one that is also temporal. With this I am following Derrida when he writes: “That is 
why we always propose to speak of a democracy to come, not of a future democracy 
in the future present, not as a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or of a utopia – 
at least not to the extent that their inaccessibility would still retain the temporal 
form of a future present, of a future modality of the living present.” See: Jacques 
Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International, Trans.: Peggy Kamuf, Routledge, 1994, p. 81 
17 Mouffe, “Critique as Counter-Hegemonic Intervention” 
18 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
19 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political, London and New York: Verso, 1993 
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Democratic Paradox (2000)20, provide a conceptual framework through 
which and against which, Betrayal is proposed here. Together with Laclau, 
Mouffe proposed a political concept that sets the limit for any claim for 
objectivity or universality. They call this: antagonism. In Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, Mouffe and Laclau describe antagonism as a setting 
which extends both real oppositions and dialectical contradiction. They name 
it ‘social antagonism’ and explain that there is no ‘cunning of reason,’ that 
would realize itself through these antagonistic relations, and no ‘supergame,’ 
that sets the rules for these relations. This is why they “conceive of the 
political not as a superstructure but as having the status of an ontology of 
the social.”21 
Mouffe and Laclau debate the Marxist deployment of the social as a division 
between proletariat and bourgeoisie. They ask what, if not this fundamental 
and universal divide, constitute society. For them the assumed universality 
of hegemony results from the specific interrelations between what they call 
“logics of difference” and “logics of equivalence.” They describe antagonism 
as neither an opposition (as it is not based solely on experience), nor a 
contradiction (for example, holding contradictory beliefs within yourself does 
not imply you are in an antagonism). Antagonism, is not an objective 
relation, but a relation in which the limits of every objectivity are shown.22 
Instead of class as the key divide at the heart of the social, they propose a 
multiplicity of particular struggles. Mouffe and Laclau formulate a multiplicity 
of antagonisms in which the conditions and the possibility of a pure fixing of 
differences recede: “every social identity becomes the meeting point for a 
                                                          
20 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, London and New York: Verso, 2000 
21 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. xiii-xiv 
22 See: Ibid., p. 125. They opt for the Gramscian ‘Historical Bloc’ rather than class, see: Laclau 
and Mouffe, p. 42 
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multiplicity of articulatory practices, many of them antagonistic.”23 They call 
‘Hegemonic Relation’ the ability of one particularity out of many that 
constitute society to occupy a position of universality.24 
In their work together, Mouffe and Laclau find it imperative to debate at 
length Marxist conceptualizations of the social. Their work, which they 
named Post-Marxist, is essential to the development of the idea that the left 
should reject the Marxist tradition by which there is nothing else to society 
except class struggle. As much as they criticize Rosa Luxemburg for the 
inconsistency of her idea of spontaneity and class unity, the authors do 
credit Luxemburg for accepting that class is a symbolic tool for converging 
struggles, or as they put it: “The unity of the class is therefore a symbolic 
unity”, making it a political tool of articulation rather than a social fact.25 The 
recognition of contingency of antagonistic relations makes political work a 
work of articulation. This notion of articulation is especially productive in 
relation to the curatorial. The work of the curatorial involves the articulation 
of potentialities. This characteristic of the curatorial will be further developed 
in this chapter as an articulation of political relations. 
Society is therefore aligned along antagonistic limits, and the political is the 
contingent framework of social antagonisms. Any articulation of one over-
arching antagonism which defines society is for Mouffe and Laclau a cause 
for suspicion. They write of the political logic of unity:  
“it may be the result of a politics of the 'left', according to which 
every antagonism may be eliminated and society rendered 
completely transparent, or the result of an authoritarian fixing of 
                                                          
23 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 138 
24 Ibid., p. xiii 
25 Ibid. 
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the social order in hierarchies established by the state, as in the 
case of fascism.”26 
It is the status of the sole possessor of the truth of the social order that is at 
the heart of their critique, be it in the name of the proletariat or of the nation. 
For Mouffe and Laclau, from this follows that social division is inherent within 
the possibility of politics, and as they argue extensively throughout the book, 
the existence of these antagonistic divisions creates the very possibility of a 
democratic politics. For them democracy should consist of the multiplicity of 
social logics and their recognition. The articulation of these antagonisms 
should be constantly re-created and renegotiated, for there is no final point 
at which a balance will be definitively achieved between the logic of 
complete identity and that of pure difference.27 
Mouffe and Laclau propose a “chain of equivalence” among different 
struggles (for example, feminism, gay rights, and anti-racists), in order to 
define how different groups share and determine their adversary, their 
“them” to which “we” are opposed. This scheme, in many ways, aims to 
avoid the master/slave dialectics that constantly reshape power. The chain 
of equivalence is intended to allow different political projects to be related 
even if those projects, viewed only through the lens of master/slave or 
bourgeois/proletariat, do not obviously have anything in common. But the 
chain of equivalence does so without any of these micro-projects and 
specific struggles, assuming the vantage point of a universality from which to 
                                                          
26 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 188 
27 Ibid. 
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offer a change that will also alter each of the given groups and not leave 
them as they were, loyal to the antagonism that defined them.28  
Mouffe’s and Laclau’s call for a diversity of political struggles has been 
described as setting the stage, on some level, for a withdrawal from politics 
by insisting on immanent difference and an absence of any common point of 
reference for an over-arching political project.29 For them, it is the intensity of 
a social relation that defines the political. Therefore, the imbalance needed 
for a permanent renegotiation and re-articulation which they call radical 
democracy, must operate towards a horizon. Otherwise, we can perceive 
their project as mere reversed-counter-hegemonic project, wherein political 
power is the domination of these chains of equivalence (divide and conquer 
through culture wars and single-agenda political movements).30  
While Laclau went on to pursue a post-Marxist path, combining Lacanian 
insights with Marxist categories,31 Mouffe turned to develop the concept of 
                                                          
28 Mouffe and Laclau develop the notion of  “chain of equivalence” in chapters 3 and 4 in: 
Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 93-193 
29 See for example: Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative 
Capitalism and Left Politics, Duke University Press, 2009, p. 34. Dean’s critique should 
be read in relation to the context of the 1980s when Mouffe’s and Laclau’s book was 
published. By then it was apparent that former deals that were made in relation to 
social tensions in the North Atlantic countries, (i.e. the welfare state), were off, and 
not only that, but huge sections of the public found themselves outside these deals 
to begin with: non-white working class, women, minority groups, to name a few. See 
for example: David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, Brooklyn: Melville House 
Publishing, 2011, pp. 372-375.  
30 Jodi Dean has written extensively on the malfunctioning of single-agenda political 
movements which have proliferated since the decline of Socialism as a viable political 
project in the industrialized countries. She terms “depoliticization,” the 
contemporary left’s “inability to raise particular claims to the level of the universal, 
to present issues or problems as standing for something beyond themselves.” See: 
Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies, p.16 
31 For example in: Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek,  Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues On The Left, London and New York: Verso, 
2000, and: Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason, London and New York: Verso, 2005 
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“radical democracy,” through civilian republicanism and liberalism.32 Later on 
in her own writing, Mouffe places political passions (for example, outrage, 
anger, empathy, and sympathy), as a basis for constructing a collective form 
of identification. Her question “What makes people crystallize into a ‘we,’ a 
‘we’ which is to act politically?” is limited to a pre-revolutionary ‘we’, in the 
sense that that ‘we’ is not interested in evolution but in limited tactical 
demands which can be achieved through the liberal rights discourse. 
It is interesting to examine how hegemony actually feeds off the chain of 
equivalence to consolidate its power. We can see this in the fact that right-
wing political domination in real existing democracies relies on a multiplicity 
of struggles, preserving them, by mixing identity politics and lobbying to 
make a grotesque version of ‘radical democracy.’ What this means is that 
formulation of the chain of equivalence is not solely operational for 
emancipatory political projects. In real existing politics, the chain of 
equivalence we encounter is based first and foremost on organizational 
abilities. Therefore, whoever has control over infrastructure 
(communications, juridical, economical etc.), can operate it. That is why we 
see hegemony consolidating power by feeding the chain in reverse through 
divide and conquer strategies. This is how we find ourselves with the anti-
immigrants, deregulation proponents and market fundamentalists, the 
military, the clergy, financial market profiteers, regional government and 
local councils with demands for bureaucratic positions of trust, and also 
militant identitarians and promoters of recreational multiculturalism. All these 
are genuinely located on the chain of equivalence of real existing 
democracies. In this setting, what Betrayal might suggest would be to 
examine the options we have when we realize that the proposal for a chain 
                                                          
32 See: Mark Wenman, “Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the Difference,” Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, Volume 29, September 2003, pp. 581-593 
46 
 
of equivalence can be understood quite differently, realizing that hegemony 
feeds off the different struggles. 
It is in this actuality of real-existing politics, that we can trace the field of 
Betrayal’s operation. Mouffe, who played a significant role in the 
conceptualization of the political in the past three decades, described hers 
and Laclau’s proposal as an ‘engagement with’ the political. But this 
‘engagement with’ can be also understood as a retreat, or a ‘withdrawal 
from’ politics.33 At the basis of the proposal of Betrayal here lays the re-
alignment of politics today. With this reevaluation of the political vis-à-vis 
politics, Alcibiades can be used as an elaboration and as a critique of Mouffe 
and Laclau and their understanding of the field at hand.  
Here Betrayal can be useful to define the intensification of relations to the 
extent they become political. Yet, this occurs in relation to other political 
intensities, and so Betrayal operates in an axis between and around the 
antagonisms available, and between and around the way they articulate 
politics, the political horizon and the not-yet-available potentialities which are 
actualized through it.  
 
Betrayal and Antagonism 
Mouffe’s and Laclau’s notion of antagonism, as it is put forward in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
proposes “engagement with” as taking a position within a given antagonism. 
Following Claude Lefort, Mouffe and Laclau point out that the democratic 
revolution opened up a new terrain at the symbolic level which implies a new 
form of institution of the social – the site of power becomes an empty space 
                                                          
33 Mouffe criticizes Paolo Virno’s notion of ‘Exodus’ to be ‘critique as withdrawal from’ the 
political: Mouffe, “Critique as Counter-Hegemonic Intervention” 
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in democratic regimes. This opens up an unending process of questioning.34 
Unity is no longer able to erase social division, and this division has come to 
be key in their understanding of Antagonism.  
Betrayal, as a movement between engagement with and withdrawal from, 
works with antagonism but goes beyond – it relies on the interdependency of 
the antagonistic sides, which Mouffe highlights following Derrida in her later 
writing. Betrayal therefore, seeks to alter the antagonistic equation and throw 
it off balance. It is in the tradition of performative modes of thinking which try 
to go beyond antagonism that Betrayal should be conceived.35  
For Mouffe and Laclau, for identity to never be “positive” and closed in itself, 
but rather constituted as transition, relation and difference, they follow 
Derrida’s articulation of discourse and deconstruction, claiming that “neither 
absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible.”36 They use Derrida’s 
notion of discourse to establish a contingent understanding of politics, by 
which the centre is a function and not a fixed locus. They quote from Writing 
and Difference:  
“'It became necessary to think both the law which somehow 
governed desire for a center in the constitution of structure, and 
the process of signification which orders the displacements and 
substitutions for this law of central presence – but as a central 
presence which has never been itself, has always already been 
exiled from itself into its own substitute. The substitute does not 
                                                          
34 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 186 
35 From those writings Mouffe and Laclau refer to Hegelian dialectics and Derrida’s notion of 
the centre and substitution. Mouffe and Laclau refer especially to Derrida’s 
“Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”, in: Writing and 
Difference, University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 278-293 
36 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 111 
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substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before 
it, henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was 
no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a 
present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not 
a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an 
infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play. This was 
the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, 
the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, 
everything became discourse – provided we can agree on this 
word – that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the 
original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present 
outside a system of differences. The absence of the 
transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely.”37  
Mouffe and Laclau describe hegemony as the antagonism which is 
perceived as the foundation of society. Relying on two key terms which 
Mouffe and Laclau base their analysis on – Articulation and Hegemony, in 
real existing politics we do recognize the ability to construct a fundamental-
antagonism. A hegemonic relation for Mouffe and Laclau is one of “absent 
totality” which becomes possible through its articulation as the 
“representation of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it.”38 In 
this sense, although Mouffe and Laclau would insist on its arbitrariness, still 
the moment of political articulation in which an antagonism comes to assume 
a hegemonic status, makes it to be a fundamental-antagonism in relation to 
all other antagonisms. It is a particular element which assumes a structuring 
                                                          
37 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 212. See also: Jacques Derrida, 
Writing and Difference, p. 280 
38 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. x 
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function within a certain discursive field, while claiming for itself the status of 
‘a universality.’39 Hegemony, which is, in Mouffe’s and Laclau’s view, the 
central category of political analysis, is therefore articulating all other 
antagonisms in relation to one which becomes the fundamental-antagonism.  
This is very true to real existing politics where domination functions 
somewhat like a reversed prism, through which all other antagonisms are 
articulated. As for the question of articulation here, it emerges both in the 
relation between each of the antagonisms but also in the relation between 
hegemony and each antagonism – this is the fundamental-antagonism. 
Articulations, in this sense, are re-compositions of tensions and 
contradictions through the process of politics. And so, following Mouffe and 
Laclau, if hegemony is order in contingency, we can see how antagonisms 
are the axes by which political identities and realities are constructed. These 
are derived and articulated to the most part in relation to the fundamental-
antagonism.  
As it operates in relation to the moment of political articulation, Betrayal can 
be located in the relations that run through different antagonisms and that 
one which comes to assume the status of the fundamental-antagonism. 
Therefore, if we take into account the notion of horizon that Betrayal 
addresses by the intensification of relations, we can see how Mouffe’s and 
Laclau’s proposition can be re-articulated today, in a way against itself. 
When faced with contemporary neoliberal hegemony by which class is no 
longer articulated as a category to operate from in politics, one would have 
to re-appropriate Mouffe’s and Laclau’s project, and with loyalty to their 
project, re-position class of all things, as an antagonism through which other 
                                                          
39 Ibid., p. xi 
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antagonisms are measured. Betrayal maintains the tensions of articulation in 
relation to hegemony.40 
 
Betrayal and Agonism 
When Mouffe goes on to examine the limits of liberal politics in her later 
writing, she uses Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of The Political (mainly the 
second chapter on specific political distinctions operating along the scheme 
of Friend/Enemy), where he stresses that liberal politics’ inclusive drive is 
always met by a self-created frontier.41 By that every ‘we’ that a liberal 
democratic political project proposes, must be distinguished from a ‘them’.42 
This affirms for her that there is a relational character to every identity, and 
by that the couple identity/difference is unavoidable. Her proposal for 
                                                          
40 One can see how the police cracking down on the Occupy movement in the US, Canada and 
the UK in November 2011, follows this exact realization – that the mere claim that 
we are in a class society is politically endangering the ruling classes. With this I am 
following Jodi Dean’s claim that the slogan “We are the 99%” highlights a division 
and a gap as it asserts a collectivity which is not unified under a race, ethnic, religion 
or national identity. She writes: “In the setting of an occupied Wall Street, this ‘we’ is 
a class, one of two opposed and hostile classes.” See: Jodi Dean, “Claiming Division, 
Naming a Wrong”, in: Theory & Event, Volume 14, Number 4, 2011 Supplement, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press:   
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v014/14.4S.dean01.html  
41 See: Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political [1927], Trans.: George Schwabe, University of 
Chicago Press, 2007 
42 Susan Buck-Morss explains that Schmitt stresses the collective nature of the enemy 
“pointing out the difference between the two forms of the enemy, exthros compared 
to polemos in ancient Greek, or inimicus compared to hostis in Latin. Whereas the 
former terms refer to individual persons, the latter (polemos and hostis) delineate 
the political enemy, the public enemy – which, as a collective term, is always an 
abstraction. You have nothing against this enemy personally. It is a category within 
sovereign power.” See: Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, pp.32-33 
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agonism relies on “the impossibility of a positivity that would be given without 
any trace of negativity.”43  
Her debate with Schmitt’s friend/enemy scheme brought Mouffe to suggest 
the concept of agonism through Jacques Derrida’s notion of the ‘constitutive 
outside.’44 In her The Democratic Paradox Mouffe came to define 
antagonism as a difference which is perceived within the framework of an 
‘us/them’ relation. This relation of difference which is seen as that between 
friend and enemy, is what she calls the Political. Following Derrida’s notion 
of the ‘constitutive outside’, Mouffe goes on to claim that although collective 
identities are established on the mode of an us/them, this mode cannot be 
reduced to a negation by which any ‘us’ asserts or negates a ‘them’. 
Therefore, she structures her notion of the Political as that in which ‘them’ is 
the symbol of what makes any ‘us’ impossible. 
She conceptualizes agonism as a solution to antagonistic politics, as a way 
to further elaborate a move towards an operative proposal for an anti-
essentialist politics. In this formation of politics: 
                                                          
43 Mouffe, The Return of the Political, p. 114 
44 Mouffe and Laclau subscribe to Derrida’s articulation of discourse as they follow his 
description of “centre and substitution” in which a series of substitutions of centre 
make for centre to take place: “as a linked chain of determinations of the centre”. 
See: Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences”, in: Writing and Difference, p. 279. Mouffe’s further use of 
Derrida’s ‘constitutive outside’ can find its background already in the chapter on 
Violence and Metaphysics in this same book (pp. 97–192). Here Derrida uses James 
Joyce’s neologism “Jewgreek” to hint on a connectedness and a process of becoming 
even through a setting that suggests only oppositions: “Jewgreek is greekjew. 
Extremes meet. Death is the highest form of life. Bah!”, see also interview with John 
D. Caputo where he explains to Emmet Cole the coupling “Greeks” (Beauty, truth), 
and “Jews” (Prophetic justice), and the way Derrida proposes that we live in the 
difference between them. See: Emmet Cole Interviews John D. Caputo, The Modern 
Word, 16 May 2005: 
http://www.themodernword.com/features/interview_caputo.html [Last retrieved: 
15.10.2015] 
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“the relation between the social agents becomes more 
democratic only as far as they accept the particularity and the 
limitation of their claims; that is, only in so far as they recognize 
their mutual relation as one from which power is ineradicable.”45 
For Mouffe, every element has inscribed in its very being something other 
than itself, and as a result, again following Derrida, “everything is 
constructed as difference”46 Therefore, as the ‘constitutive outside’ is present 
within the inside, every identity along the antagonism is contingent, 
therefore, political. With agonism, the enemy becomes adversary. For her 
this is the heart of a modern pluralist democratic politics, through which she 
sees “democracy as ‘agonistic pluralism.’”47 This ‘agonistic pluralism’ 
enables not only for a containment of the antagonisms, but rather it makes 
possible for the constitutive outside to find its place inside by transforming 
antagonism into agonism.” Unlike her work with Laclau which aimed to 
correct rigid Marxian doxa by describing what they saw as the operations of 
politics, Mouffe moved in her later writing to outline what politics should be, 
stating that: “In my view the aim of democratic politics should be to provide 
the framework through which conflicts can take the form of an agonistic 
confrontation among adversaries instead of manifesting themselves as an 
antagonistic struggle between enemies.”48 But ‘Agonistic pluralism,’ very 
much like the outcome of ‘radical democracy’ in real existing politics, seems 
to mean the opposite of what it aimed to achieve. Agonism portrays an even 
plateau for politics, not taking into account uneven formations of struggle or 
clandestine operations of power. Therefore, it can be performed by the 
                                                          
45  Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 21 
46  Ibid. 
47 Ibid., p. 14 
48 Ibid., p. 117 
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political elite already today in real existing democracies without carrying the 
meaning which Mouffe aimed for it to have. 
 
Betrayal and Loyalty in Israel-Palestine 
Mouffe’s move enables us to think of Israel/Palestine for example through 
the possibility for the exterior to come inside into the interior, by that the 
antagonism Israeli/Palestinian can be re-articulated in terms of an agonistic 
pluralism. Mouffe’s Derridean articulation through the constitutive outside 
helps in further developing the notion of Betrayal as a move inside-out, not 
only a change of sides from ‘here’ to ‘there’ but also a move through other 
durations of beginning and end, and from protocol to horizon. Our inhabited 
fictions (be it “Zionism”, “The Middle East” or “The European Union”), 
generate in them a series of conflicts which constitute our political identities 
– a variety of antagonisms that outline societies, geographies, subjectivities, 
bodies. These inhabited fictions call for an embodied politics that will offer a 
way to that no-longer/not-yet available outside. Imagining a vantage point 
that is unimaginable within the perspectives offered through the antagonism 
itself. 
Hegemony, the antagonism through which all other antagonisms are being 
perceived and by which collective and political identities are being 
articulated, cannot be undone through treason. Because treason still 
operates within its “us”/”them” framework, it still follows the protocol as its 
political logic, and thus leaves us still within the fundamental-antagonism of 
Jew/Arab or Israeli/Palestinian.  
The narratives in Israel-Palestine since the 1990s all stem from the US 
doctrines of New World Order and the War on Terror which brought among 
other things, the US interventions in the Middle East. In Israel, these joint 
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processes of destruction included privatizations together with new ways of 
managing the Occupation of the Palestinian Territories through a mixture of 
agreements and policing technologies. This reality, which was invested in a 
disavowal of power relations, in actuality served for the perpetuation of 
disproportionate power relations between Israel and the Palestinians. The 
neoliberal subjectivity that emerged did not make the antagonism obsolete, if 
anything it made it a fundamental antagonism exactly by proposing a denial 
of power relations (for example through the Oslo Accords of 1993).  
Betrayal in this context needs to be articulated as travelling between the 
antagonism and its exterior. We can give as an example for this mapping the 
notion of ‘absolute enemy.’ Susan Buck-Morss uses post-Soviet philosopher 
Valerii Podoroga’s concept of the ‘absolute enemy’ to describe what is at 
stake when we destabilise the co-dependency of enemies within an 
antagonism. She explains that Podoroga “distinguishes the ‘enemy’ both as 
a term within the political imaginary and, on a metalevel, as a threat to the 
political imaginary.” The first is the normal enemy and the second is 
considered the absolute enemy. She goes on to contest Karl Schmitt’s 
notion of the enemy, and explains how the enemy for him occupies a 
position of the ‘other’ which the ‘one’ is always dependent on: “in occupying 
this position – and this is something Schmitt does not see – the enemy loses 
the absolute character”. Buck-Morss concludes that “it is the absolute 
political enemy that threatens the existence of the collective not only (and 
probably not mainly) in a physical sense but, rather, in an ontological sense, 
because it challenges the very notion by which the identity of the collective 
has been formed.”49  Betrayal thus engages in the metalevel of the 
antagonism and instead of playing simply within the logic of the antagonism, 
                                                          
49 See: Buck-Morss,  Dreamworld and Catastrophe, pp. 12-34 
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moving from one side to the other in it, it engages with the antagonism’s 
underlying logic as it withdraws from its confines.  
Betrayal can be perceived as a loyalty to the horizon. It is positioned against 
the logic of allegiance/treason, because Betrayal undoes the us/them 
dichotomy. Containing in it an unresolved tension, Betrayal is loyalty to a 
horizon, beyond protocols of allegiance. By that, Betrayal offers a state by 
which it is always already. As Israeli politics have come to articulate the 
political as a binary between Palestinian and Israeli, Jew or Arab, a 
dichotomy that cannot be bridged, a Loyalty Oath law and several laws of 
allegiance have been legislated in recent years by the Israeli parliament. 
These laws regard loyalty as a protocol. They demand Palestinians living in 
Israel to acknowledge the state of Israel, of which they are citizens, as a 
Jewish state, with them having individual rights as citizens but no rights as a 
collective. 
These laws bring to its peak a fundamental-antagonism through which 
politics is conceptualized in Israel-Palestine as either/or; either one is Israeli 
or Palestinian, a Jew or an Arab. For an analysis of this fundamental-
antagonism, one should address also the formats through which the 
dichotomy manifests itself, in this case, the new Israeli laws of allegiance.50 
These laws perceive loyalty as protocol – as a list or a set of regulations to 
follow or to avoid – they supply a manual for allegiance. But, if an allegiance 
is a fixed protocol, or better still, if loyalty is a protocol, then within it treason 
exists as its internal-opposite. By this I mean that treason does not break 
with the protocol itself, it may break each and every clause in the protocol of 
allegiance but it still accepts the protocol as the rule to determine 
                                                          
50 Another very present format is that of differential citizenry as the repeated attacks on Gaza 
have shown: Biopolitics and the administration of life for Israelis and Necropolitics 
and the management of death for Palestinians. 
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loyalty. These constitutive relations between treason and allegiance actually 
maintain the “status-quo as protocol” and likewise constitute “the protocol as 
the status-quo”.  
The co-dependency of enemies within an antagonism, should therefore be 
de-stabilized by other means, as Podoroga suggests. The ‘absolute enemy’ 
constitutes a threat not only within the political imaginary, but it also poses a 
threat to the political imaginary itself. Betrayal differs from treason not only in 
its spatial proposal – moving from the “us/them” antagonism, but it also 
offers a blurring of the constitutive relations that allegiance/treason rely on. 
Betrayal offers a way beyond the fundamental-antagonism by either 
intensifying it, bringing it to its limit, or by simply not accepting the protocol 
as the form through which loyalty is performed. Betrayal, therefore, offers 
itself as another form of loyalty – one that defines itself as a horizon, not as a 
protocol. By that, Betrayal goes beyond allegiance/treason for this setting 
revolves around the status-quo as protocol and the protocol as status quo.  
Betrayal would then be loyalty that de-stabilizes the status quo as protocol 
and undermines the protocol as status quo. For Betrayal stems from the 
notion that “Everything can be otherwise”, it is a horizon of loyalty beyond 
protocols of allegiance, it is a loyalty to the horizon. Betrayal displays the 
possibility for other potentialities to be actualized. To the horizon of these 
potentialities Betrayal is loyal. Betrayal is therefore the inevitable narrative 
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and event of true loyalty, beyond protocol; loyalty to the new collective 
subjectivities that are yet to come.51 
If a concept, a person, a discourse or an act, subscribes to the fundamental-
antagonism, they can either perform allegiance or its internal opposite – 
treason, which would be no more than counter-allegiance. For one to 
perform Betrayal, a concept, a person, a discourse or an act has to be loyal 
to the horizons of potentialities beyond the protocols of the fundamental-
antagonism.  
Therefore, going back to these Israeli laws of allegiance, they are definitely 
not loyal to any horizon of new collective subjectivities emerging in Israel-
Palestine, but rather they fortify the fundamental-antagonism of Israeli or 
Palestinian. Here Betrayal is loyalty; a two-fold move – away from the 
us/them framework and away from the protocol as definitive script for loyalty 
as allegiance. 
 
Loyalty and Non-Belonging 
Betrayal as a repositioning and opening to potentialities on discursive, 
social, spatial and temporal levels, proposes non-belonging as a form of 
loyalty. At stake here is the attempt to formulate a taxonomy of Betrayal, and 
not one of betrayers. This is not a proposal for a self-positioning and self-
fashioning project by which individual subjects are re-constructed by their 
                                                          
51 The vocabulary here is very much in the spirit of Derrida’s messianicity without messianism, 
as he developed it in Specters of Marx where he speaks of a law of a future that 
would carry beyond what has up until now been called history: “It is this law that 
dislodges any present out of its contemporaneity with itself. Whether the promise 
promises this or that, whether it be fulfilled or not, or whether it be unfulfillable, 
there is necessarily some promise and therefore some historicity as future-to-come. 
It is what we are nicknaming the messianic without messianism”. Derrida, Specters of 
Marx, p. 91 
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actions as subjects-facing-an-antagonism. Betrayal is a movement between 
these subjectivities, between discourses and objects, institutions and 
meanings.  
Given that Betrayal is a loyalty that is not expedient, it offers itself through 
affinity, not through belonging. Betrayal actualizes the ever-changing 
potentialities which make the horizon of loyalty by way of non-belonging. 
New narratives through which to perform politics appear by way of affinity. 
Non-belonging carries the promise of loyalty by Betrayal. Together with non-
belonging as a mode of engagement with an antagonism, affinity provides a 
positionality that is both spatial and durational in its withdrawal from the 
confinements of its internal logic. This mapping is in constant relation to the 
horizon of potentialities, repositioning one in a place and a time that might 
seem unavailable or unattainable within the existing antagonism, but which 
is actualized through Betrayal. 
Directly in relation to the self-perpetuating deadlock of the fundamental-
antagonism in Israel-Palestine, which absorbs all fields of meaning and 
action, non-belonging emerges as loyalty. Non-belonging as loyalty is 
Betrayal. 
 
Alcibiades and Betrayal  
“…for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular […] 
The particular is – for example – what Alcibiades did or suffered.” 
Aristotle, Poetics, part IX 
At this point, we will embark on a reconstruction of Alcibiades, what he did 
and what was done to him. His voice will be synthesized from various 
sources, narrating his actions as much as possible from his voice and the 
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voices of his contemporaries52. Alcibiades will be used here because he is 
perceived as a classic example of a betrayer who abuses trust with his 
ambitions of power. The notion of Betrayal I hope to propose can be 
considered through his actions, which betray the trust that the antagonisms 
he was engaged in demanded. Different authors have described him 
differently. This person from 2,500 years ago is a prominent character in 
classical texts that have survived from antiquity. From all the different 
portrayals of Alcibiades by the different sources, the Alcibiades I will work 
with is mainly based on what is attributed to him directly. The direct quotes 
from the different sources (his contemporaries Plato, Thucydides and 
Xenophon and those who came after him like Plutarch), produce the 
Alcibiades I choose to work with. What I am hoping to achieve in reading 
Alcibiades’ story is a description of a movement that travels through cultural, 
religious, political and social antagonisms by engaging with them. The way 
the movement is done provides one method of Betrayal.  
I am working here with Alcibiades’ actions although and maybe because of 
his specific character which in many ways resists modeling. His story 
involves so much “noise”, self-promotion and self-interest, that sharing it as 
a method of Betrayal seems risky to begin with. And yet, his doings and the 
story of his deeds has enabled me in an early stage of this research to 
articulate many of the tensions that Betrayal seeks to address. Therefore, 
Alcibiades himself is not the model but what he did and what was done to 
him can be used to demonstrate one method of Betrayal as exhaustion of 
antagonisms.  
                                                          
52 Sources and references to Alcibiades from antiquity abound to the extent that there are 
fake texts on him that pretend to have been written in antiquity. “Alcibiades II” 
which was considered to be written by Plato is the most notable of these apocryphal 
sources. See: Plato, Complete Works, Ed.: John M. Cooper, Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1997, v, pp. 596–608 
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Born around 450 BC at the very apex of the Athenian aristocratic elite, 
Alcibiades saw the Polis at its peak: The Parthenon was built on the 
Acropolis as he was growing up (it was inaugurated in 432 BC); Sophocles’ 
Antigone was first staged in 441 BC and the Attic tragedy and the famous 
Athenian dramatic festival Dionysia reached their zenith in his lifetime; 
among his contemporaries were Euripides (480-406 BC) and Aristophanes 
(446-388 BC), the historian Thucydides who wrote of him (Alcibiades is well 
documented in Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War and makes several 
important appearances in books VI and VII of that work). He had personal 
relationships with Socrates and his followers Plato and Xenophon who also 
wrote about him. Alcibiades had lost his father at an early age and moved to 
live with his maternal uncle, Pericles, who was the leader of Athens in its 
Golden Age.53  
As difficult a character as he may be, I will now examine his story to better 
understand one of the ways Betrayal is performed. The aim here is to read 
him, sometimes against himself, sometimes against his authors, and the way 
that he explains himself. Alcibiades’s contemporaries are varied and 
sometimes contradictory in depicting his character and actions, yet he 
comes across as an ambitious Athenian, whose main ambition in a way is to 
be an Athenian, with the greatness this demands and promises. 
Nevertheless, Alcibiades came down through history to be known as an 
arch-traitor, the one because of whom Athens was defeated and Socrates 
was executed.  
One of the ways for Betrayal to perform itself, can occur by exhausting 
treason. By that the either/or structure is entangled. This method of Betrayal 
                                                          
53 This era in the history of Ancient Greek city-states is called the Classical Age and is dated 
around 479–323 BC. See: Ian Morris (Ed.), Classical Greece: Ancient histories and 
modern archaeologies, Cambridge University Press, 1994 
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will be explored here through the actions of Alcibiades. The story of 
Alcibiades is that of a series of treasons: being the pupil of Socrates, he 
chose political life over philosophy – committing treason against his teacher. 
This treason is depicted mainly in Plato’s Alcibiades I where their first 
meeting is described and in The Symposium when Alcibiades enters 
Agathon’s house last. Later on, Alcibiades has brought defeat to Athens, 
through a series of multiple political treasons – these actions lead writers of 
his time to accuse him of enabling a tyrant to take over the Polis. In addition, 
he was also blamed for being the cause for the execution of Socrates.  
Yet through this infamous figure, one who even his educator (and lover) 
Socrates seemed to denounce, Betrayal performed itself as a repositioning 
in relation to and of antagonisms. By this I do not mean to see Alcibiades’s 
actions as a manual for Betrayal today, yet a reading of these actions can 
enable for the productions of this method of exhausting antagonisms. One 
way of summarizing the interpretative articulation of Alcibiades as Betrayal, 
would be to position him, an Athenian of the Classic Hellenic period, as it 
came to be called, as someone who performs a Hellenistic logic already, 
including the non-Greek in his variety of identities. This, while striving to be 
the ‘ultimate Athenian.’  
 
Alcibiades and Socrates: First Circle of Treasons  
“I am enamored of two things –  
Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, and philosophy.”  
Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias 
 
When proposing Betrayal in relation to Alcibiades, Alcibiades is used to 
explore the potential for a political possibility: for being Hellenistic in an 
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Athenian world, so to speak. As a singularity, Alcibiades probably does not 
offer us a fixed manual to implement and deploy today, although the cunning 
politician might find inspiration in him. What is proposed here is a way to 
work with his story in order to carve out a proposal for Betrayal.54  
The story of Alcibiades and Socrates is told here from different sources 
(mainly Plato’s Alcibiades I and Symposium), in order to trace the first circle 
of treasons by Alcibiades, namely that of philosophy and politics. The 
historical figure of Alcibiades was written by different authors, among them 
Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon and Plutarch. Alcibiades as fiction plays the 
role of history itself – performing the different positions in a conflicted 
situation. Labelled as a turncoat and traitor by his contemporaries, his 
motivations are explained both by Thucydides and by Plato in Alcibiades I. 
This dialogue stands as an extended discussion on the nature of politics. 
Ascribed to Plato, it is considered to have been written in the later period of 
Plato’s writing around 350-347 BC, when he was back in Athens, reflecting 
on his own experiences with Dionysius II of Syracuse, who he educated 
himself.55 Many sections of the dialogue demonstrate Alcibiades’ views on 
his contemporaries, but the driving force here is the puzzlement Socrates 
                                                          
54 Sigmund Freud used the story of Oedipus to simplify, illustrate and illuminate a complex he 
identified within the nuclear patriarchal family. When suggesting a ‘literary’ model 
for a political action, Freud’s modelling based on myth is of course a very charismatic 
proposal. Freud could have taken other aspects of the story and the play (a social 
reading, for example, would maybe emphasize the fact that the child is born to 
royalty and is being bought up by commoners), yet Freud chose to extract and 
solidify a model of emotional relations. Following this example, we can see how 
different aspects in Alcibiades’s story can be used as models for different things, but 
here his story is suggested to be a model for one form of Betrayal as a political 
action. 
55 Nicholas Denyer makes the connection between Dionysius II and Alcibiades – two ambitious 
politicians who in an early age found interest in philosophy but went on to disappoint 
their teachers. See: Nicholas Denyer, “Introduction,” in: Plato, Alcibiades, Ed.: 
Nicholas Denyer, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 1-26 
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puts Alcibiades in. Several aporias are presented to us – Socrates questions 
Alcibiades about the nature of several notions – doing good, ruling, being 
free.  At each point Alcibiades begins full of confidence and finishes with an 
insoluble impasse. Socrates’s pedagogical technique of aporia proves 
efficient yet again. Perplexed, Alcibiades declares at the end of the dialogue 
that he will follow Socrates from now on:  
Alcibiades: “I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to 
be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow 
you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and 
you shall be my master.” 
Socrates: “O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like 
the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have 
hatched.” 
Alcibiades: “Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think 
about justice.” 
Socrates: “And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, 
not because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, 
which may be too much for both of us.” 
(Plato: Alcibiades I; 135) 
 
But the aporia experienced by Alcibiades in the dialogue could be extended 
to his character being posed as an aporia in itself, through its actions, a 
series of contradictory treasons of inconsistent premises. In this dialogue, 
which depicts the first encounter of Alcibiades and Socrates, Alcibiades is 
almost nineteen years old. In this intimate dialogue he lays down his political 
plan to rule, and explains to Socrates that his competition comes not from 
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foreign enemies but rather from his fellow Athenians. Socrates challenges 
him by asking: 
Socrates: “Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and 
then with the Lacedaemonians (Spartans) and with the 
great king (of Persia)?” 
Alcibiades: ”True enough.” 
Socrates: “And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you 
not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian 
(Spartan) and Persian king were your true rivals?” 
Alcibiades: “I believe that you are right.” 
(Plato: Alcibiades I; 119) 
This exchange establishes the setting of enmity in Alcibiades’s and 
Socrates’s world. As an Athenian, Alcibiades accepts that these are his 
enemies: the Spartans (Lacedaemonian) and the Persians. After being 
pressed by Socrates to admit that he is not yet fit for a political career, 
Alcibiades adds: 
Alcibiades: “There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not 
suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great 
king are really different from anybody else.”  
(Plato: Alcibiades I; 120) 
While they are on conflicting sides of war, still Alcibiades recognizes these 
enemies to be the same as the people he knows. A monarchy of warriors 
and an empire are perceived here by Alcibiades to have something in 
common with the democratic polis of Athens. And if not in common than at 
least they are not extremely foreign and different as the conflict with them 
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might suggest. The underlying logic that unites the three enemy states and 
their leaders is their pursuit of power. They all comply with a similar logic 
which Alcibiades aims to master – possessing power. 
We find already Alcibiades the boy here understanding that the internal 
politics of the polis are the foreign policy of the polis. Alcibiades embodies a 
logic that sees interrelations between the inside and outside – he sees in the 
Athenian adversary an enemy, and in the foreign enemy he sees an 
adversary. He saw his adversaries to be antagonists and his antagonists to 
be his adversaries, operating as an agonistic Schmittian (if such a thing can 
exist – betraying agonism).  
In Plato’s Alcibiades I, a dialogue dedicated to governance, power and 
governmentality, Alcibiades comes across as ill equipped not only in his 
perception of the political sphere but also as a citizen produced to fulfill the 
polis’s values and policies. He is ungovernable. One is tempted to read 
Alcibiades in Alcibiades I as someone who challenges the common sense of 
his time – someone who performs a reversal of that which is acceptable – he 
chooses victory over heroism, enemies over adversaries, a break from his 
polis and a promise of royal descendants elsewhere in Sparta over loyalty to 
his people with a promise to be revered in their history. A reading of his 
arrogance and charm, his seductive powers and political talents, and a 
deployment of the tensions between aristocracy and democracy that he 
embodied are actually not the focus point of the proposal of Alcibiades’s 
Betrayal.  
Alcibiades’s actual political actions led to anarchy and death. Against his 
intended actions, which are egotistic and destructive, we can formulate a 
conceptual framework, which he might not have intended – one that does 
permit new collective subjectivities to appear as potentialities. The attempt 
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here is firstly to follow his actions not for the celebration of his political 
cunning but for the sake of what can be done with the meaning of his actions 
– namely his serial treasons. By applying a heightened speculative and 
potentiality-seeking reading, I hope to suggest through his actions an 
understanding of the realignment of antagonisms and the opening-up of 
potentialities through Betrayal. 
It is not his motivations but what his actions carry; the performance of 
political action is the center of this investigation – therefore, what Alcibiades 
did and what was done to him is the story that would interest us here, if only 
to read in it what it enables for us, rather than what it enabled Alcibiades 
himself personally.  
Alcibiades’s relationship with Socrates is that of treason, by which he is 
choosing political action over philosophy already in Alcibiades I. In Plato’s 
Symposium, some fourteen years after he first met Socrates, Alcibiades is 
the last one to speak (Plato, Symposium; 212-222). He is now preparing for 
his entrance into politics, and has just won the horse races in the 91st 
Olympic Games. He enters Agathon’s house drunk and is startled to meet 
Socrates there. When speaking, Alcibiades praises Socrates, telling stories 
from the battlefield. Yet a tension is felt between the two, as it is obvious that 
Alcibiades had left Socrates’s flock and he is no longer part of the Socratic 
school. 
But Alcibiades proposes an entanglement here. On the one hand it seems 
he has forsaken his teacher, but on the other, he continued to follow his 
teachings. Hannah Arendt explains how Socrates has been revolutionary in 
that he drew different examples and illustrations for the polis from everyday 
experiences of private life:  
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“these aspects of the teachings of the Socratic school, which soon 
were to become axiomatic to the point of banality, were then the 
newest and most revolutionary of all and sprang not from actual 
experience in political life but from the desire to be freed from its 
burden, a desire which in their own understanding the philosophers 
could justify only by demonstrating that even this freest of all ways of 
life was still connected with and subject to necessity.” 56  
Alcibiades constantly plays on the tension between his private and public 
life. Plutarch writes: “renown by public services was equaled by the 
admiration of his private life.”57 This movement between inside and outside 
that is personified by Alcibiades’s with his blurring of private and public life 
can be addressed through two different readings. Arendt writes of the polis 
and the household in relation to the public and the private realm that 
“whoever entered the political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and 
too great a love for life obstructed freedom, was a sure sign of slavishness”. 
Alcibiades’s notorious attraction to ‘the good life’ is seen here as an act 
taken in the polis and not as part of his private life, as the life of the citizen in 
Athens, as Aristotle put it, has to do with “mastering the necessities of sheer 
life.”58  
The borderline between household and polis is blurred by Alcibiades to the 
extent that his private life was famously suggested by Michel Foucault to 
propose a politics of ‘care of the self.’59 The reasoning brought forth by Plato 
                                                          
56 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 37 
57 Plutarch, Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans: Volume 1, Trans.: Arthur Hugh Clough, 
Digireads Books, 2009, p. 203 
58 See: Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 36-37 
59 See: Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of The Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1981-1982, New York: Picador, 2004, pp. 65-82 and pp. 187-205 
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in Alcibiades I in relation to the ‘care of the self,’ is used by Foucault as a 
landmark, as he calls it, for an ethics of social conduct. Paul Allen Miller 
explains that Foucault sought to elaborate an ethics founded on what he 
referred to as an ‘art’ or ‘stylization’ with direct reference to Alcibiades: “the 
purpose of this stylization was not self-absorption, but to offer new means of 
resistance” writes Miller, “an ethic and aesthetic of existence, founded on the 
history of subjectivation, was in part to be a means of resistance to the 
commodified, sexualized, and normalized subject of capitalist modernity.”60 
Alcibiades in Alcibiades I and in the Symposium by no means subscribes to 
an agonistic political project a la Mouffe, yet he constantly performs a 
‘constitutive outside’ – any ‘us’ with him is impossible: Any “Alcibiades” 
brings forth a radically un-decidable tension of its own constitution. 
After the restoration of the Democratic regime in Athens in 404/403 BC, 
Socrates was put on trial for “corrupting the young” (Plato, Apologia, 24b). 
His prosecutors were accusing him of being the educator of men like 
Alcibiades, who brought Athens to its demise. The prosecutor is quoted 
saying: “But to return to Critias and Alcibiades, I repeat that as long as they 
lived with Socrates they were able by his support to dominate their ignoble 
appetites” (Xenophon: Memorabilia, book I Chapter II; 12).61 To this 
affiliation with them Socrates famously answers: “I have never been 
anyone's teacher, but if anybody desired to listen to me talking and fulfilling 
my mission, whether young or old, I never rejected anyone” (Plato: Apologia; 
33a).  
                                                          
60 See: Paul Allan Miller, “The Art of Self-Fashioning, or Foucault on Plato and Derrida”’ in: 
Foucault Studies, No. 2, May 2005, p. 56 
61 Gary Alan Scott writes of this: “It might be concluded from evidence about the later careers 
of historical characters such as Charmides and Alcibiades that more young men were 
made worse than made better by this philosopher’s counsel”. See: Gary Alan Scott, 
Plato’s Socrates as educator, Albany: State University of New York Press 2000, p. 1 
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Alcibiades and Athens: Second Circle of Treasons  
“Once being hard pressed in wrestling, and fearing to be thrown, he 
got the hand of his antagonist to his mouth, and bit it with all his force; 
and when the other loosed his hold presently, and said, "You bite, 
Alcibiades, like a woman." "No," replied he, "like a lion." 
 
From Plutarch’s Lives62 
The story of Alcibiades and Athens is told here from different sources 
(mainly Thucydides and Plutarch), in order to trace a second circle of 
treasons by Alcibiades, namely that of private and public life, which involves 
the Olympic games, the Athenian expedition to Sicily which he led, followed 
by his defection to Sparta and then to Persia. Rising to power by sponsoring 
several winning chariots in the Olympic games of 417/416 BC, his speech in 
the assembly calling for the launching of an expedition to conquer Sicily from 
the Spartans won Alcibiades the role of joint leadership of the military 
campaign, together with his political opponent Nicias – in this speech he 
speaks of his right to speak to the assembly, both by merit and by pedigree, 
and recommends attacking Sparta in Sicily: 
“Remember, too, that the city, like everything else, will wear out 
of its own accord if it remains at rest, and its skill in everything 
will grow out of date; but in conflict it will constantly be gaining 
new experience and growing more used to defend itself not by 
speeches, but in action. In general, my view is that a city which is 
active by nature will soon ruin itself if it changes its nature and 
                                                          
62 Plutarch, Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans: Volume 1, p. 196  
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becomes idle, and that the way that men find their greatest 
security is in accepting the character and the institutions which 
they actually have, even if they are not perfect, and in living as 
nearly as possible in accordance with them” (Thucydides: VI; 
19).  
One can see how Alcibiades here identifies himself with Athens, speaking of 
both his and the polis’ active nature. Yet, on the way to Sicily, he is called 
back to Athens to stand trial for sacrilege of sacred statues of the Hermae – 
pillars dedicated to the god Hermes. According to allegations by his political 
rivals back in Athens, Alcibiades had been in an orgy with friends and they 
had been mocking religious rituals (Thucydides: Book VI; 60-62).63 Following 
this incident, we are told, a furious Alcibiades changes sides and turns to the 
Spartan camp. After campaigning in Athens for an aggressive military action 
against Sparta, and being a strong opponent to the “soft” Nicias camp that 
promoted a peace treaty with Sparta, Alcibiades now becomes an 
accomplice of his sworn enemies. In Sparta, Alcibiades gives another 
speech in which he attempts to explain his act of treason (Thucydides: Book 
VI; 88-94) – he speaks of political reasons, of shared ancestors and shared 
enemies. He also offers valuable strategic information to the Spartans that 
                                                          
63 This incident has been the cause for many speculations and investigations from antiquity to 
this day. Such is the interest in this event that it has been carefully dated by 
contemporary historians to around the end of May-early June 415 BC. The basic 
allegations against Alcibiades include a mocking of holy rituals by dressing up as 
priests and conducting a religious ceremony. The event, nevertheless, includes the 
vandalizing of most of the statutes of the Greek god Hermes around Athens during 
one night. The aftermath of this involved Alcibiades’s slave, Andromachus, giving 
testimony, Alcibiades being refused his request for an immediate trial before sailing 
for Sicily, and him being condemned to death for this incident in absentia. For an 
investigation into this event, including a comparison with nightly drinking gatherings 
of upper-class Athenians such as the one depicted in Plato’s Symposium, as well as 
unsupported reconstructions of that night which put the blame on women who 
opposed the Sicilian expedition, see: Debra Hamel, The Mutilation of the Herms: 
Unpacking an Ancient Mystery, Self-published, North Haven, CT, 2012 
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will push the Athenian army back from Sicily to their polis. He concludes by 
defending his reputation:  
“I claim also that none of you should think the worse of me if, in 
spite of my previous reputation for loving my country, I now join 
in vigorously with her bitterest enemies in attacking her; nor 
should you suspect my argument on the grounds that it derives 
simply from the strong feelings of an exile. I am an exile 
because of the villainy of the men who drove me out, not out of 
any wish, if you listen to me, to help you. And the worst enemies 
of Athens are not those who, like you, have only harmed her in 
war, but those who have forced her friends to turn against her. 
The Athens I love is not the one which is wronging me now, but 
the one in which I used to have secure enjoyment of my rights 
as citizen. The country that I am attacking does not seem to me 
to be mine any longer; it is rather that I am trying to recover a 
country that has ceased to be mine. And the man who really 
loves his country is not the one who refuses to attack it when he 
has been unjustly driven from it, but the man whose desire for it 
is so strong that he will shrink from nothing in his efforts to get 
back there again” (Thucydides: VI; 92). 
For Alcibiades, Athens without him is no longer Athens. His ability to change 
sides from a democratic deliberative regime to a monarchic authoritative one 
proves not only his political flexibility but also shows the potential for this 
antagonism to be negotiated. In this speech Alcibiades presents his treason 
in the context of his political gain. His changing sides here is directed by 
personal interest. One can also read in his speech a demand for return, a 
commitment to his homeland and a yearning for belonging – not at all a 
turning-away from it. In Sparta, after consulting the military and helping it 
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bring the Athenian army back to the walls of the polis, it is said that 
Alcibiades seduced and impregnated Queen Timaea while her husband the 
Spartan King Agis was away in the battle field. Plutarch gives Alcibiades’s 
explanation to this scandal:  
“He, on the other side, would say, in his vain way, he had not 
done this thing out of mere wantonness of insult, nor to gratify a 
passion, but that his race might one day be kings over the 
Lacedaemonians (Spartans)”64  
Alcibiades loses the sympathy of the Spartans and has to flee and change 
alliances yet again. This time he moves to the Persian satrap of Asia Minor, 
Tissaphernes. Alcibiades changes sides now from Greek to Persian, proving 
not only his cultural flexibility, but also showing the potential for this 
antagonism also to be negotiated. Plutarch recounts that Tissaphernes was 
a hater of the Greeks, but he enjoyed Alcibiades’ company very much.  
Wanted both by the Spartans and the Athenians, Alcibiades consulted the 
Persians to ‘sit on the fence’ for a while and not to take sides in the war 
between Sparta and Athens (Thucydides: Book VIII; 46-50). Thucydides 
does not give us a speech or a monologue by Alcibiades at this point. At this 
stage he moves to discuss the way Alcibiades’s new alliance is connected 
with the war – the interests of Athens seem now to work in correlation with 
Alcibiades’s own self-interest. As Attica (and Athens, in the heart of it) is 
right in the middle between the Peloponnese (under Spartan rule) and Asia 
Minor (under Persian rule), it was strategically important for the Athenians 
that the Persians did not collaborate with Sparta against them, thus opening 
up a second front. Plutarch tells the story in a few concise sentences: 
                                                          
64 Plutarch, Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans: Volume 1, p. 208 
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 “Alcibiades was looked up to by the Greeks of both parties, and 
the Athenians, now in their misfortunes, repented them of their 
severe sentence against him. And he, on the other side, began 
to be troubled for them, and to fear lest, if that commonwealth 
were utterly destroyed, he should fall into the hands of the 
Lacedaemonians (Spartans), his enemies.”65 
Here, his country becomes yet again his source of identification. This time, 
not so much because it is his, but rather because it is its enemy’s enemy. 
Thucydides says that after the Athenians found out that Alcibiades has 
influence with Tissaphernes, Alcibiades sent messages to their chief men to 
ask them: 
“to make his views known to the best people in the army and to 
say that, if there were only an oligarchy instead of that corrupt 
democracy which had exiled him, he was ready to return to his 
country and take his part with his countrymen, and make 
Tissaphernes their friend. Thus the captains of the Athenian 
ships in Samos and the leading men in the army set themselves 
to the task of overthrowing the democracy” (Thucydides: VIII; 
47).  
The abolishment of democracy in the polis secured the Persians siding with 
Athens. Alcibiades promoting the abolishment of the political system in 
Athens proves not only his moral flexibility, but also shows the potential for 
the antagonism between private and public to be negotiated. And so the 
Persian support Alcibiades promised entailed a change of the political 
regime of Athens, in return for Athens keeping its sovereignty. Therefore, for 
Athens to become yet again Alcibiades’s Athens (as he said to the 
                                                          
65 Ibid., p. 209 
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Spartans), Athens had to change. It could no longer be Athens in order for it 
to be again Alcibiades’s Athens. It could no longer continue to be what made 
it Athens – a Greek democracy.  
In his famous Funeral Oration, Pericles, Alcibiades’s uncle, names the 
specific characters that make Athens unique – and at the top of them stands 
the democratic regime (Thucydides: II; 34-46). But for the nephew, the thing 
that made Athens unique was his relation to it, and not the political system it 
developed. Thucydides writes of him when he is called back to Athens after 
spending time with Tissaphernes:  
“Alcibiades, he rightly thought, cared no more for an oligarchy 
than for a democracy, and only sought to change the institutions 
of his country in order to get himself recalled by his associates” 
(Thucydides: Book VIII; 48).  
Plutarch adds:  
“…among the many strong passions of his real character, the 
one most prevailing of all was his ambition and desire of 
superiority […]”66  
But the pro-Spartan Oligarchy of the Four Hundred which was formed in 
Athens, did not invite Alcibiades back after seizing power of the polis. As he 
suspected that they would not call him back, Alcibiades now planned for his 
radical Democratic party in the city to demand his return with the threat of 
yet another coup – this time a democratic one of which he would be the 
leader. The first assembly to reconvene after the fall of the Oligarchy voted 
for the return of Alcibiades and other exiles (411 BC). On his way back to 
Athens Alcibiades won the battle of Abydus for the Athenians against the 
                                                          
66 Ibid, p. 195 
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Spartans in Hellespont. He joined the Athenian fleet and led it to a series of 
victories in Cyzicus, Chalcedon and Byzantium. After eight years in exile 
Alcibiades returned to the polis as its democratic regime was restored. He 
was received as a savior and was assigned to be the leader of the Athenian 
army, but an early defeat in Notium cost him his position. The Spartans and 
Persians formed an alliance and Alcibiades realized that his opponents in 
Athens were just looking for an opportunity to get rid of him yet again 
(Plutarch: Volume I; p. 218). Now his fate and that of Athens correlated 
tragically. 
As the Spartans controlled the land and sea, Alcibiades retreated to Phrygia 
in the inland of Asia Minor where looked for ways to secure Persian support 
for Athens yet again. By then the Spartans had already taken Athens and 
established the pro-Spartan government of the Thirty Tyrants. Critias, 
another one of Socrates’ pupils, who was a member of the Thirty, advised 
the Spartans that Alcibiades was a real danger to their hold of the Polis. The 
Spartans tracked Alcibiades and in 404 BC, according to one of the 
accounts of his death, Alcibiades was assassinated in his house in Phrygia. 
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Serial Treason as a Form of Betrayal  
“Please, Pericles, can you teach me what a law is?” 
Alcibiades in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 
The adventures of Alcibiades, as laid out here, suggest him as a chameleon, 
a trickster, a ‘polytropic’ being. In one ‘world war’ which included the three 
great powers of the time – Sparta, Athens and Persia – Alcibiades operated 
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on all sides of the conflict, changing his position between cultures and 
regimes, politics and philosophy, private and public. Again, his privileged 
position and manipulations are not proposed here as a teaching for political 
cunning. For his contemporaries Alcibiades excited a fear for the safety of 
the political order – an order that was based on defined antagonisms of 
monarchy/democracy, Greek/non-Greek, private/public. Alcibiades’s series 
of treasons performed a Betrayal of the different conflicted identities which 
constituted that world. It is not the horizon he was aiming for that is 
interesting here, but that which was opened by his Betrayal. His serial 
treasons constitute a model for Betrayal by exhausting the available 
antagonisms.  
If we move from his self-motivated actions, we see entailed beyond them 
possibilities of Betrayal.68 As he was embedded in the political competition of 
his time (agonistic and antagonistic), these terms become key references to 
his actions. Alcibiades was not professing or promoting an all-encompassing 
universalist vision, from which he acted and committed his serial treasons – 
he was striving for political power for himself, but at the same time the series 
of treasons he exercised, performed a Betrayal of the antagonisms 
available. As much as he was strategically agonist externally and 
antagonistic internally, his serial treasons propose one form of Betrayal that 
exhausts the antagonisms through which the world was articulated. 
Plutarch describes Alcibiades’ ability to change camps as that of a human 
chameleon:  
                                                          
68 “And the fact is that although history has always known those who, like Alcibiades, wanted 
power for themselves”, writes Hannah Arendt in relation to the revolutionary spirit 
of the last centuries.  See: Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin Classics, 2006, p. 
25. But it is not his motivations for acting, but rather the trajectories generated by 
his actions that are of interest when discussing him in relation to Betrayal. 
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“The renown which he earned by these public services was 
equaled by the admiration he attracted to his private life; he 
captivated and won over everybody by his conformity to Spartan 
habits. People who saw him wearing his hair close cut, bathing 
in cold water, eating coarse meal, and dining on black broth, 
doubted, or rather could not believe, that he ever had a cook in 
his house, or had ever seen a perfumer, or had worn a mantle 
of Milesian purple. For he had, as it was observed, this peculiar 
talent and artifice for gaining men's affections, that he could at 
once comply with and really embrace and enter into their habits 
and ways of life, and change faster than the chameleon. One 
color, indeed, they say the chameleon cannot assume: it cannot 
itself appear white; but Alcibiades, whether with good men or 
with bad, could adapt himself to his company, and equally wear 
the appearance of virtue or vice. At Sparta, he was devoted to 
athletic exercises, was frugal and reserved; in Ionia, luxurious, 
gay, and indolent; in Thrace, always drinking; in Thessaly, ever 
on horseback; and when he lived with Tissaphernes the Persian 
satrap, he exceeded the Persians themselves in magnificence 
and pomp. Not that his natural disposition changed so easily, 
nor that his real character was so variable, but, whether he was 
sensible that by pursuing his own inclinations he might give 
offence to those with whom he had occasion to converse, he 
transformed himself into any shape, and adopted any fashion, 
that he observed to be most agreeable to them.”69  
                                                          
69 Plutarch, Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans: Volume 1, pp. 207-208 
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Alcibiades’s Betrayal constantly confuses polarities.70 Ever the trickster, 
Alcibiades pathologically disobeys his given setting – committing treason on 
the level of the culture, the regime, the politics. In each of these antagonisms 
he proves his personal commitment for change and flexibility as the art of 
the politician; Persian or Greek, monarchy or democracy, private or public, 
philosophy or action, all are transgressed by him. Alcibiades does not inhabit 
only one antagonism, changing sides within it. His serial and overlapping 
treasons amount to a Betrayal. He deserves Plutarch’s depiction as being an 
evolved chameleon. Not only because of his talent of taking opposing sides, 
but also by what his constant repositioning does to the antagonisms 
themselves, his treasons accumulate to a Betrayal.  
By this, we should not conclude that Betrayal stands for the meaning which 
he attributes to his own actions. The horizon Alcibiades aims for is very 
limited and involves solely his political career. The thing accumulated here is 
not his motivations but his actions that work against them; the overlapping 
treasons of protocols of allegiance, of political systems, religion beliefs, of 
nations. His accumulated Betrayal enables another horizon to open in 
relation to these antagonisms. Betrayal opens new horizons beyond his own, 
exhausting the given antagonisms, by condensing them, stretching them and 
performing them to their limit. 
                                                          
70 Writing on the trickster’s intelligence, Lewis Hyde describes it as “seizing and blocking 
opportunity, confusing polarity, disguising tracks”. One of the marks of the trickster 
is the ability to alter the appearance of their skin – “sometimes they actually replace 
one skin with another”’ he writes (Plutarch’s description of Alcibiades as chameleon 
fits well here, of course). Connecting the idea of skin shifting with the notion of turn, 
Hyde says there are only three characters in Greek literature who are said to be 
“turning many ways” – Polutropus in Greek (Polytropic in English) – Hermes, 
Odysseus and Alcibiades (tropic – means turning – phototropic plants in tropical 
climate turn to follow light). Anti-polar and polytropic, Alcibiades’s serial treasons 
not only formed him as a singularity but devised us with a tactic for political action. 
See: Lewis Hyde, Trickster Makes This World: Mischief, Myth and Art, New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998, pp. 51-52  
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Addressing Alcibiades' motivation opens up a whole different set of ethics 
beyond ‘doing good’ which seems to necessarily rest upon insisting on one 
view of what constitutes a good life. Like the dandy, Alcibiades lives a good 
life but seems to expose the artifice of it all along the way. This is not some 
tepid relativism. His constant inversion calls to mind Gilles Deleuze’s 
explanation of the comic mode as the only way to destabilize the law. 
Deleuze differentiates between irony and humor in relation to the Marquise 
de Sade and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s fictions. Sade’s fiction proposes 
a superior principle that subverts the law with irony – putting against it an 
institution of upside-down laws, one of wickedness and evil, says Deleuze. 
Masoch’s fantasies, on the other hand, propose a downward principle of 
humor – that which reverses the law’s absurdity as a punitive contract 
system, and takes pleasure in its consequences.71 Inverting Socrates’s 
notion of “knowing good and doing good” would make Alcibiades here ironic 
according this Deleuzian scheme. Portrayed as a human chameleon – 
disguising himself as the different people he collaborates with (and then 
committing treason against them) – Alcibiades externalizes the internal 
contradictions of each of his escapades.  
Accepting and operating for the position of a privileged, masculine master 
warrior, it is also obvious that at the same time Alcibiades’s actions have 
strengthened other antagonisms that were articulated politically in the world 
he inhabited. Yet, I wish to use what his actions enable us, even contrary to 
his interests, to use as a model to think of ways for new collective 
subjectivities to emerge. 
                                                          
71 See: Gilles Deleuze, “Coldness and Cruelty”, in: Masochism, New York: Zone Books, 1991, 
pp. 81-90. 
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Alcibiades as Method: Exhaustion 
“And if I say anything which is not true, you may interrupt me if you 
will, and say ‘that is a lie,’ though my intention is to speak the truth. 
But you must not wonder if I speak any how as things come into my 
mind; for the fluent and orderly enumeration of all your singularities is 
not a task which is easy to a man in my condition” 
Alcibiades to Socrates in Plato’s Symposium  
The suggestion to see beyond Alcibiades’s motivations for his serial 
treasons, as an exhaustion of the antagonism of his time, makes his actions 
already propose the time to come. He was a product of the classical age in 
Athens, whose actions prefigure the formations of power and the 
antagonisms that were yet to come. His serial treasons performed a proto-
Hellenic journey. The model of Betrayal Alcibiades proposes is that of 
exhaustion of antagonisms. His Betrayal was one that swept the rivaling 
sides that constituted his world. His story offers one tactic of Betrayal – that 
of a series of treasons spiraled through the various antagonisms, bringing 
them down. What his world experienced almost one hundred years later, 
after the conquests of Alexander the Great – with its own antagonisms – 
cosmopolitan identities within the great Hellenistic empire, Alcibiades 
experienced in his life-time; an Athenian turned Spartan, turned Persian, 
turned Athenian again. If Betrayal displays the possibility for other 
potentialities to be actualized, then we can argue that Alcibiades’s serial 
treasons can be regarded as Betrayal. 
The method of this Betrayal is by exhaustion of the antagonisms. This 
entails exhausting oneself as well. Discussing the works of Samuel Beckett, 
Gilles Deleuze uses the term ‘the exhausted’ as a mode that “exhausts the 
possible” through what he calls ‘inclusive disjunction’. In this disjunction 
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“everything divides, but into itself.”72 Beckett can present a set of variables of 
a situation, but without any order or preference, any relation to a goal or any 
signification, explains Deleuze. This description cannot be furthest from 
Alcibiades, the highly-motivated and goal-oriented politician. But the 
accumulation of his actions (that do not accumulate to the goal he set for 
himself), provides a very different setting. Alcibiades exhausts the identities 
of Athenian, Spartan, Persian with his movement between them. His 
Betrayal enables us to use Deleuze’s formulation of Beckett’s exhausted – 
which relies mainly on language – in relation to politics. According to this 
proposal, the exhausted remains active, not for something, but for nothing. 
In this sense the exhausted might be self-defeating, but actually holds a very 
optimistic proposition – “to exhaust the possible,” meaning that something 
new will come out of the nothing; something which was not there in the 
different combinations of the already existing something.73 
Although it is hard to ‘digest’ Alcibiades’s proposal beyond what he testifies 
to himself, his spiraling series of treasons formulate a Betrayal in the form of 
the exhausted. His very distinct goal-oriented actions accumulate into a lack 
of preference. He exhausted that which, in the possible, is not realized. But 
this lack of preference that emerges beyond his personal interest, this 
Betrayal, has its own direction. His exhaustive series of actions indeed 
divided Athens into itself. It also divided Alcibiades himself, making present 
the dependency on the outside that is constitutes it. When examining his 
actions in relation to Betrayal, one finds in exhaustion a creative realm for 
                                                          
72 Deleuze draws four ways in which Beckett ‘exhausts the possible’: “Forming exhaustive 
series of things, drying up the flow of voices, extenuating the potentialities of space, 
and dissipating the power of the image” (p. 161). Forming exhaustive series of things, 
resonates on some level the exhaustion enacted by Alcibiades’s Betrayal. See: Gilles 
Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” in: Essays Critical and Clinical, Trans.: Daniel W. Smith and 
Michael A. Greco, London and New York: Verso, 1998, pp. 152-174. 
73 Gilles Deleuze, “The Exhausted,” p. 156 
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political action. The Betrayal we extract from his actions constitutes new 
knowledge for unattainable potentialities to appear. Working with established 
narratives of conflict and antagonism, the Betrayal of Alcibiades opens up 
possibilities not only as a metaphor but also for rethinking the political 
horizon and action.  
Athens is the horizon which is in fact what grounds his Betrayal. No matter 
his narrow self-interest seeking, he never ceases to be an Athenian, in the 
sense that he looks for greatness, as Socrates would put it: “…you are of the 
most gallant family in your city, the greatest city in Greece…” (Plato, 
Alcibiades I; 104). For Mouffe, antagonism is an irreconcilable conflict. Her 
way of re-establishing a dynamic of conflictuality goes through 
acknowledging the divide. Operating on both the agonistic and antagonistic 
level against themselves, Alcibiades suggests one practice of Betrayal. By 
literally exhausting the antagonisms through serial treasons, changing sides 
several times, in what was then a ‘world war,’ The Peloponnesian War, 
Alcibiades performed a Betrayal of the conflicts that were at hand. While 
being in the conflict, the accumulation of his actions performed a non-direct 
strategy of challenging the conflict. He was a conflictual participant in each 
of the antagonisms, but his actions generated that inclusive disjunction, 
wherein they spiraled from the fundamental distinctions of the conflict, and 
while engaging with them, already offered a withdrawal from the logic of 
antagonism the conflict offers itself through. 
We can see with Alcibiades how Betrayal is not reduced to the act nor the 
aim of the act, but an interpretation made by it in relation to other actions 
and settings. It is the meanings we can take from the actions. On a certain 
level it is in the acts as a series, in the sense that it is the way through which 
we can consider the acts in relation to one another. Deleuze makes an 
important point for us when he considers the exhausted in relation to aporia, 
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that Socratic pedagogical tool. The exhaustive series puts that which can be 
done in aporia. Deleuze is saying that: “the aporia will be solved if one 
considers that the limit of the series does not lie at the infinity of the terms 
but can be anywhere in the flow.” So the series is exhausted already 
between two terms; “between two voices or the variations of a single 
voice.”74 So exhaustion comes out of aporia but it is not aporia. 
Alcibiades’s Betrayal enables the exterior to come inside into the interior, by 
that the antagonisms can be re-articulated outside their own terms. This is 
achieved through the exhaustion of antagonisms. When we examine the 
idea of fundamental-antagonism and Mouffe’s move from enemy to 
adversary or from a politics of antagonism to agonism, in relation to 
Alcibiades, we must consider the specific Betrayal we articulate through 
serial treasons – this form of exhaustion, passes through the various 
available antagonisms and one by one it undoes them.  
Describing Alcibiades's actions as a method to differentiate Betrayal from 
treason and desertion, has been the aim of this part of the chapter. Like the 
stories of characters such as Oedipus or Antigone, this (non)-fictional 
character from antiquity enables us to extract a radical political tool. As 
treason still operates within the antagonisms, we need to betray them. As 
states of political antagonism actually demand us to bestow our trust in them 
and to believe in them in order to participate in their conflict and to actually 
make them happen (through a variety of practices – from collaboration, 
complacency and apathy, to critique and direct resistance), the model we 
can extract from Alcibiades is that of turning from these antagonisms. This is 
not a model for political resignation but rather for ‘secret’-agency of 
potentialities of new collective subjectivities.  
                                                          
74 Ibid., pp. 157-158 
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Alcibiades’s actions contaminate clear distinctions of us/them, by performing 
an entanglement of inside and outside. His Betrayal makes present their 
connectedness and interrelation. The Betrayal he performs through 
exhausting the existing antagonisms moves between a discourse of a 
‘historical bloc’75 to a practice of a ‘single bloc of becoming.’76 Instead of 
being confined to the antagonism’s logic – like Mouffe and Laclau map the 
logic of antagonism – his Betrayal re-aligns, and shifts the lines of struggle. 
By moving from one side to the other, crossing the lines outward time and 
time again he engages with the antagonisms by repeated exits. These exits 
though, never leave him outside Athens but always in relation to it. 
If we were to ask what Betrayal is a symptom of, we could argue after 
Mouffe that it is to the political need to always re-articulate the antagonisms 
in order for ‘everything to be otherwise.’ This ‘otherwise’ is done through the 
exhaustion of the antagonisms themselves. Alcibiades has exhausted 
treason and made the exterior interior – directly engaging the antagonisms 
of his time, his actions gave way to surpassing them. The re-articulation of 
antagonisms, is at the heart of the proposal for actualizing potentialities for 
new collective subjectivities. By committing a series of treasons (against 
philosophy, Athens, Sparta, the Persians and the regime from which he 
gained his power), Alcibiades betrayed the political antagonisms of his time, 
proposing new positionalities that were yet to come. Mouffe’s use of the 
constitutive outside in relation to antagonism, helps in understanding the 
meaning of Alcibiades’s Betrayal as a move inside-out, that does not only 
subscribe to a change of sides from within (‘here’ to ‘there’). By that his 
Betrayal is re-politicizing the ability for action to engage with the emergence 
of new collective subjectivities. 
                                                          
75 See: Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 42 
76 See: Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II,  p. 2 
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Alcibiades and the Curatorial  
As method, Alcibiades’s Betrayal can be instructive in enhancing, 
intensifying and expanding what can be done in relation to the fundamental-
antagonism. Unlike Mouffe’s agonism and Mouffe and Laclau’s antagonism, 
Alcibiades brings forth the presence of the outside that is not only the one 
constituting the political equation, but also that which is external to the 
political system – in this way his actions challenge the somewhat hermetic 
logic that both agonism and antagonism propose. The circumstances of a 
functioning empire such as Athens in the fifth century BC, allow for its 
privileged political class to conduct its matters by way of agonism, and in 
many ways Alcibiades takes advantage of that when he makes his enemies 
adversaries for his own gain. But with Betrayal, there is always an outside to 
that. This external political entity is not conceivable within agonism. At one 
point, the internal contradictions of the upper classes no longer allow them to 
conduct politics through agonism and the rupture of the antagonism 
surfaces. Alcibiades seems to enact this rupture time and time again, and by 
that he not only performs different antagonisms, but the repetition of 
antagonisms his activates undermines each of them, and the logic that 
makes them.  
Alcibiades’s actions defy monolithic allegiance to Athens as they propose 
paradoxical loyalty to Athens as a series of treasons instead. This is loyalty 
to Athens as an open question, problematizing its fundamental quest for 
political and philosophical greatness. By that he enhances, intensifies and 
expands Athens beyond the polis’ territorializing logic. This meaning of his 
actions suggests an inclusive disjunction of Athens. Alcibiades’s actions 
perform a Betrayal that proposes engaging with the antagonisms at hand 
while modifying their conditions. Through his serial treasons, his actions hint 
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that this is a contingent becoming that is potentially in any antagonism. His 
actions actualize this contingency by way of Betrayal. 
Going back to the curatorial, we could say that in relation to the notion of the 
series, the curatorial would be a reading of each element in relation to the 
other (“between two terms, between two voices or the variations of a single 
voice”). The formation of a conceptual framework these elements suggest 
for reading them emerges from an inductive reasoning if you like, by which 
each relation between the elements informs the others. The exhausted is 
key for the curatorial because what the curatorial aims to achieve is the 
emergence of something which was not there in the different combinations 
of the already existing something.  
In this respect, when considered in relation to the curatorial, Alcibiades’s 
form of Betrayal seems useful. In the curatorial, we work with notions of 
inhabited fictions that call for an embodied politics that will offer a way to that 
no-longer/not-yet available outside. We are constantly imagining a vantage 
point that is unimaginable within the perspectives offered through the 
antagonism itself. Embodying Betrayal contains the painful and liberating 
tension of unresolved subjectivities. Performing potentialities through an 
expanded understanding of the curatorial (involving publishing, screening, 
organizing, setting up and putting together art exhibitions, readings, 
demonstrations and more), does not immediately entail the formation of new 
subjectivities. While claiming for political validity, this way of operating might 
seem too loose, too fragmented, yet it has become a form for performing 
and practicing Betrayal as a loyalty to a horizon, beyond protocols of 
allegiance. While moving away from given antagonisms, Betrayal is a 
political project which engages with collective and personal motivations. The 
curatorial involves the constant labor of politics – of renegotiating not only 
within different fields and discourses but also in between these fields and 
87 
 
discourses. Assuming not-yet-available and no-longer-available standpoints 
– sometimes simultaneously – makes Betrayal a proposal to be applied in 
the present tense. Therefore, political agency and political power is not 
merely sought after through scenarios of Betrayals but is also constituted, 
produced and proposed through Betrayal.  
This contingent complexity is part and parcel of the curatorial – it is the 
complexity of the charted and the explored, and the uncharted and 
unexplored, the narrated and analyzed, and the unnarratable and that which 
resists analysis. The curatorial engages with given circumstances and with 
publics that are yet to come, and operates through interdependency and 
connectedness between separate and contradictory categories. Alcibiades’s 
Betrayal therefore, is a potential curatorial strategy of exhausting 
antagonisms and actualizing connectedness outwards, one which has 
political validity.  
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Introduction 
Men make their own history; but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by 
themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmitted from the past. 
 
Karl Marx’s 18th of Brumaire of Louis Napoleon 
The Curatorial seems to lend itself to Betrayal. The curatorial undoes 
dichotomies and binaries as it involves movements between things and 
fields rather than solidifying meanings. By this, the curatorial demonstrates 
the possibilities of Betrayal. The movement, the relations and the 
connectedness of the concrete and the abstract, the material and immaterial, 
the present and the absent, allow for a set of different approaches towards 
meaning, the production of meaning and its interpretation. 
In this chapter I will address fictionalism and anachronism as forms of 
Betrayal. To do this I will describe these proposals as ways to reenter 
historical and political narratives. Therefore I will first outline a set of 
relations in contemporary political narratives which fictionalism and 
anachronism aim to challenge.  
But in order to do that, we have to first address some questions regarding 
history. Emancipatory projects used to circle around an escape from the 
clutches of the given reality, an exit away from real existing circumstances, a 
leap  beyond history. Paradigmatic shifts, revolution, “making everything 
new” ─ were all proposals that the avant-garde embraced.  
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But today we experience a counter-movement when it comes to the 
traditions of emancipatory struggles. A variety of reasons, including the 
proliferation of creative destruction77, the failed outcomes of the successful 
critique of alienation78, and the reality of debt which freezes time and power 
relations79, have all brought us to a point where it is actually the reactivation 
of history, of historical projects ─ successful as well as failed ones, existing 
and imagined ─ that has proliferated; we find ourselves returning back to it, 
by reconnecting to what seemed no longer available or was never actually 
                                                          
77 A summary of this condensed history of the notion of capitalist accumulation through 
destruction will include Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto where they observe 
that “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the 
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them 
the whole relations of society.” Then with Marxist concepts such as primitive 
accumulation and accumulation by dispossession, and as well with Walter Benjamin’s 
constitutive and preservative violence, to Schumpeterian creative destruction, and 
the more recent iteration in this genealogy of terms ─ Naomi Klein’s “disaster 
capitalism”. See: Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in: Walter Benjamin, 
Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, Ed.: Peter Demetz, 
Schocken Books, 1986; Joseph Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
[1942], Routledge, 1994; Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism, Metropolitan Books, 2007; David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the 
Crises of Capitalism, London: Profile Books, 2010 
78 In his essay “The Flexible Personality: For a New Cultural Critique,” Brian Holmes follows Luc 
Boltanski and Ève Chiapello in articulating the relation between creativity, 
subjectivity, spectacle, and labor. Following Boltanski and Chiapello, Holmes defines 
May ’68 as a point where we can see a move from the critique of exploitation (“social 
critique”) by workers’ movements to the critique of alienation (“artistic critique”), 
which gained more presence by the mass cultural education of welfare-state 
universities. With this shift “the young, aspiring managerial class, whether still in the 
universities or at the lower echelons of enterprise, became the major vector for the 
artistic critique of authoritarianism and bureaucratic impersonality.” This is how, 
Holmes explains, “the organizational figure of the network emerged to provide a 
magical answer to the anti-systemic cultural critique of the 1950s and 1960s—a 
magical answer, at least for the aspirant managerial class.” See: Brian Holmes, “The 
Flexible Personality: For a New Cultural Critique,” in: transversal: Machines and 
Subjectivation, EIPCP, January 2002: 
http://www.eipcp.net/transversal/1106/holmes/en.  
79 See: Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man, Trans.: Joshua David Jordan, 
Semiotext(e), 2012 
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available. Artistic practices of the past decade and a half, involving 
reenactment and simulations, documentary research and media activism 
seem to propose that this move back to history entails the retracing of 
politics in cultural production, to later reappear back in politics. 
The ambivalence of leaving history/re-entering history characterizes the 
materials I am dealing with here, and it relates directly to Betrayal operating 
as both ‘withdrawal from’ and ‘engagement with.’ Betrayal provides a 
withdrawal on some respects and an engagement with others. Fictionalism 
and anachronism as they are proposed in this chapter, propose different 
strategies of entanglement of engagement and withdrawal – approaching 
real existing circumstances from perspectives that are perceived as 
unavailable to us. 
Betrayal as an exploration of the devices that destabilize the fundamental 
antagonism would have to follow this trail of reactivating history. For this, 
Sigmund Freud’s last book on the biblical figure of Moses seems 
instructive.80 Freud’s “Moses” provides a scenario that unsettles the concrete 
and abstract, myth and science, belief and sacrilege, fact and narrative, Jew 
and Egyptian. And all this was done in direct relation to real existing 
circumstances he was facing in Austria when a direct political division was 
made between Jew and German.  
Freud’s “Moses” frames the discussion in this chapter and it informs the 
whole discussion that will be developed here in relation to spectatorship and 
history, notions of transparency and conspiracy, practices of reenactment 
and historical narrative, strategies of collision and addition, and the 
proposition of parafictions, anachronism and fictionalism as political devices 
in relation to Betrayal. By developing a structure that de-constructs the 
                                                          
80 See: Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, Trans.: Katherine Jones, Vintage Books, 1939 
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fundamental antagonism he was facing, Freud offers in his book about 
Moses another way for putting into action the building of the destabilized 
relations between narrative and analysis, science and myth. His “Moses” 
performs Betrayal as re-entry into history. This late work by Freud was 
referred to by the German psychoanalyst and researcher of Freud Ilse 
Grubrich-Simitis as an essay on the psychology of religion, a form of bible 
criticism, a novel re-writing a myth, a historical essay on the evolution on the 
concept of psychoanalysis, a monograph on the development of the 
neurosis of the self and society, a political manifesto and a metaphorical 
biography. In a word, she calls this work “a daydream.”81 Moses and 
Monotheism was the last book Freud published during his lifetime. It 
presents an exceptionally speculative analysis on the biblical figure of Moses 
and the origins of monotheism, Judaism and anti-Semitism. But its proposal 
of an origin is directed at the realities of the time when it was published, 
when the author experienced the unbridgeable tensions of Judaism and anti-
Semitism in Europe. At the time of working on the book, Freud himself 
experienced a dramatic escape from his hometown of Vienna, where he had 
developed his theory and practice of psychoanalysis. The book can be read 
simply as an application of several analytical strategies, and even on this 
level it is an exciting and extremely creative work. But the relevance of 
Freud’s “Moses” for us here has to do with its proposition in the context of 
the real existing circumstances of its time. On this level, the inventive 
strategies provided by its author should be read as potential strategies for 
entangling dichotomies and unsettling structural divisions.  
From all the suggestive qualities of this work, this chapter will highlight its 
proposition of fictionalism and anachronism as forms of Betrayal. These are 
                                                          
81 Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, Early and Late Freud: Reading Anew Studies on Hysteria and Moses 
and Monotheism, Trans.: Philip Slotkin, Routledge, 1997, p. 60 
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two strategies that one can find in contemporary works that are preoccupied 
with the ambivalence of leaving history/re-entering history. These strategies 
highlight the tensions that Freud himself was also tackling when faced with 
the Jew/German dichotomy. Before discussing Freud’s work in detail, I will 
address several issues of historicity and historical narration that are present 
in contemporary works. This will be done in order to describe the setting in 
which the concepts that Freud’s “Moses” proposes seem most needed. 
 
History and Narrative 
“For legends attract the very best in our times, just as ideologies 
attract the average, and the whispered tales of gruesome secret 
powers behind the scenes attract the very worst.”  
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism82 
A philosophy of history that does not question the notion of being in history, 
is doomed to seem arbitrary. In the field of critical theory, we usually use the 
attribute “historical” as a way to somewhat refute a category. If we think of 
human sexuality, economic activity, the family, the body, our notion of seeing 
─ all these have been historicized in the sense that they were made flexible, 
ever-changing, never-natural or universal.  
In an essay on history and narrative, philosopher Noam Yuran explains that:  
“Historicity is characterized not only by a thought that becomes 
possible at a certain moment, but more so by what cannot be 
thought. […] It is of course a characterization that can only be 
attributed retroactively, looking back from a later point in time. 
                                                          
82  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [1951], San Diego: Harcourt Inc., 2001, p. 
209 
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However, if historical knowing is a particular kind of knowing, it is 
necessarily entangled with what could be understood retroactively.”83  
Yuran shows how both Freud and Marx view history as simultaneously 
interpreting and hiding itself. This logic, he observes, operates for both on 
the level of politics and on the level of the subject. “To know about sex 
means to repress the fact that your sexual identity is formed around 
ignorance” Yuran paraphrases Freud, “To know means not to know that you 
don’t know.” 
Yuran’s main argument for a reentry into a philosophy of history involves 
these interplays between knowing, not-knowing and unknowing:  
“The limit to thought as defining historicity posits a few simple terms 
as a focus of a philosophy of history. It allows us to think about terms 
like “already”, “still”, “not yet”, which in a context of history necessitate 
philosophical thought. […]  They demand and enable us to think about 
how a thing isn’t just what it is, but how it is already something else 
and how it is not something else just yet.”84 
With “already,” “still,” and “not yet” Yuran’s discussion of historicity moves to 
the role of narrative. The narrative deployment of history compels him to ask 
how history can take the form of a story at all. For this reason, he addresses 
Hayden White’s influential claims on historical text as literary artifact. The 
historical narrative, White argues, depends on omitted facts no less than it 
                                                          
83 Noam Yuran, “Already, Still and Not Yet: How History Is,” Translated by: Avi Pitchon, 
Maarav Journal, The Israeli Centre for Digital Art, 2013: 
http://www.maarav.org.il/english/2013/10/already-still-and-not-yet-how-history-is-
noam-yuran [Last retrieved: 15.10.2015] 
84 Ibid. 
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relies on those that are included in it.85 If reality contains only fact, then the 
fact that a story depends on omitting some facts means that every narrative 
is partial, untrue, says Yuran. Yuran is showing how on a “factual” level this 
might be a solid argument, but if human reality is organized around a lack – 
limit to knowledge, the unthinkable, the lack of knowledge – around what 
was omitted from it, then reality can be given to narrative structure. Historical 
narratives, therefore, need to be organized around that which is not fact, or 
around that which is absent from factual reality. What Yuran is looking for, is 
a way to read in White’s claims on our inability to guarantee that one 
historical narrative will be closer to the truth than another, an analysis of the 
conditions of possibility of historical truth: 
“If all we have is facts, then there’s no one true story. Were we to 
combine all possible facts, the story itself would vanish. Yet, the same 
argument also follows through to say that if what we have are stories, 
                                                          
85 See: Hayden White, “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact”, in The Tropics of Discourse: 
Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 90. In 
a series of publications, White developed categories for approaching historical 
writing through literary devices. For his, any historical narration of facts, chronicles, 
documents, actions, involves literary preferences. He highlights four genres of 
historical emplotment: Romance, Tragedy, Comedy and Satire. The first two (Comedy 
and Tragedy) follow distinct rules and are determined by these rules rather than by 
the human agency of their protagonists. The second pair (Romance and Satire) are 
organized around human protagonists and their actions. A comedy is structured 
around contradicting rules and their collision. The outcome of which is the restoring 
of order – a happy ending (White relates this to Hegel). A tragedy on the other hand 
brings the collision of contradicting rules (biological, economic, social etc.) to its 
bitter end in the form of catastrophe (he relates this to Marx). Romance tells the 
human story of conquest, perseverance and personal victory (he relates this to the 
story of Jesus and to Nietzsche). And satire tells the story of human defeat – how 
attempts to overcome human fate have failed, and amounted to defeat and death 
(he relates this to liberal writers like Jacob Burckhardt and Benedetto Croce). See: 
Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. For a critique of White, see: 
Carlo Ginzburg, Threads and Traces: True, False, Fictive, Trans.: Anne C. Tedeschi and 
John Tedeschi, University of California Press, 2012 
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then human reality cannot be formed strictly out of facts. In other 
words, White’s razor-sharp argument in fact presents an acute 
ontological dilemma about history. If what reality contains is just fact, 
then narratives have no ontological status. Facing that, if there are 
narratives, if there is a truth value to a historical narrative, then reality 
is not only built with fact. If stories exist, then fact isn’t all there is. To 
articulate it more radically, if stories exist, then human reality contains 
not just what is, but also what isn’t.”86 
Yuran hints on a relation between what can/cannot be thought and what 
is/isn’t. Here, it is not only the structural tension between the factual/non-
factual and the thinkable/unthinkable and their reversal, as Yuran explains, 
which makes for a philosophy of history. It is actually in the tensions 
between these two formations, factual and contemplated, and their internal 
contradictions, that history takes place. As we will see with Freud’s “Moses,” 
anachronism and fictionalism are two strategies of interfering with this 
quadruple structure of is/isn’t-thinkable/unthinkable. Yuran concludes that a 
historical moment in the fullest sense of the term is a moment “when the 
unthinkable is thought, and equally so it is a moment when what used to be 
thought can no longer be. It’s a moment when history is. When history 
appear as a substance.”87 
 
Spectatorship and Conspiracy 
The discursive explosion of conspiracy theories in recent years treats history 
literally as substance. Yet, it seems to offer the opposite of what Yuran is 
suggesting. In a way, there is almost no other way to discuss truth in the 
                                                          
86 Yuran, “Already, Still and Not Yet: How History Is” 
87  Ibid. 
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political sphere today, other than through conspiracy theories and the 
tracings of deals between elected officials, public servants, big business, the 
clergy, lobbyists, and other parties of interest. As we are subjected to a 
politics of representation in two ways – one is the system of political 
representation (parliamentary regimes) and the other is that of the 
representation of politics (through media outlets), we find ourselves to be 
both the sovereign (“The People”) and the audience of viewers (“The 
Spectators”). This double-bound meaning of representational regimes 
includes the system of political representation and the representation of the 
political system.  
Historian Benedict Anderson presented a compelling description of the birth 
of the nation-state out of the invention of the printed press. Imagined 
communities like nations have come to existence thanks to the invention of 
newspapers, and their commercial success, he suggested:  
“If the development of print as-commodity is the key to the generation 
of wholly new ideas of simultaneity, still, we are simply at the point 
where communities of the type 'horizontal secular, transverse-time' 
become possible. Why, within that type, did the nation become so 
popular? The factors involved are obviously complex and various. But 
a strong case can be made for the primacy of capitalism.”88  
What Anderson proposes is a reversal of perspective in order to historicize 
the notion of a nation. The experience of simultaneous-distribution-time 
provided the framework to envision a community that is like-minded on the 
level of experience, language, habits. It is therefore practice rather than myth 
that makes a nation. But this practice, Anderson would suggest is not 
                                                          
88 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London and New York: Verso, 1983, p. 37 
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intentional and conscious but rather derives from the repetition of habits and 
costumes that are in no way explicitly symbolic for the formation of a nation.   
This double-bound meaning of the system of political representation and the 
representation of the political system was further developed by Bruno Latour 
when articulating what his “object-oriented democracy” attempts to do:  
“[…] to bring together two different meanings of the word 
representation that have been kept separate in theory although they 
have remained always mixed in practice. The first one, so well-known 
in schools of law and political science, designates the ways to gather 
the legitimate people around some issue. In this case, a 
representation is said to be faithful if the right procedures have been 
followed. The second one, well known in science and in technology, 
presents or rather represents what is the object of concern to the eyes 
and ears of those who have been assembled around it. In this case, a 
representation is said to be good if the matters at hand have been 
accurately portrayed.”89  
In both modes, passivity is our mode of operating. Combining these two 
passivities, we can argue that the phenomenon of conspiracy theories 
expresses a hyperactivity of political passivity.  
This dual status of representational regimes produces a series of paradoxes 
that feed a conspiratorial knowledge. We find ourselves reading images from 
the media – photos, captions, headlines, and news stories – in a paranoid 
                                                          
89 Bruno Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public,” in: Making 
Things Public – Atmospheres of Democracy, Eds.: Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, 
catalogue of the exhibition at ZKM – Centre for Art and Media Karlsruhe, MA: MIT 
Press, 2005, p. 6  
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way. The hermeneutics of suspicion expands here.90 In its immersion in this 
double-bound passivity, the critical stand borders here the conspiratorial 
one, raising questions such as: “Where did this image come from? Who 
brought it to my knowledge? Why am I seeing this?”91 
Jorge Luis Borges’s short story “Theme of the Traitor and the Hero” (1944), 
offers a model for reading into (and writing) conspiracy theories. The story 
begins with a researcher writing a book on the Irish liberation movement of 
the mid-nineteenth century and its leader Fergus Kilpatrik. Its focus is the 
story of some Irish rebels, one of whom (Kilpatrik) has confessed to 
betraying their movement. After confessing, “he and his cabal decided that 
he should die a hero, a martyr, thus redeeming his traitorous act by 
furnishing Ireland with a shining example of heroism”.  
Taking inspiration in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar and Abraham Lincoln’s 
assassination, and using the entire town as a stage, it is decided that 
Kilpatrik will play the role of a hero and sacrifices himself “in order to 
preserve his heroic image and the peoples’ passion for the cause”.92 
The execution takes place in the theatre with the audience witnessing it as 
an assassination. The researcher in the story realizes the truth – the 
assassination was in fact an execution. The role of the audience in the 
theatre was therefore of constituting and validating the theme of 
                                                          
90 See: Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, Trans.: Denis Savage, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, p. 32 
91 Jodi Dean has written extensively on conspiracy theories, relating them to different media 
outlets and to psychological circuits of drive. See: Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other 
Neoliberal Fantasies; Jodi Dean, Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits of 
Drive, Polity Press, 2010 
92 Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths. Eds. Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby New York: New 
Directions, 1964, pp. 72-75 
100 
 
assassination of the hero over that of the reality of the execution of the 
traitor.  
Aside from Borges’s interest in historical truth here, the role of the audience 
as participant and even instigator is what makes this short story a template 
for conspiracy theories. The ‘Death of the Author’ logic of narration it 
proposes, by which it is the reader/viewer who actually authors the piece, is 
taken here to the level of presence and participation. Therefore, conspiracy 
theories should be read as models of implicated spectatorship. Being 
politically passive through the mechanism of representatives, we are 
hyperactive when decoding representations of politics. The role of the 
spectators is to validate the events as they unfold, as if the regimes of 
representations and representatives are independent from them.  
In these atmospheres of democracy, the deep mistrust in mediated news 
outlets produced a complementary project to that of conspiracy theories – 
the growing demand for transparency. Structurally, the demand for 
transparency in representative-based regimes has its roots in ancient times. 
The theatre – “a place for seeing” in ancient Greek – embodies already in its 
structure the tensions of sight and sound that we have inherited from 
Athenian democracy; its main acoustic feature is the enhancement of the 
voice of the speaker at the bottom, where the stage is located. While it offers 
transparency (as all are seen by all, performers and audience), the physical 
structure of the theatre implies a power relation manifested by visibility and 
acoustics: as the person speaking from the seats cannot be heard, the 
speaker represents the listeners, the performer represents the viewers, the 
politician represents the people.93 
                                                          
93 See: Richard Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994, pp. 31–67 
101 
 
Our recent proliferation of conspiracy theories therefore, has to do with the 
deepening double-bound passivity at the heart of our representational 
regimes. The blatant lies about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by the 
US government, following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, has placed the politics of 
lying in the center of the debate on democracy.94 Governmental strategies of 
deception and ongoing questions of accountability generated a demand for a 
politics of transparency. This demand found its outlet in initiatives such as 
Wikileaks which began its operations in 2006. Later on these demands took 
the shape of horizontal modes of organizing used by the Occupy movement 
and the mass encampments of the movement for social justice around the 
world. 
 
Transparency and Conspiracy 
The way politics is represented is tied to the way we are represented in it. 
Julian Assange, co-founder of Wikileaks, produced several manifestos to 
support his cause and lay out his strategy. In these manifestos he describes 
governance as conspiracy and explains how a systematic exposure of 
governmental wrongdoings should be done. Assange’s formulation of politics 
not only equates it to conspiracy but displays the way in which the demand 
for transparency relies on this portrayal. In the first part of his manifesto, 
titled “State and Terrorist Conspiracies” (dated November 10, 2006), 
                                                          
94 In the first Colbert Report TV show on Comedy Central in October 2005, US satirist Stephen 
Colbert coined the word “truthiness,” which later made its way into English 
dictionaries. Colbert described truthiness as “truth that comes from the gut, not 
books.” The American Dialect Society later defined the word as: “the quality of 
preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts 
known to be true.” This word represented for many in the media at that time, the 
relation the Bush administration had with the truth.  
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Assange proposes to see political power as an arithmetic map of links that 
generate the conspiratorial network of government. He writes:  
“Where details are known as to the inner workings of authoritarian 
regimes, we see conspiratorial interactions among the political elite 
not merely for preferment or favor within the regime but as the primary 
planning methodology behind maintaining or strengthening 
authoritarian power.”95 
In the second part of the manifesto, titled “Conspiracy as Governance” 
(dated 03.12.2006), Assange concludes:  
“When we look at an authoritarian conspiracy as a whole, we see a 
system of interacting organs, a beast with arteries and veins whose 
blood may be thickened and slowed until it falls, stupefied; unable to 
sufficiently comprehend and control the forces in its environment. 
Later we will see how new technology and insights into the 
psychological motivations of conspirators can give us practical 
methods for preventing or reducing important communication between 
authoritarian conspirators, foment strong resistance to authoritarian 
planning and create powerful incentives for more humane forms of 
governance.”96 
Here, the ambition to upload information in order to give the public the raw 
data before it can be filtered or analyzed, stands for idealism. It is perceived 
                                                          
95 Julian Assange, “State and Terrorist Conspiracies,” 10.11.2006. See: 
http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf [Last retrieved: 15.10.2015] 
96 Julian Assange, “Conspiracy as Governance,” 03.12.2006. See: http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-
conspiracies.pdf [Last retrieved: 15.10.2015]. The interesting thing here is that  in 
turn, this truthiness became the currency used by Fascists in newly introduced 
democracies, non-liberal democracies, where speaking the truth meant giving license 
to racism. The common phrase here would be “at least he’s not lying or hiding 
behind empty politically correct statements.” 
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as an uncompromising stand for transparency and therefore truth. Media 
critic Orit Gat has defined this mode of operation as “The Politics of 
Scanning”: 
“The romanticized image of the scanner is based on the assumption 
that by scanning and uploading we make information available, and 
that that is somehow an invariably democratic act. Scanning has 
become synonymous with transparency and access.”97  
The weakness Gat finds in this mode of political action is that it lacks 
meaningful analysis. “Because the release of documents is viewed as a 
positive, even heroic gesture, the analysis thereof may be lackluster,” she 
writes. In many ways, the assumption that the internet enables widespread 
distribution, is countered by a more common reality in which scans are 
facilitated through centralized access, she says.  
“The contemporary political imaginary links the scanner with 
democracy, and so we should explore further the political possibilities, 
values, and limitations associated with the process of scanning 
documents to be uploaded to the internet. What are the political 
possibilities of making information available?” 
The scan turns the document into an image. On the one hand, becoming a 
digital image helps it circulate and gain traction. On the other, in order to find 
                                                          
97 Orit Gat, “Unbound: The Politics of Scanning”, rhizome.org, See: 
http://rhizome.org/editorial/2014/oct/9/unbound-politics-scanning/ [Last retrieved: 
15.10.2015]. Gat’s observations should be read in light of the critique of participation 
as the hallmark of online activity on blogs and social networks. Jodi Dean described 
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on political drive rather than desire. Dean herself recognizes that these online 
platforms are viewed as democratizing society based on the belief that competition 
and participation are the preconditions for democracy. See: Jodi Dean, Democracy 
and Other Neoliberal Fantasies 
104 
 
it, it now relies on description words for search engines. So we’ve changed 
the image back to text for collection and dispersion. Even with OCR text 
recognition, Gat says, the document as image file still depends on 
convenient, centralized, easily controlled hosting services, “limiting its 
potential for political disruption.” 
Using Yuran’s concept of the philosophy of history as the history of not 
knowing, we can say that information-based activism might be a limited form 
of political action as it assumes that politics can be summarized with facts 
and figures. Access to information, through transparency or conspiracy, still 
lacks critical assessment, which is the basis for political analysis. In addition, 
and here Freud’s ”Moses”, is of relevance as well, this form of politics lacks 
the realization that “human reality contains not just what is, but also what 
isn’t.” 
It seems that the culmination of the demand for this kind of transparency 
politics was exemplified in 2011 with the encampments of the movement for 
social justice around the world. In these encampments experiments were 
made in practicing direct democracy. This form of politics aimed to execute 
non-representational relations. What the encampments of Occupy share with 
the operations of Wikileaks, is an ethics of transparency that envisions an 
open field of politics where lucidity and frequency are tuned in the right pitch 
and light without any noise or resonance. Representational politics would be 
for them the noise, the echo and corruption of the clear voicing of demands 
by individuals to other individuals.  
But in reality, the political action carried by the encampments and the 
Occupy movement was exactly that of representation. Paradoxically, while 
the model of representation was rejected inwards and the experiments with 
direct democracy reached a dead end, the movement took it upon itself to 
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represent the class division outwards as the basis of our society, therefore, 
representing the divide, the void. As political thinker Jodi Dean and political 
activist Jason Jones write: 
“This new mode of representation doesn’t attempt to reconcile. It 
doesn’t aggregate interest, extract division, and assert a forced false 
unity in a different place. Occupy makes this antagonism appear. 
Asserting division, it represents possibility.”98 
So the demand for transparency which was at the heart of the worldwide 
movement for social justice actually produced representation on another 
level. While attempting to produce internal non-representational political 
systems, the encampments claimed to represent the 99%, therefore 
enacting external representation. This means that even those movements 
that were able to mobilize massive publics were still operating 
representational politics. If we take the masses in Tahrir square in Cairo, 
they were still a fraction in number compared to the multitude they claimed 
to represent.  
Eventually, the conspiracy/transparency formulation of politics found itself 
facing questions of representation. And those questions call for interpretation 
and articulation, two characteristics of old school political work and 
contemporary curatorial work.  
 
                                                          
98 Jodi Dean and Jason Jones, “Occupy Wall Street and the Politics of Representation,” in: The 
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The Revolution as Language 
Political theorist Ariella Azoulay has been developing in recent years a visual 
vocabulary for the revolution. Assisted with an ongoing archive of images 
Azoulay maps the many civil awakenings of our time and through them 
attempts to shed a new light on the great revolutions of the eighteenth 
century. According to Azoulay’s proposal of the revolution as language, 
those ‘classic’ revolutions were immediately replaced by governmental 
power instead of partnership among members of the body politic. The 
regimes that came out of those revolutions eventually constituted rulers and 
those ruled and therefore did not execute the full potential of what a 
revolution might be:  
“Civil language is not new. It is being revived today because all over 
the world, simultaneously, more and more women and men speak to 
each other in civil language.”99  
Azoulay expands the revolution to include a language of gestures rather 
than an irreversible violent event. Azoulay calls this ‘a civil revolution,’ and 
defines it the following way: 
“Civil revolution means beginning afresh, returning to starting points, 
to moments in which another rift can be made. New potential – such 
as that between the ruling and the civil, and from within the latter – 
draws on new threads and creates a parallel tradition from which 
various civil moments interweave anew with events that were not 
necessarily recognized as ‘revolution.’ These are part of a rich 
language, a kind of lingua franca spoken by those who do not 
necessarily share a mother tongue. Civil revolution means correction, 
                                                          
99 Ariella Azoulay, “When the Body Politic Ceases to Be an Idea,” Manifesta Journal, #16, 2013, 
pp. 46-47 
107 
 
reparation, repartition, imagination, common experience, possible 
dreams. This is a language spoken by individuals in different places in 
the world. When they have had enough of the sovereignty of the 
nation-state and the capital to which they are subjugated, enough of 
the evil it produces and its oppression of them and others in the 
shadow it casts over the horizon of imagination, their gaze, speech, 
and action, they begin to speak it in public. They seek interlocutors, 
rubbing against others who speak as they do and resolve to speak 
with each other in civil language, no matter what. Urgency drives them 
to imagine and to act, doing so not behind closed doors but rather in 
the presence of others – foreigners and strangers – like them. The 
language they speak expresses an imagined partnership with.”100 
Language is the form of being-together of people, Azoulay declares as she 
defines revolution as a language. The language of revolution is made of a 
vocabulary, a syntax and grammar – these are gestures that are understood 
and developed together by all participating parties. As a language it evolves 
according to those speaking it, creating new vocabularies, dialects and 
abilities, forming it as they transmit it from one person to the other. This 
revival Azoulay speaks of operates through recurring excavation. Each 
iteration of this civil revolution finds its gestures and vocabulary in history.  
Not unlike the archive, the curatorial is able to resurface forgotten histories 
against the logic of their hosting institutions. But the curatorial does so not so 
much as potential, but more as an actualization of potentialities, that is, as 
an opening up of potentials. It does not only make a claim by using an 
                                                          
100 See: Ariella Azoulay, “Revolution,” in: Political Concepts – A Critical Lexicon, online platform 
by The New School for Social Research, NYC: 
http://www.politicalconcepts.org/revolution-ariella-azoulay/ [Last retrieved: 
15.10.2015] 
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institution against its own logic (say intervening with the archive of a 
museum of art or a historical museum). What it does as well is to provide a 
platform for other claims to be made. By that the curatorial provides a setting 
for this language to appear.  
This realization helps us to appreciate the potentials that are already 
present. On the most immediate level, the gestures of the revolution are 
circulated through anti-revolutionary means, namely though commoditized 
images. One can speculate upon the way advertisements that include signs, 
symbols, and icons of protest and revolt – risen fists, red flags, burning 
barricades, and mass manifestations, Che Guevara, Karl Marx, V.I. Lenin, 
Red Army Faction, and more recently the Guy Fawkes mask of the 
Anonymous activists, are many time the first encounter people have with 
images and in that respect to histories of the revolution – to this language of 
gestures that we are able to speak together.  
German art historian Rudi Maier finds that the use of revolutionary 
iconography in commercials begins – and not by chance – around 1967, 
when revolution in the decolonized world and the capitals of the West 
threatened the industrialized powers. The failure of that revolutionary 
movement was diverted to become a counterculture, which mixes together 
consumerism, the cultural industries, and notions of creativity, horizontality, 
and network managerial ideology.101 
On the one hand, these ads can be seen as examples for the 
commodification of authentic political gestures of revolution. On the other 
                                                          
101 The use of a special category of signs, those of anti-capitalist protest movements, the icons 
of left and alternative protests like Che Guevara, Karl Marx, Ulrike Meinhof, etc., for 
commercial purposes is the topic of the German anthropologist Rudi Maier’s project 
“That’s Revolution – Ads & Revolt.” Maier has collected more than 1500 commercial 
ads from 1967 to present. See: http://home.bawue.de/~mauss/revo.html [Last 
retrieved: 15.10.2015]  
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hand, we can understand them as some sort of fossils of the revolution kept 
alive by its enemies. Following Azoulay’s formulation, these ads constitute 
an archive of revolutionary gestures waiting to be revived and activated at 
any moment. This form of thinking relates to a wider array of attempts for 
reentering history. To explore these attempts more, demands an 
investigation into the ways in which political realities are produced by 
activating images. 
 
Reenactments and Parafictions 
The archive of gestures became a key method in contemporary art. Both 
reenactments and parafictions have been proliferating in the last two 
decades, exactly as a way to activate history by other means. Sven 
Lütticken relates this to performative capitalism and to the presentation of 
the self in commoditized everyday life:  
“If one is always reenacting roles partially scripted by others, one 
might just as well use reenactment against itself by recreating 
historical events. […] Historical reenactment may only be as escapist 
diversion from daily life, but perhaps it is also an anachronistic 
challenge to the present.”102  
Lütticken suggests that an age of restoration, in which neoconservatives are 
reconstituting ‘conservative revolutions’ was taking place after the 
dismantling of the Soviet Bloc, and to a greater extent after the 9/11 attacks 
                                                          
102 Sven Lütticken, “An Arena in which to Reenact,” in: Life, Once More: Forms of Reenactment 
in Contemporary Art, Ed.: Sven Lütticken, Witte de With Centre For Contemporary 
Art, Rotterdam, 2005. p. 19. The exhibition by the same name, curated by Lütticken 
at Witte de With included works by Mike Bidlo, Bik Van der Pol, Rod Dickinson, Omer 
Fast, Andrea Fraser, Robert Longo, Eran Schaerf, Catherine Sullivan, and Barbara 
Visser.  
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in New York in 2001. He explains the proliferation of reenactments in 
contemporary art in light of this and as an opposition to this: 
“Art can examine and try out – under laboratory conditions, as it were 
– forms of repetition that break open history and the historicist returns 
of past periods; it can investigate historical moments or eras as 
potentials waiting to be activated, in forms that need not resemble 
anything […] It may lead to artistic acts that, while not instantly 
unleashing a ’tremendous emancipatory potential,’ create a space – a 
stage – for possible and as yet unthinkable performances.”103 
After their forced retreat by the neoconservatives, emancipatory political 
projects found refuge in the confinements of contemporary art practices. 
Their way back into history involves artistic reenactments. In this respect, we 
are like the underground of book-lovers in Ray Bradbury’s dystopian 
Fahrenheit 451, who have each memorized books for an upcoming time 
when society is ready to rediscover them. Contemporary art’s reenactments 
provides a hibernation ground, for revolutionary politics, as it waits for its 
moment to come back. 
During this epoch of restoration, another mode of operation has emerged 
bordering between art and media activism. This was also a performative 
practice, aiming to reenter history but this time, not so much through 
repetition but through embodying fictitious narratives. Carrie Lambert-Beatty 
uses the term ‘parafictions’ to describe an array of practices that combine 
the field of fiction with that of the real: 
“Unlike historical fiction’s fact-based but imagined worlds, in 
parafiction real and/or imaginary personages and stories intersect with 
                                                          
103 Sven Lütticken, “An Arena in which to Reenact,” p. 60 
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the world as it is being lived. Post-simulacral parafictional strategies 
are oriented less toward the disappearance of the real than toward the 
pragmatics of trust. Simply put, with various degrees of success, for 
various durations, and for various purposes, these fictions are 
experienced as fact.”104 
Lambert-Beatty’s essay focuses on the years 1998-2008 and it seems to 
provide a report on that moment’s artistic practices’ political intervention 
entanglements. That moment, Lambert-Beatty herself admits, preferred 
‘intervention’ over ‘resistance.’ Acting disruptively outside the immediate 
artistic context seemed to provide more political currency than declarative 
political statements within art contexts. The parafictions she describes, 
involve a variety of strategies: from injecting fictions into historical settings to 
mockumentaries, from hyper-identification grotesques to media-hackings by 
well-crafted masquerading and deceit on network news channels.105 
The credibility of those parafictions, she explains, is based on stylistic 
mimicry. Experts on the specific field the parafiction deals with, might know it 
is false (and therefore might enjoy it more, as they take pleasure in their 
privileged knowledge, and hence won’t tell on the artist). This point, which 
Lambert-Beatty makes regarding knowledge gaps between audiences, is 
symptomatic to the meaninglessness of superiority of knowledge we are 
faced with when it comes to history. Yuran’s formulation provides a useful 
explanation – history cannot be reduced to the factual, and has to include 
                                                          
104 Carrie Lambert-Beatty “Make Believe: Parafictions and Plausibility,” October 129, Summer 
2009, MA: MIT Press, p. 54. Lambert-Beatty paraphrases Rosalind Krauss’s definition 
of Barthes’s and Derrida‘s ‘paraliterary’ when she defines parafiction thus: “It’s not 
history, but can’t be called not-history.” Ibid. 
105 Lambert-Beatty mentions among others Michael Blum, Atlas Group, the Yes Men group, 
Sasha Baron Cohen, Stephen Colbert, Franco and Eva Mattes and Aliza Swartz. Her 
examples bring to mind a variety of ironic disguises, from the satirical Eighteenth 
Century Persian Letters of Montesquieu to the pranks of Dada-Berlin in 1919. 
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the narrative. For the parafictions to work, the authority the speaker is able 
to obtain is paramount. Nevertheless, Lambert-Beatty sees them to be 
speech acts that don’t take. These are performative utterances that apply 
only in the fictitious:  
“Parafictions is general are performative, where that is understood to 
mean that they effect or produce something rather than describe or 
denote it. They are unhappy performatives insofar as they […], are 
‘make-believe.’ But insofar as they make someone believe, however 
temporarily or ambiguously, they trouble the distinction between 
happy and unhappy performativity.”106  
This means that the questions of performativity in relation to parafictions, is 
the question of technique. The more believable the role-playing is, the more 
it becomes effective, and therefore a happy performance, in the sense that it 
may produce a reality. Here we see how we are drawn back into the logic of 
conspiracy. “Parafictions train us in skepticism and doubt, but also, oddly, in 
belief,”107 says Lambert-Beatty but what she means is that the field of politics 
is not questioned but the way to engage with it is. Facts are treated as 
processes by which something becomes truth through debunking or 
establishing authority. 
 
Anachronism in Israel-Palestine Guerrilla Culture 
Faced with an impossible reality, Freud resorted not to history, but to 
anachronism. He analyzed a myth as an historical factuality, only to make 
destabilize the fundamental antagonism that factual history presented him 
                                                          
106 Lambert-Beatty, “Make Believe: Parafictions and Plausibility,” p. 61 
107 Ibid., p. 78 
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with. Freud was not using historical claims or historical comparisons. He was 
analyzing myth as history to produce a claim in the political reality he was 
facing.  
Yuran’s formulation of what can and cannot be thought at a certain moment, 
helps to explain why historical comparisons might not be so useful when 
applied directly at the present, trying to explain it through what past events 
can say about it. Nevertheless, Yuran’s formulation proposes the possibility 
that historical comparisons enable us to understand better what was going 
on in the past, through an analysis of what is actually taking place right now 
in the present – as these events both continue and disavow the past. In this 
sense, anachronism would be the name for the re-discovery of useful 
models that have been thrown away or denied, and now appear as we 
compare the present to past times. Slavoj Žižek enlisted the power of 
anachronisms as a tool for re-entering our contemporary political 
predicament. When discussing communism he suggested that:  
“instead of asking the obvious question ‘Is the idea of communism still 
pertinent today, can it still be used as a tool of analysis and political 
practice?’ one should ask the opposite question: ‘How does our 
predicament today look from the perspective of the communist idea?’ 
Therein resides the dialectic of the Old and New [...] The only way to 
grasp the true novelty of the New is to analyze the world through the 
lenses of what was ‘eternal’ in the Old”  
Žižek gives communism as the example for this and explains: “it is eternal 
not in the sense of a series of abstract-universal features that may be 
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applied everywhere, but in the sense that it has to be re-invented in each 
new historical situation.”108 
The strategies described thus far provide a background for the concerns I 
wish to present when proposing the notions of fictionalism and anachronism. 
Varying from questioning historical truths to voicing silenced narratives, 
these strategies highlight the demand for justice through exposure of hidden 
networks of domination or the appropriation and re-activation of images and 
gestures as part of emancipatory politics. Some even go as far as 
reconsidering the spectrum of the revolution, either as a language or as a 
hibernating potential to be reenacted. 
All proposals seem to consider the currency of rhetorical abilities as a 
subversive tool; this tool can make a performance become ‘real’ and thus 
produce a reality, or rather it can make claims that will force a structure of 
power to collapse by exposing its inner workings. While the notion of the 
revolution as language and the proposal of reenactment are invested in 
participatory modes of political engagement, parafiction relates to the 
conspiracy/transparency drive that portrays the contemporary political 
entanglement through forms of knowing and not-knowing. The problem they 
pose was described by Yuran when saying that “To know means not to know 
that you don’t know.” 
The curatorial proposes articulation as its mode of operation. But this form of 
articulation is not based on truth claims. As much as it relies on rhetorical 
tools to obtain its authority, the curatorial does not revolve around fact-based 
utterances. Actually its claims for concreteness are invested in performativity 
and narration more than fact. This is exactly how the curatorial continuously 
evaluates the notions through which it operates. Parallel to weighing the way 
                                                          
108 Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, London and New York: Verso, 2009, p. 6 
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in which some terms and ideas are available in one moment and are no 
longer valid in another, it explores how we can use and re-use notions that 
seem no-longer attainable or not-yet possible.  
It can be seen as a form of horizontal history of mapping connections, as 
Lambert-Beatty might put it. From this perspective, what the curatorial can 
add to artistic and political performative attempts at reenactment, parafiction 
and the diachronic gestural revolutionary language, is a reentry into history 
by means of fictionalism and anachronism.   
Anachronism stands for the injection of a perspective that would seem 
unavailable in a given antagonism. This re-introduction of a perspective 
operates very differently than what we would call retro or nostalgia. While 
retro and nostalgia read the past from today – either as a lack to hold on to 
or as form to revisit – anachronism proposes an overlapping of perspectives; 
those from the current condition, and those which are unavailable anymore. 
An example for this would be the communist horizon in the Middle East – 
from the Syrian-Lebanese, to the Iraqi, the anti-Zionist, the Egyptian to the 
Palestinian communist parties. While today these might not offer themselves 
to be very practical in the current setting of political Islam versus military 
regimes, considering the fact that overlapping internationalisms existed in 
the Middle East opens up this moment we are in for new and surprising 
alliances. These might operate in an imaginary level at this moment, but they 
provide a remodeling of the current condition in ways that promise another 
reality for the Middle East.109 
                                                          
109
 In recent years, a significant amount of work has been done around the Middle East in an 
attempt to excavate these communist projects that never matured. Their traces can be 
found either within the confines of nation state building projects or in anti-imperialist 
networks that were formed by exiled organizers. See:  Leon Zahavi, Apart or Together: Jews 
and Arabs in Palestine according to the Documents of the Comintern (1919-1943), Tel Aviv: 
Keter, 2005 [In Hebrew]; Avner Ben Zaken, Communism as Cultural Imperialism: The 
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Operating on a cultural map which is mainly informed by ethnic and religious 
narration, one finds himself compelled to resist not only the given identities, 
but more so the mechanisms modelling these identities. Yet, this resistance 
many times mirrors the operations of these models themselves, applying 
either erasure or excavation tactics in order to make claims that would prove 
to have historical grounds. I found myself many times taking part in creating 
platforms and organizing events which looked to construct a model or map 
that would enable the production of very different identities from those 
scripted through the modelling mechanisms. These platforms (exhibitions, 
screenings, poetry demonstrations, publications), used various tactics of 
overlap which involved time and space, periodization and fictionalization, 
historical comparison and spatial realignment. One of these platforms, 
“Guerilla Culture” (2003-2010), involved the setting up of “poetry 
demonstrations”. These included the weaving of a network of relations 
around the country with unions, NGOs, lawyers, poets, journalists, political 
activists and public officials. The events were set up mainly around workers 
struggling for collective bargaining through their elected unions – from 
teachers to constructions workers, from paperless workers to care workers. 
The demonstrations included speakers from the specific struggle together 
with poets. This mélange attracted not only the media but also politicians 
who found it useful to endorse a struggle when the poets were there. 
Somehow, what a decade before could have been envisioned as one front of 
political activists and unions, now needed poets to bring them together and 
to enable them to operate, even though for a specific struggle each time, as 
one front. During those years, as the country was going through rapid 
privatization processes, with no political opposition presenting itself, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Affinities between Eretz-Israeli Communism and Arab Communism 1919-1948, Tel Aviv: 
Resling Publishers, 2006 [In Hebrew]; and: Joel Beinin, Was the Red Flag Flying There?: 
Marxist Politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict in Israel and Egypt 1948-1965, Berkeley: 
California University Press, 1990. 
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overlapping of what seemed as two anachronisms – unions and poetry – 
proved to be a useful combination on a very practical level.  
Therefore, the understanding of anachronism here has to do with an 
injection of perspectives that would have seemed unavailable in the context 
of the given antagonism. The alliances this forms are unpredictable and 
provide a re-shuffling of the map of antagonisms itself. This is how Betrayal 
played out through the anachronism of Guerilla Culture’s poetry 
demonstrations. To give but one example of Guerilla Culture’s many actions, 
in solidarity with the demand of workers in a cement factory in the south of 
Israel, in a town bordering the Gaza Strip, we came to set up an event with 
local activists and workers and with poets from around the country. As the 
people came on to the microphone in front of the factory’s gates, either 
describing their situation or reading their prepared materials – poems and 
speeches – a realization emerged by all parties involved, including the 
media reporters and policeman assigned to keep an eye on the crowd. The 
poetry demonstration articulated this labor dispute in direct relation to the 
Occupation. Gradually intensifying, the speeches reoriented all parties’ 
positions, to form an alliance between the people on both sides of the border 
– the Israeli workers and the people in Gaza. The specific workplace was 
exactly the site for such an articulation – the location but also it being a place 
for production of building materials. Through the connections that 
anachronism enables between unionism and poetry, staging the concrete 
alters it allegorical meaning and thus shifts its original meaning. The 
curatorial articulates conceptual claims by aggregating concrete utterances; 
each case remains specific to its circumstances yet at the same time 
together they solidify a theme or narrative. At that poetry demonstration, 
something changed in the meaning of that factory and the workers struggle. 
Suddenly, a long-distance solidarity with those on the other side of the wall 
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was present. It was not only their dire need for building materials – it was the 
formation of power relations, of exploitation, class divisions and tactics of 
intimidation that made it apparent to all participants that realignment of 
affinities has occurred.  
 
Fictionalism in Israel-Palestine: Yael Bartana 
The political retreat that reenactments seemed to respond to in artistic 
contexts has been replaced by an activism on the level of believability in the 
case of the media-event parafictions. If the first option wants to repeat the 
facts so that it can own its own historical narrative, the later wants to inject 
fake facts to mock and counter hegemonic historical narratives with other 
truths to replace them. If ‘to know means not to know that you don’t know,’ 
then the task of history-writing would be that of interpretation. History, 
according to this formulation, could be considered a kind of a traumatic 
experience in that it both compels and disallows speech – it demands 
constant rewording; some things can and some cannot be thought at a 
certain moment, therefore new words and concepts are invited as much as 
other words and concepts cease from having meaning.  
When proposing anachronism and fictionalism, this is not simply an invitation 
to voice silenced narratives, that through anachronism and fictionalization, 
we would light the dark sides of the narratives we already embody. In a way, 
fictionalism is life-after-parafictions; it is the way we embody and make use 
of fictions. It is not only an alternative story but a story to live by alternatively. 
Therefore it is not only a tool for critique but a tool for enabling new collective 
subjectivities to emerge. Unlike parafictions, fictionalism is not about 
superiority of knowledge but about negotiating knowledge through 
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unknowing. It involves an active use of history as substance – participating 
in it through continuous genealogization of the present.  
Yael Bartana is an Israeli artist who has developed several projects that 
involved reenactments. Some of her projects converted those reenactments 
into simulations, and those include several that have proposed a fictionalized 
parallel history. Summer Camp/Avodah (2007), documents activists from the 
Israeli Committee Against House Demolition (ICAHD), re-building a 
demolished Palestinian house in East Jerusalem, in the manner that Helmar 
Lersky’s Zionist propaganda film Avodah (Labour) (1935), documented 
pioneers constructing houses in Palestine. Summer Camp/Avodah even 
uses the original film’s soundtrack and music and follows its framing, in order 
to draw a comparison between the pioneers and the activists. In its use of 
anachronism it combines a reclaiming of Socialist heritage from Zionism, 
together with an ironic take on reconstruction as a starting point.  
In her trilogy “And Europe will be Stunned” which is comprised of three films: 
Mary Koszmary [Nightmares] (2007); Mur I wieźa [Wall and Tower] (2009); 
and Zamach [Assassination] (2011), Bartana not only developed the 
narrative through fictionalism, but the trilogy literally performed it. The three 
films center around a movement Bartana has initiated for the return of Jews 
to Poland. Bartana even designed an emblem for JRMiP – the Polish coat of 
arms, an eagle and crown on a background of half a Shield of David. 
Together with Polish curator Sebastian Cichocki she composed a manifesto 
for the Jewish Renaissance Movement in Poland (JRMiP). The first film in the 
trilogy is a speech made in an empty stadium by Polish intellectual Slawomir 
Sierakowski, founder and editor of the Left-wing Polish periodical Krytyka 
Polityczna (Political Critique), in character as leader of the JRMiP, calling the 
Jews to return to Poland. The second part is set in the heart of Warsaw 
where a group of pioneers from the JRMiP has come to settle. The film 
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combines Socialist, Zionist and Polish nationalist tools, instruments and 
symbols to produce an actual settlement in a park in Warsaw. The third part 
presents the followers of the movement as they mourn the death of their 
leader, who apparently was assassinated.  
Wall and Tower opens with an extract recalling Sieriakowski’s speech from 
the first film: 
“Jews, return to Poland, to our land and your land! Heal our wounds 
and your wounds will be healed! We shall be together again! This is a 
call not to the dead, but to the living. We want three million Jews to 
return to Poland, to live with us again! We need you! We ask you to 
come back!”  
A group of men and women in work clothes, the women wearing head 
scarves and the men wearing hats, march on the heart of Warsaw against a 
background of the Polish anthem. The group, which looks like a combination 
of Zionist pioneers, Soviet revolutionaries and members of Gadna (the 
Israeli junior cadet movement) are armed with timber beams and planks, 
ropes and tools to house the returning Jewish population and to answer the 
call in Mary Koszmary. Against a background of shouts of encouragement 
from the leader of the group, and while Sierakowski’s voice is still echoing 
round the stadium, construction on the site is gradually takes place. Young 
Jews are learning Polish in camp again. The type of building they are 
erecting is what is known as “Wall and Tower”, a kind of Potemkin village 
developed by Zionist activists in Palestine during the British Mandatory 
Regime around 1936-1939, at the time of the great Arab revolt. The purpose 
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of these structures was to maintain a hold on the land as a means of 
establishing Jewish settlements in Palestine.110 
The Jewish settlement in the heart of Warsaw blends not only different styles 
of dress and different kinds of revolutionaries, but also different narratives. 
When the Jewish pioneers in Poland string out lines of barbed wire along the 
wooden walls surrounding their settlement, while Warsaw pedestrians can 
be seen walking back and forth across the city center, it resembles as well a 
ghetto or even a concentration camp.  
The specific Soviet stadium from Mary Koszmary and the Nazi stadiums of 
propaganda films, the Zionist construction of a house and the pro-
Palestinian activists re-rebuilding a house demolished by Israeli police in 
Summer Camp/Avoda, the settlement and the concentration camp in Wall 
and Tower – Bartana works with traumatic histories and applies various 
strategies of simulation, re-enactment and rehearsal when drawing the 
connections between them. Through the dress and the buildings, the filming 
and the editing, the narrative and the music, Bartana re-activates 
anachronisms into the current political sphere, with the aim of imbuing them 
with new political significance. 
The trilogy was made at a time of a solidification of a regime of segregation 
in Israel-Palestine. During this time, attempts to develop a Jewish superiority 
in all state levels was intensifying, with the aim to equate Israeli solely with 
                                                          
110 Some Israeli architecture historians claim that “Wall and Tower” has been the archetype of 
Israeli contracture building up to the present day –  from the original “Wall and 
Tower”, to the establishment of settlements in the West Bank and the erection of 
the Separation Wall. This type of building has developed from a fear of the outside 
(the wall) and a need to develop means for controlling it (the tower). This has had a 
lasting effect on Israeli architecture until this day. See: Sharon Rotbard, “Wall and 
Tower”, in: A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture, Eds.: Rafi Segal 
and Eyal Weizman. Tel Aviv-Jaffa: Babel and London and New York: Verso, 2003, pp. 
39-56 
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Judaism, making all minorities of Muslims, Christians and others, second 
rate citizens. Bartana was undoing this essentialist political project by 
proposing another one, which engages a third party – Poland. By that she 
was actually showing the return of Jews to Poland as a possible proposition 
for the return of Palestinian refugees to Palestine. Under the antagonistic 
political realities of competing narratives, Bartana’s work with fictionalism offers 
new access to enter the political. In Israel, Poland and Palestine, these films 
perform a political act. They demand the examination of political concepts.   
The trilogy not only suggests the transformation of Zionist imagery for the 
struggle against the occupation – it injects speculation into history and 
traumatic reality. The trilogy shows a readiness to argue against the alignment 
of the opposing positions, and is already suggesting new alliances. It suggests 
a fiction through which one can re-enter history, creating the possibility of 
working within fictitious stories. It proposes fictionalism as an opportunity to 
delve again into painful history by re-articulating it. Bartana’s films suggest 
recharging in the form of story-telling, and they make it possible to work from 
the shared archives of Israelis and Palestinians, Jews and Poles. In the 
antagonistic realities of competing narratives like these, Bartana’s work with 
fictionalism offers new access to reality. 
And reality did not wait long. In 2011, Bartana was invited to represent Poland 
in the Venice Biennale with the trilogy. It was exhibited as the official 
representative of Poland for the national pavilions in the Giardini in Venice. This 
fact validated the JRMiP, in a way that actually performed fictionalism in reality. 
It wasn’t the project’s attempt to achieve truth-status as a parafiction. Namely, 
that the JRMiP would be perceived as an authentic movement for some of 
the people some of the time, depending on their superior access to 
knowledge in relation to the project. The attempt here was not to launch 
123 
 
something false into quasi-truthfulness, but to speculate on a parallel reality 
that would then penetrate reality by injecting fictions into history.111 
 
Montage: Collision and Addition in Israel -Palestine 
“Do you know why we Palestinians are famous? We are famous 
because you are our enemy.” He answers and explains: “The interest 
in us stems from the interest in the Jewish issue. The interest is in you 
not in me. So we have the misfortune of having Israel as an enemy 
because it enjoys unlimited support. And we have the good fortune of 
having Israel as our enemy because the Jews are the center of 
attention. You’ve brought us defeat and renown.” 112 
─ Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, to Israeli journalist Judith 
Lerner (actress Sarah Adler), in Jean-Luc Godard’s film Notre 
musique (2004)  
To further explore the projects that suggest Betrayal through narrative 
means, I would like at this point, to turn to the writings of Ariella Azoulay. As 
in the case of the revolution as a language, where she proposes a structure 
that is neither objective, nor subjective, such as language, to describe the 
revolution as something that is shared, produced and developed between 
people, here specific writings on Israel-Palestine shift the spatial with the 
                                                          
111 See the publication accompanying the exhibition of the Polish Pavilion at the 54th 
International Art Exhibition in Venice “Yael Bartana: And Europe will be Stunned”: 
Sebastian Cichocki, Galit Eilat (Eds.), A Cookbook for Political Imagination, Sternberg 
Press, 2011 
112 These quotes by Darwish in the film are based on an interview he gave to Helit Yeshurun, 
publisher and editor of literary review Hadarim [published in Hebrew, Hadarim 12, 
1996]. The interview was translated to French and published in: Revue d'Études 
Palestiniennes (Éditions de Minuit), N° 9 nouvelle série - automne 1996; In English it 
appeared in: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 42, no. 1, 2012 
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temporal. By this move, she is able to convert the prominent discourse of 
partition into a counter-discourse of being-together. Aligned along the 
antagonism Israeli/Palestinian or Jew/Arab, one can demonstrate how 
projects such as those by Azoulay manage to destabilize this antagonism at 
its core, by injecting speculations and potential histories. Azoulay’s ongoing 
work with photography archives of Palestine in the years 1947-1950, and 
1967 onwards, proposes a reshuffle of the camps.113 
Using Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence and applying its notion of 
constitutive violence – that which forms the law – she challenges the two 
competing histories: that of independence for Israelis and that of catastrophe 
(Nakba) for Palestinians, both aligned since 1947-1948 on the notion of a 
separation between the two communities. These competing histories are 
met by a potential history of life together – intertwined. Working with 
photographs from 1947-1950 (including especially those documenting the 
deportation of some 700,000 Palestinians from approximately 417 villages), 
Azoulay betrays this separation and fictionalizes a shared past (and future) 
of a Jewish-Arab civil society. This enables her to claim that the Nakba did 
not only happen to “us” or to “them” in the past tense, but that “we” are 
experiencing it. And that “we” is Israeli-Palestinian. 
Through her reading of photographs from the period, Azoulay formulates a 
civil contract of photography. This proposal embeds the photographer and 
the photographed, the viewer and the archivist into one community that 
transcends the “us versus them” narration of Israel/Palestine. She 
                                                          
113 Azoulay’s developed these ideas in several exhibitions, among them: “Act of State”, 
Minshar, Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 2007; “Constitutive Violence”, Zochrot, Tel Aviv-Jaffa in 2009; 
and books which include: The civil contract of photography, New York: Zone books, 
2008; From Palestine to Israel: A Photographic Record of Destruction and State 
Formation, 1947-1950, Pluto Press, 2011; and Civil Imagination: Political Ontology of 
Photography, London and New York: Verso, 2012.  
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dismantles the unity of opposing identities in Palestine along the divide by 
fusing a shared past. In Azoulay’s proposals, new alliances emerge as other 
are descending.114  
In a film she made in 2012 titled Civil Alliance, Azoulay gathers 
contemporary Jewish and Palestinian intellectuals and activists around a 
map of Palestine under British rule. They mark the map in order to report on 
what Azoulay calls “a civil race against the clock taking place in Palestine 
until the founding of the State of Israel in May 1948.” The film is staged like a 
kind of a séance session, where people stand around a table, mentioning an 
event from 1947-1948 and marking the map where it took place. As the film 
explains, intense civil activity was happening throughout the country, mainly 
in urgent encounters, some short and spontaneous, others planned and 
carefully laid out in detail – in which participants raised demands, sought 
                                                          
114 With this, Azoulay followed among others, Palestinian historian Salim Tamari who has been 
researching Palestinian identities of Muslims, Christians and Jews under the rule of 
late Ottoman empire and early British Mandate, a time when national identities were 
forming in the region. In his writing Tamari proposes local, regional and spatial 
trajectories as preconditions which surpass the identities which have solidified with 
the rise of nationhood in the region under Imperial rule. His historical research 
includes the memoirs of various Palestinian figures from different backgrounds. 
Through his reading and weaving of these source materials Tamari is able to draw 
new maps of the region prior to ethnic and religious identities of the nation state. In 
his book Mountain against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture, 
Tamari’s main claim is that a geographical perception of Palestine suggests a divide 
of coastal and highland culture and identity, each with its own elites and 
underclasses. Along this divide he says, Palestine experienced Imperialism and 
colonization, nationhood and ethnicity, as categories that produced a conflictual 
modernity, by which groups which were living together, have been separated from 
each other to the extent that now they have come to negate one another. This has 
happened along new divides that were not mere geographical distances, but rather 
operated in intimate proximities. The introduction of the coastal/highlanders divide 
has a stimulating potential in injecting a no-longer available perspective into the 
mapping of Palestine-Israel, making it a creative anachronism. See: Salim Tamari, 
“The Mountain against the Sea?: Cultural Wars of the Mediterranean”, in: Mountain 
against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture, University of California 
Press, 2009, pp. 22-35 
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compromises, set rules, formulated agreements, made promises, asked for 
forgiveness, made efforts to reconcile and compensate – and did everything 
possible not to let violence take over their lives. Azoulay explains that these 
Jewish and Arab neighbors did their utmost to halt the violence that national 
and military forces were intending on igniting and negotiated with each other 
in order to create mutual civil alliances.  
What the film is able to do is exactly this mirroring of historical comparison 
between the times and the actions it describes and the times and actions it 
documents, between the now of the making of the film, and the historical 
moment it refers to. Azoulay actively reads facts from the past in direct 
relation to the contemporary political reality around her. What comes out is a 
narration and an actual performance of histories that seemed unattainable. 
What Azoulay is actually producing is a form of montage that relies not on 
collision of images but on addition. When Jean-Luc Godard suggested in 
Historie(s) du Cinema (1988-1998) that cinema gave its body to history, he 
meant to say that the twentieth century was made on film – from the 
reenactment of the storming into the winter palace in St. Petersburg in 
Sergei Eisenstein’s October (1928), to Leni Riefenstahl’s stadiums of 
Triumph of the Will (1935) and Olympia (1938), to news reels and fiction 
films, that for him were never fiction, but a reality of another order that refers 
directly to ours. Later on Godard proposed a relation between history and 
cinema which, according to him, is embodied by montage. Alan Wright 
summarizes this notion of montage thus: 
“Montage à la Godard constructs an image of history in the light of an 
extreme variations between a vision of happiness and the sense of 
catastrophe. Cinema serves as the ideal instrument for representing 
the ‘dubious’ nature of historical relations. The technical procedure of 
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montage supplies the formula for a conceptual principle. It contains 
the promise of a method. For Godard, the capacity of an image to 
project in two different directions at once, to display two distinct 
senses of meaning, assumes the status of a rule. His theory of 
montage depends upon drawing a set of connections from a 
relationship of looks.”115  
But the image does not exist by itself. It is the relation between projection 
and reflection that circumscribes the look. Godard describes this thus: “the 
image is the relation with me looking at it dreaming up a relation at someone 
else. An image is an association.”116 In his film JLG/JLG: Autobiography in 
December (1994), Godard describes the logic of history as montage through 
the idea of ‘stereo,’ using the shape of the Star of David, the mystical Jewish 
hexagram symbol of two equilateral triangles: 
“Stereo is made for dogs and blind people. They always project like 
this but they should project this way. Because they project like this, 
because I, who listen and watch, am here, because I receive this 
projection as I face it, because I reflect it back, I am in the position 
described by this figure. [he draws a triangle in a notebook] There was 
Euclid and then there was Pascal – this is the mystical hexagram. But 
in History, in the history of History, there was Germany which 
projected Israel. Israel reflected this projection and Israel found its 
cross. And the law of stereo continues. Israel projected the Palestinian 
people and the Palestinian people in turn bore their cross. This is the 
                                                          
115 Alan Wright “Elizabeth Taylor at Auschwitz: JLG and the Real Object of Montage”, in: 
Michael Temple and James S. Williams (Eds.), The Cinema Alone: Essays on the Works 
of Jean-Luc Godard 1985-2000, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000, p. 52 
116 Gavin Smith, “Interview: Jean-Luc Godard,” in: Jean-Luc Godard: Interviews, Ed.: David 
Sterritt, University Press of Mississippi, 1998, p. 190. The interview originally 
appeared in: Film Comment, vol. 32, no. 2, March-April 1996, pp. 31-41   
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true legend of stereo [he draws another triangle on top of the first one, 
making the shape of a Star of David]”117  
Following this suggestion by Godard, we can examine the way his 
formulation of montage can be implemented back in history, and thus 
constitute Betrayal. “The shot and reverse shot are the basics of cinema,” 
says Godard in his 2004 film Notre musique. He is giving a lecture in 
Sarajevo showing two frames from a film by Howard Hawks – one close-up 
of a man and another of a woman, “You will see that this is actually the 
same shot twice.” He continues by saying that truth has two faces, and to 
give an example, he shows a colour photograph of people getting off boats 
on the coast: “In 1948, the Israelis walked in the water to reach the Promised 
Land.” Continuing, he then shows a black-and-white photograph of people 
marching along the coast: “The Palestinians walked in the water to drown.” 
He puts the photos one on top of the other: “Shot and reverse shot. The 
Jewish people have become the stuff of fiction, the Palestinians, of 
documentary.” 
The creation of Israel is the displacement of Palestinians. This can be read 
as a classic example of shot/reverse-shot, a thesis of hope and an antithesis 
of pain, together creating a synthesis of history. The rivalling narratives of 
independence and Nakba focus on 1948. But if Azoulay says that the Nakba 
happened to both groups, in the sense that the Zionist victory in 1948 is also 
the tragedy of the Jews who could have been much more, sharing their self-
governance with other groups rather than excluding these groups, being 
more than just a group which defines itself as nation, constituted in negation 
to others. In Godard’s notion of montage, the practice of partition, which 
Azoulay tries to overcome, is replaced by a specific logic of addition.  
                                                          
117 Wright, “Elizabeth Taylor at Auschwitz,” pp. 52-53 
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Following Godard’s approach, I wish to use his construction of montage as a 
conceptual framework from which to find potential histories. In the case of 
Palestine-Israel, we can examine his and Anne-Marie Miéville’s film Ici et 
Ailleurs (Here and Elsewhere, 1970-1976), which was originally 
commissioned by the PLO from the Dziga Vertov Group (Godard and Jean-
Pierre Gorin). When Godard and Gorin set out to shoot a film in the PLO run 
Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan in the summer of 1970, the full working 
title was Jusqu’à la victoire (Méthodes de pensée et de travail de la 
révolution palestinienne). The idea was to join the Palestinian revolution and 
to show solidarity with the Palestinian struggle. The materials they came 
back with looked not so different from the Zionist propaganda made fifty 
years earlier (similar to works like those of Larsky who Bartana based her 
Summer Camp/Avoda video on): fighters posing and practicing shooting and 
drilling exercises, farmers working the fields, children reciting ideological 
slogans, tented settlements. 
After their return to Paris, following the quadruple hijackings of Dawson’s 
Field in September of that year, the Jordanian military entered the 
Palestinian refugee camps and waged a deadly attack on its inhabitants, 
massacring many PLO and PFLP fighters. Many of the people shot by 
Godard and Gorin were dead. Godard did not confront the materials until 
1974, as the Dziga Vertov group ceased to exist. Together with Miéville, they 
reevaluated the materials through the notion of “Here” and “Elsewhere.” The 
film now focused on the complicated the relationship between the place and 
the way the images had been filmed and the place and the way in which 
they were edited.118 
                                                          
118 See: Colin MacCabe, Godard: A Portrait of the Artist at 70, Bloomsbury, 2003, pp. 242-247 
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Through a closer look at the montage strategies Miéville and Godard have 
developed, we can produce a narration of continuation and repetition rather 
than mere collision between the negating entities of “Israel” and “Palestine”. 
We can take Godard’s formulation of history and cinema at its word almost 
and try to apply a reading of history through the montage technique 
developed by him and Miéville when attempting to make a film on Israel-
Palestine.  
As fictionalism and potential histories call for narration strategies, montage 
becomes an essential consideration. Gilles Deleuze’s description of 
Godard’s montage method of that time is instructive in proposing montage 
as a form for narrating Betrayal:  
“It is not a matter of following a chain of images, even across voids, 
but of getting out of the chain or the association. Film ceases to be 
'images in a chain ... an uninterrupted chain of images each one the 
slave of the next', and whose slave we are (lci et ailleurs). It is the 
method of BETWEEN, 'between two images', which does away with 
all cinema of the One. It is the method of AND, 'this and then that', 
which does away with all the cinema of Being = is. Between two 
actions, between two affections, between two perceptions, between 
two visual images, between two sound images, between the sound 
and the visual: make the indiscernible that is the frontier, visible (Six 
fois deux). The whole undergoes a mutation, because it has ceased to 
be the One-Being, in order to become the constitutive 'and' of things, 
the constitutive between-two of images. The whole thus merges with 
what Blanchot calls the force of 'dispersal of the Outside', or 'the 
vertigo of spacing': that void which is no longer a motor-part of the 
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image, and which the image would cross in order to continue, but is 
the radical calling into question of the image.”119  
For the most part, Godard and Miéville reflect on the “And,” the “et” in the 
title lci et ailleurs. The connectivity of And is proposed here as an entity by 
itself. It is not a mere serial addition, true to accumulative capitalist logic 
adding easily interchangeable unities. Nor is it a connectivity of a dialectic 
nature, which defines the relations between its unities in the revolutionary 
logic of mutual negation which provides a synthesis on a higher order. 
Throughout lci et ailleurs, Godard and Miéville demonstrate how both 
models have failed: they say the world is a “millionaire in images of 
revolution,” meaning that both models of connectivity have merged – 
Television, which takes a big part of the film, is exactly this machine of 
endless additions. The addition their “And” proposes is that of counterpoint – 
breaking the chain of images and making them a simultaneous collage. The 
relation between images is not sequenced or linear. Each image actually 
opens to question the other one. Here we have in addition to the Godardian 
mismatch between sight and sound, the presence of two voices, that of 
Godard, who was there, shooting in Palestinian refugee camps in 1970, and 
that of Miéville who questions the images mobilized for the cause of the 
revolution. 
Miéville’s voice over in the film proposes to read in each of the images 
Godard and Gorin brought from Jordan, its own internal break and with it the 
break it produces in relation to other images. “So what’s at stake is the 
engagement of a filmmaker as a filmmaker,” writes Serge Daney about the 
film: 
                                                          
119 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Trans.: Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Caleta. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. 180 
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“For it’s in the nature of cinema (delay between the time of shooting 
and the time of projection) to be the art of here and elsewhere. What 
Godard says, very uncomfortably and very honestly, is that the true 
place of the filmmaker is in the AND. A hyphen only has value if it 
doesn’t confuse what it unites.”120 
The application of Godardian montage onto history plays in surprising ways. 
We can observe how images travel. For example, the gestures and dress of 
Second World War anti-Nazi partisans of Socialist inclinations traveled to 
post-War Palestine where Zionist militia assumed their tropes and symbols, 
only to be followed by Palestinian fighters, the Fedayeen, who have been 
active since the Nakba. The second generation of militant Fedayeen were 
among those documented by Godard and Gorin. 
Applying the logic of “And”, by which the cut not only divides but also 
connects two images together, positions us in a very different place in 
relation to the antagonism of Israel/Palestine. Addition of a different order, 
between two images, proposes a new relation in Israel-Palestine. Now the 
narratives are no longer played one against the other but rather become an 
archive from which to work from. This proposal performs Betrayal in the 
most direct way as it highlights the “And” as a productive place from which to 
operate.  
A variety of projects have been made in relation to lci et ailleurs, but more 
importantly it produced a perspective from which we can evaluate cinematic 
attempts dealing with Israel-Palestine not as a mere dichotomy but as a 
                                                          
120 See: Serge Daney “Preface to Here and Elsewhere,” lecture that was written for the US 
premiere of lci et ailleurs as part of the first Semaine des Cahiers du Cinéma at the 
Bleecker Street Cinema, NYC in 1977. It was never delivered due to terror threats by 
pro-Israeli activists: http://kinoslang.blogspot.co.il/2009/01/preface-to-here-and-
elsewhere-by-serge.html [Last retrieved: 15.10.2015] 
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spatial and durational setting of overlaps. The fictional stories about run-
down places in an occupied city like Jaffa in The Truth, by Scandar Copti 
and Rabih Boukhary (2003), or the speculations on the future Jewish-Arab 
State in The Jewish-Arab State by Yossi Atia and Itamar Rose (2007), 
involve documentary strategies that undermine the existing reality. As these 
short films narrate a location as something that it is not (a water tower as the 
holy grail, for example), and then presenting this fiction to people who are 
interviewed, they describe the existing reality as an evitable reality. The 
simulations on a future flag done by Palestinians in Israel in The Jewish-
Arab State project already on the present a trajectory of a state for all its 
citizens – two nations becoming one society. 
Other, less recent references for these overlaps that Godardian montage 
provides access to in relation Israel-Palestine are visions of Palestine-Israel 
reflected from Uganda, as proposed by Ugandan dictator Idi Amin in General 
Idi Amin Dada: A Self Portrait by Barbet Schroeder (1974). Uganda was 
considered a possible site for Jewish settlement by the British Empire and 
the Zionists in the early twentieth century, and the outcomes of the anti-
imperialist coup there suggest many similarities to Zionism in Israel, where 
what saw itself as a secular liberation movement turned colonizer and 
religious fundamentalist. The landscapes of Jerusalem and the Dead Sea so 
familiar to both Palestinians and Israelis being under the rule of another 
state – Jordan in Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Sopralluoghi in Palestina per il 
vangelo secondo Matteo (1965), and in Struggle in Jerash by Eileen 
Simpson and Ben White (2009), a project using the footage from a 1957 lost 
Jordanian film of the same name. These are but a few examples that 
activate this “And” logic formulated by Godard and Miéville, reading the 
history of Palestine-Israel through cinema, and the history of cinema through 
134 
 
Palestine-Israel, reading cinema through history, and history through 
cinema.  
To these projects in film, I can add artistic projects by artists from the Middle 
East mainly, that can be grouped around a proposal of factionalism. When 
addressing them we are already dealing directly with incorporations of the 
logic of Freud’s “Moses”. This group includes artists from Lebanon, Israel, 
Egypt and Palestine such as Roee Rosen, Akram Zaatari, Rabih Mroue, 
Emily Jacir, Hassan Khan, Walid Raad, Ariella Azoulay and Yael Bartana 
who all engage with fictionalism in their work. While they vary in their 
themes, genres, medium and style, they all propose a fictionalist relation to 
history and to political trauma. The entanglements they suggest in their 
works operate on the reality with which they are dealing with.  
All of these artists’ projects are invested in entangling the dichotomies that 
make the political reality in which they operate. They do so along the lines of 
what Gil Anidjar has described in relation to Jewish-Arab enmity in Israel-
Palestine. Anidjar explains that in Israel, nationality (‘Arab’ or ‘Jew’) is a 
category distinguished from citizenry (‘Israeli’) – both Arab and Jew are 
divorced from religious meaning here and come to denote an ethnicity. 
Anidjar quotes Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin in saying:  
“Palestinian history and Palestinian national identity are part of the 
discussion of Zionist history, essential parts of the context of 
responsibility. The definition of Palestinian rights and the definition of 
Jewish rights are one and the same. This is the context of 
responsibility that Zionism has created…A bi-national perspective 
leads to…the definition of a common Jewish-Arab space.”  
What this means is that in these artists projects conflict and antagonism are 
approached two another layer of affinity and connectedness by which both 
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sides of a dichotomy are constituted by it, and by that have something they 
share.121  
 
Fictionalism and Anachronism: Freud’s Moses  
“The poor Jewish people, who with its usual stiff-necked obduracy 
continued to deny the murder of their ‘father,’ has dearly expiated this 
in the course of centuries. Over and over again they heard the 
reproach: ‘You killed our God.’ And the reproach is true, if rightly 
interpreted.” 
Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism 
Freud’s “Moses” has been the instigator for this exploration of Betrayal 
through narration. The potentials of fictionalism and anachronism will be now 
be further developed through a reading of this final work by Freud. This final 
part of the chapter is dedicated to the analysis of this work, the 
circumstances in which it appeared and the contexts which it produced. The 
reality in which it was developed relates directly to the cut or the hyphen that 
does not confuse what it unites. Through Freud’s “Moses,” Betrayal is 
proposed here as form of fictionalism that undermines an antagonism from 
within so to speak. To further establish fictionalism and anachronism as 
strategies of Betrayal, Sigmund Freud’s Moses and Monotheism is an 
exceptional precursor for injecting fictions into historical narratives. In the 
case of Freud’s last book, as we will see, fictionalism performs Betrayal in 
face of the political reality. The presupposition that grants the political 
conditions the status of unalterable reality is rejected here. This does not 
simply mean that one’s identity will stay stable and coherent while all the rest 
                                                          
121 Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy, pp. 163-164 
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of the setting will get re-organized. On the contrary, the one applying critique 
might be the one most implicated. Betrayal means that the conditions within 
which the struggle takes place are modified, and the context within which a 
problem has arisen is modified with it. By not opting for one or the other of 
the provided alternatives Betrayal alters the rules of the game through 
unrestrained invention. Fictionalism and anachronism are two ways to 
achieve this proposal for disequilibration through invention. 
 
Freud’s Loyalty  
The German-speaking Jews and their history are an altogether unique 
phenomenon; nothing comparable to it is to be found even in the other 
areas of Jewish assimilation. To investigate this phenomenon, which 
among other things found expression in a literally astonishing wealth 
of talent and of scientific and intellectual productivity, constitutes a 
historical task of the first rank, and one which, of course, can be 
attacked only now, after the history of the German Jews has come to 
an end. 
Hannah Arendt122 
With Freud’s “Moses,” Jewishness becomes again an open question. Read 
from the perspective of contemporary Jewish state in Israel, the 
anachronism it offers activates the immediate political and social reality. The 
fact that Freud’s “Moses” comes from a time when ‘Jewish’ could still claim 
not to converge into a nation, an ethnicity or race, keeps it as a question. 
Therefore, Freud’s Betrayal is performed exactly in this loyalty to Jewishness 
                                                          
122 See: ‘Preface’ to Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, Ed.: Liliane 
Weissberg, Trans.: Richard and Clara Winston, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997, p. 82 
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as an open-ended question. Historically, we can say that in the Christian 
world the Jews, unlike the Muslims, were tolerated. But while Muslims were 
regarded as an enemy on the level of a war on resources, power and control 
of land and sea, the Jew functioned differently as it was also an internal part 
of the Christian world (through theology but not only). Jew was that which 
provoked the world, unsettled it. The Jew reminds us that maybe the 
messiah did not yet arrive. That we might be wrong about the world – maybe 
what we know as truth is a lie. This is the basic hermeneutics of suspicion 
that the Jew proposes. In this respect, writing from today, all these potentials 
are available only as an anachronism. And Freud’s “Moses” provides for a 
unique unsettling provocation of our world because it is applied to the Jews 
themselves. It is a study in destabilization on both internal and external 
levels – both in relation to the anti-Semitic setting of the time it was written 
and in relation to a stable Jewish identity as nation, religion or race. 
Here we encounter the unique function of the Jew within a dichotomy such 
as that of Jew/German. The uniqueness lies in the fact that Jewishness itself 
occupies a binary when played out in an anti-Semitic imaginary. Theodor 
Lessing wrote in 1930 in Jewish Self Hatred (Der Jüdische Selbsthass), that 
the Jews are always being accused by anti-Semites of certain characteristics 
and their polar opposites. They are castigated for being calculating and 
rationalist, on the one hand, and instinctual and physical, on the other; too 
spiritual and too materialist; excessively primitive and excessively modern. 
They are accused of being both communists and capitalists; of the crimes of 
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religion and the sins of secularity. Therefore, they can operate as a basic 
dichotomy for all the others.123 
In his “Moses” book, Freud devises a method of addressing political reality 
by retrieving history through analyzing a mythical narrative. He opens the 
book with these words:  
“to deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of its sons 
is not a deed to be taken lightheartedly – especially by one belonging 
to that people”124  
Moses and Monotheism was the last book to be published by Freud during 
his lifetime. It is comprised of three essays which Freud wrote between 1934 
and 1938: “Moses an Egyptian”, “If Moses Was an Egyptian” and “Moses, 
His People, and Monotheistic Religion”. The book is an extraordinarily 
creative speculation on Moses, his life and his death, the origins of 
monotheism and anti-Semitism, and the making of the slaves in Egypt into a 
people and the creation of the religion of Moses – Judaism. The book was 
written in Vienna and in London at a time when Freud, an Austrian-Jew, had 
to find refuge after the Anschluss – the annexation of Austria into the Nazi 
Reich in March 1938.  
Using a variety of works by Egyptologists, archeologists, geologists and 
researches of the scriptures, Freud claims that Moses was an Egyptian – 
                                                          
123 See: Sander Gilman, Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Anti-Semitism and 
the Hidden Language of the Jews, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 
pp. 300-304. Footnote 139 is dedicated to Freud and Lessing and the way that they 
are able to accuse each other for Jewish flaws. Gilman writes: “Lessing’s own interest 
in the psychopathology of self-hatred was understood as stemming from his own 
fragmented sense of self. Lessing had attacked psychoanalysis as a ‘typically Jewish 
abortion.’ In 1936 Freud recalled Lessing’s attack on him and wrote to Kurt Hiller that 
Lessing’s self-hatred was ‘an exquisite Jewish phenomenon.’” 
124 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 3 
139 
 
either a priest or a noble man – who lived in the thirteenth century BC. 
Freud’s Moses was not an Israelite, son of slaves found by Pharaoh’s 
daughter on the Nile as the biblical story tells us. Freud’s Moses was not 
adopted by the Egyptian princess and rose to power in the court not knowing 
he is of the sons of Israel, as the biblical story tells us. For Freud’s Moses 
was a descendent of the proto-monotheistic cult of the Sun God (Aten), 
which was formed by the Pharaoh Akhenaten who ruled in the fourteenth 
century BC (there are also claims Akhenaten is the father of Pharaoh 
Tutankhamun). Akhenaten’s religion is noted for abandoning traditional 
Egyptian polytheism and introducing worship similar to monotheistic. Freud’s 
Moses was one of those who were still practicing this marginalized religion 
and after finding the slaves of Egypt to be useful for his political and religious 
goals, he then united them as a people around this religion (Biblical Moses’ 
stammering is explained by Freud as a late literary concealment of the fact 
that being Egyptian, Moses did not speak the language of the slaves).  
Working with the notion of the “Primordial Father”, Freud himself admits 
throughout his book that he is actually applying onto the story of the Jewish 
people some of his previous theories from Totem and Taboo (1913) and his 
1921 essay “Group psychology and the analysis of the ego.” But to make 
things more complicated, Freud actually claims that there were two “Moses” 
– one Egyptian and the other Midianite – who are combined by the biblical 
text into one. Moreover, Freud claims that the people these Moses formed, 
the Israelites, killed Egyptian Moses in the desert before entering the land of 
Israel. Later on, he adds, the figure of Moses merged with that of god as a 
“volcano-god”:  
“Jahve [i.e. Yahweh] was certainly a volcano-god. As we know, 
however, Egypt has no volcanoes and the mountains of the Sinai 
peninsula have never been volcanic; on the other hand, volcanoes 
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which may have been active up to a late period are found along the 
western border of Arabia. One of these mountains must have been the 
Sinai-Horeb which was believed to be Jahve’s abode.”125  
This form of elaborate conjecture makes Freud’s Moses an inventive and 
creative text of speculations. Among the traditions inherited by the Religion 
of Moses was the practice of circumcision, which originates, Freud says, in 
the Egyptian religion.  
 
Freud’s Betrayal  
To my knowledge, the nineteenth century saw the birth of two or 
three children that were not expected: Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. 
'Natural' children, in the sense that nature offends customs, 
principles, morality and good breeding: nature is the rule violated, the 
unmarried mother, hence the absence of a legal father. Western 
Reason makes a fatherless child pay heavily. Marx, Nietzsche and 
Freud had to foot the often terrible bill of survival: a price 
compounded of exclusion, condemnation, insult, poverty, hunger and 
death, or madness. I speak only of them (other unfortunates might be 
mentioned who lived their death sentences in colour, sound and 
poetry). I speak only of them because they were the births of 
sciences or of criticism. 
Louis Althusser126 
                                                          
125 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 39 
126 Louis Althusser “Freud and Lacan”, in: Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, Trans.: Ben 
Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971, p. 196. The essay was published 
originally in French in the Communist Party Journal La Nouvelle Critique in 1964 and 
appeared in English in The New Left Review in 1969. 
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The method of Betrayal in Freud’s “Moses” is that of loyalty to Jewishness 
as an open question. In it, Moses is presented as an Egyptian prince who 
developed a model of Monotheism and executed it through a multitude of 
slaves. So the Jewish people did not develop monotheism. But they were 
still the chosen people, maybe not by god but by another man, an Egyptian 
prince. We can see in Freud’s “Moses” the various dimensions it intervenes 
in – it is on the one hand a book on history that questions a mythical account 
about Moses from the bible. It tells a counter story to that which the bible 
presents, but on another level, it follows the biblical story of a chosen 
people. It thus performs a move that is both immersed in and oppositional to 
the biblical story. In this way, we can say that what Freud is proposing is his 
own myth that he articulates in a historical situation that informs his analysis.  
In the last years of his life, when he was forced to leave his home of Vienna 
and to find refuge in London, Freud returned to Moses to discuss his 
character and the people and religion he constituted within the framework of 
the identification of a people with their leader whom they both admire and 
fear. Working in the context of trauma and memory, Freud addresses the 
reality and politics in his own time – the rise of the Nazis and the persecution 
of Jews. When referring to the National-Socialists in the book, Freud 
explains Anti-Semitism as a reaction to the practice of circumcision and the 
castration anxiety it inflicts.127 This is of course hardly an explanation for 
social pathologies emerging in front of his eyes and affecting the people 
around him and himself. But at the same time, it is indicative of the way he 
uses Moses’s story in relation to the political reality of his time. In the book 
Freud examines something that has to do with the Jews in order to 
destabilize the Nazi formation of reality. He is compelled to draw the lines 
that would alter the political conditions, in a way that he too must be altered.  
                                                          
127 See: Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 116-117 
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Freud’s idea for operating beyond the given antagonism involves a 
fictionalization which dismantles the unity of one of the identities. One can 
read his fiction of Moses in light of what it enabled him as author in the 
moment of writing. At the backdrop of this book lays the issue of hyphenated 
identity of German-Jewish and Austrian-Jewish people. National Socialism 
has institutionalized the antagonistic polarity of “Jewish” or “German,” to the 
extent that superior and inferior would not suffice to describe the divide. Jew 
was sentenced to death and to a space of extermination in the death camp, 
and German meant life itself and the living-spaces of territories and 
stadiums; Jew was sentenced to a body-less and speechless existence; and 
German was granted an eternal body and the language of action.128 As 
these extreme antagonistic relations were forming under Nazism, different 
approaches were developing on the “Jewish” side of the equation. Arnold 
Schoenberg, for example, found the reality he was facing in Vienna 
compelling him to compose the opera Moses und Aron (1930-1932) which 
was professed as a manifestation of Jewish identity.129 Another example for 
a response within the polarity “German” of “Jew,” can be found in an article 
written in 1932 by Ludwig Holländer, director of the Central Association of 
German Citizens of the Jewish Faith (CV) (the most prominent organization 
of liberal Jewry in Germany at that time):  
”…We find in Judaism the fulfillment of our personal ideals, religious 
ideals, familial ideals, social ethical ideals, spiritual and educational 
                                                          
128 See: Boaz Neumann, Nazi Weltanschauung - Space, Body, Language .Tel-Aviv: Haifa 
University Publishing House and Sifriat Ma'ariv, 2002. [In Hebrew]  
129 Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet’s adaptation of Schoenberg’s opera in their film 
Moses und Aron (1973), which insists on a kind of Semite aesthetics by proposing a 
Marxian reading of abstract divinity and idolatry performs in itself a beautiful 
anachronism as it portrays the Israelites as nomadic people of the desert, proposing 
a Jewish-Arab affinity through the theme of Semitism. In this sense the film follows 
Freud’s “Moses” more than Schoenberg’s original work.  
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ideals and peaceful ideals […] in its history of sorrow and tears 
Judaism always protected its ideals against the whole world”.130  
Opposed to the rise of the particularity of German nationalism, these 
manifestations of German/Austrian-Jewry saw themselves committed to the 
project of Bildung, identifying Judaism with universalism. They were 
operating in a moment of nation-state building for which they were 
designated the role of foreign outsiders. Their identification with universalism 
was perceived as a threat by some Germans.131 As these German-Jews and 
Austrian-Jews were struggling against the polarization of their hyphened 
identity, they presented different ways to operate by respecting the polarity – 
from Jewish nationalism, Zionism, to a disavowal of their Judaism, these 
various strategies performed treasons that still did not destabilize the 
dichotomy logic of the either/or order that anti-Semites and later on the 
Nazis have established vis-à-vis the Jews. 
 
Freud and Kafka 
Jewish-German theology scholar and philosopher Franz Rosenzwig (1886-
1929), coined the term Bindestrichjudentum – the Judaism of the Hyphen, to 
describe exactly this mode of existence. Franz Kafka’s famous letter to Max 
Brod, in which he describes his relation to writing in German as a Prague 
Jew, highlights the impossibility that is the hyphenated existence. “Kafka 
marks the impasse that bars access to writing for the Jews of Prague and 
turns their literature into something impossible,” say Deleuze and Guattari, 
                                                          
130 See: Avner Dinur, “On Both Sides of the Hyphen: Jewish-German-Universal Culture, 
Nationalism and Post-colonialism” in: Tabur: Yearbook for European History, Society, 
Culture and Thought, Vol. 2: “Crime and Madness in Germany”, Hebrew University 
Jerusalem, 2009, pp. 127-153 [in Hebrew] 
131 See: Arendt, “The Jews and Society,” in: The Origins of Totalitarianism  pp. 55-88 
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“the impossibility of not writing, the impossibility of writing in German, the 
impossibility of writing otherwise.”132 Deleuze and Guattari place this 
impossibility in relation to experience of Jews in the late Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, these include among others, Kafka, Schoenberg and Freud, some 
of whom navigate between four languages ─ German, Yiddish, Hebrew and 
Czech:  
“Let’s return to the situation in the Hapsburg Empire. The breakdown 
and fall of the empire increases the crisis, accentuates everywhere 
movements of deterritorialization, and invites all sorts of complex 
reterritorializations – archaic, mythic, or symbolist. At random we can 
cite the following among Kafka’s contemporaries: Einstein and his 
deterritorialization of the representation of the universe (Einstein 
teaches in Prague, and the physicist Philipp Frank gives conferences 
there with Kafka in attendance); the Austrian dodecaphonists and their 
deterritorialization of musical representation (the cry that is Marie’s 
death in Wozzeck, or Lulu’s, or the echoed si that seems to us to 
follow a musical path similar in certain ways to what Kafka is doing); 
the expressionist cinema and its double movement of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the image (Robert Wiene, 
who has Czech background; Fritz Lang, born in Vienna; Paul 
Wegener and his utilization of Prague themes). Of course, we should 
mention Viennese psychoanalysis and Prague school linguistics. What 
is the specific situation of the Prague Jews in relation to the ‘four 
languages?’”133 
                                                          
132  See: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Trans.: Dana 
Polan, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, pp. 16. For the letter to 
Max Brod, see the one from June 1921 in: Franz Kafka, Letters, Trans.: Martin 
Greenberg, Schocken Books, 1949, p. 289 
133 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, pp. 24-25 
145 
 
The four languages they mention were proposing different facets of 
experience; mythical, bureaucratic, literary, rural, official, urban, forgotten, 
hidden. And each one came with its own relations to territoriality, 
deterritoriality and reterritoriality. They explain Kafka’s dense three 
impossibilities thus:  
“The impossibility of not writing because national consciousness, 
uncertain or oppressed, necessarily exists by means of literature (‘the 
literary struggle has its real justification at the highest possible levels’). 
The impossibility of writing other than in German is for the Prague 
Jews the feeling of an irreducible distance from their primitive Czech 
territoriality. And the impossibility of writing in German is the 
deterritorialization of the German population itself, an oppressive 
minority that speaks a language cut off from the masses, like a ‘paper 
language’ or an artificial language; this is all the more true for the 
Jews who are simultaneously a part of this minority excluded from it, 
like ‘gypsies who have stolen a German child from its crib.’ [<-quote 
from Kafka] In short, Prague German is a deterritorialized language, 
appropriate for strange and minor uses. (This can be compared in 
another context to what blacks in America today are able to do with 
the English language).”134 
For this reason, for Kafka Jewish-German literature is impossible; the 
hyphen cannot be moved or replace by a gap. The hyphen cannot be 
included in the German side of the equation. At the same time, the German 
language cannot be ignored or traded for another language, because the 
German language itself is not located exclusively on either sides of the 
hyphen. The German language is on both sides of the hyphen, but it does 
                                                          
134 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, pp. 16-17 
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not allow for an “And” or for simultaneity, only an operation between 
tensions.  
 
Moses the Egyptian 
The method of Betrayal that Freud’s “Moses” proposes is that of loyalty to 
Jewishness as an open question. Freud’s Moses is a Betrayal of the 
antagonism German/Jew, by its attack on one of the essential poles of the 
polarity – the Jews are not Jewish, he says in it, they are but slaves who 
were taken by an Egyptian prince or priest and made into a people. The 
earth shifts with this proposition. When considering it, one finds himself 
suddenly on the other side of his own story. This rewriting of the myth 
through an analysis of the text suggests so many new horizons. But for 
Freud’s contemporaries, the book was perceived as a mistake or an insult. 
Jewish philosophy scholar Martin Buber opened his 1945 book Moses with a 
footnote which states: 
“One should wonder with regret that such an important scholar in his 
field as Sigmund Freud, has found it in his heart to publish such an 
unscientific book which is based on ungrounded speculation.”135  
For Buber, who sees Freud as a ‘man of science,’ this book is an insult as 
he regards this book as a flawed scientific work. But the entanglement of 
myth and science that this work suggests stems exactly from anachronism 
and fictionalism as two strategies of interfering with the quadruple structure 
of is/isn’t-thinkable/unthinkable that Yuran proposes in relation to history. 
Freud’s speculative Moses turns from the polarity of German/Jew, not 
ignoring it, but constituting something else. When faced with the antagonism 
                                                          
135 Martin Buber, Moses: The Revelation and the Covenant [1945], Humanity Books, 1988, p. V 
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of either “Jew” or “German”, as two distinct negating races, as it was 
articulated in German politics at the time, Freud is still “Jerman.” He cannot 
let go of the hyphen. He embodies it. Therefore, he finds a way to undo the 
polarity by going back to Moses, the founder of the “Jewish People”, and 
claiming that even he is not Jewish. By this he is performing a betrayal of the 
polarity itself. Freud’s Betrayal with Moses can be used as an example for 
fictionalism – he is working with a myth, analyzing its text to find the stitches 
the story conceals, only to come up, not with a simple claim for a historical 
truth behind the fictitious myth, but with another fiction to be presented in his 
political present. Fictionalism here is a way of injecting potential histories into 
embodied narratives, and by that destabilizing identities aligned along an 
antagonism.  
“A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather that 
which a minority constructs within a major language,” 136 say Deleuze and 
Guattari. They explain how language is affected with a high coefficient of 
deterritorialization in minor literature, and how everything in minor literatures 
is political, and takes on a collective value:  
“The three characteristics of minor literature are the deterritorialization 
of language, the connection of the individual to the political 
immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation.”137  
Maybe not on a linguistic level, but definitely as a literary project, one can 
read the operations of Freud’s Moses as minor literature. Assuming a 
position that is no-longer-and-not-yet available is what can be called 
anachronism here in relation to betrayal. And it becomes an essential part of 
the promise of Betrayal. This tactic can be applied as a political tool, for 
                                                          
136 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka,, p. 16 
137 Ibid., p. 18 
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example, in Palestine-Israel today. Articulating affinities rather than 
belonging shifts the divide. This opens up the possibility for a temporal 
perspective to emerge, through which we can approach the archeology of 
the present as potential. Freud’s “Moses” involves a deterritorialization of 
language, it is directed at the political immediacy of its time, and this involves 
a collective assemblage of enunciation through its subject. It is a minor 
literature in relation to German, to science, to history, to fiction, to myth, to 
politics. In this respect, Freud’s psychoanalysis as a whole can be 
considered here as an example of minor literature in itself. 
 
Freud’ Method  
The “Moses” book is Freud’s work which received the least attention when it 
was published, compared to his earlier works. It almost stands as the odd 
one out, at least when measuring its presence against its contemporaries. 
Out of all of Freud’s writings, his “Moses” might be the most marginal book 
with regards to it establishing a school or a paradigm. In addition, unlike 
other works in which he obfuscates Jewish cultural tropes and universalizes 
them (for example in his 1905 book Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious)138, his “Moses” is the only book to directly addressing Jewish 
themes. And again it should be emphasized that this is done amidst the rise 
of the Nazis in Germany and the annexation of Austria.  
The specificity of this work nevertheless, generated what we can call a small 
collection of writing referring directly to Freud’s “Moses.” These works delve 
into a variety of topics, from Judaism to orientalism, deconstruction and the 
archive, but in them we can trace “Moses” and its proposal. Since the 1990s, 
                                                          
138 See: Sander Gilman, The Jew’s Body, Routledge, 1991, especially chapter 5: “The Jewish 
Genius: Freud and the Jewishness of the Creative,” pp. 128-149  
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a series of publications have come out in relation to the book, borrowing its 
initial attempt to confront contemporary tensions of identity in relation to 
history. Many years after Martin Buber attacked the book for its lack of 
scientific reasoning, Freud’s “Moses” came back into the field of cultural 
critique and historical evaluation through an analysis of what the work 
attempted to achieve – for its readers as well as for its author – in the time of 
its writing and publishing. 
In this list of books coming out of this marginal school of Freud’s “Moses,” 
we can find Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi’s, Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable 
and Interminable  (originally published in 1991)139, Jacques Derrida’s 
response to this book in the form of Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression 
(which is based on a talk originally given as a lecture in 1994 and published 
as a book in 1995)140, Peter Sloterdijk’s short book on Derrida following the 
philosopher’s death Derrida, An Egyptian: On the Problem of the Jewish 
                                                          
139 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991 
140 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, Trans.: Eric Prenowitz, University of 
Chicago Press, 1998 
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Pyramid, (originally published in 2006)141, and Edward W. Said’s Freud and 
the Non-European (which was given as a lecture in 2001)142.  
Before going into detail in describing the different moves and themes these 
works explore in relation to Freud’s “Moses,” it seems relevant to mention 
first of all the fact that these works do so more than fifty years after the work 
was published. Not only that, the battle was won by the Nazis in the sense 
that they managed to create a reality of total antagonism between German 
(life) and Jew (death), but after the war, Judaism became more and more 
connected to a state that articulated Judaism not an a cultural identity or 
history or even religion, but mainly as an ethnicity. Therefore, Freud’s 
“Moses,” in which Jewish could still claim not to converge into a nation, an 
ethnicity or race, is for us still a useful and pressing suggestive anachronism. 
What we have here is fiction on fiction; writing about Moses as a character 
that arises from the text and analyzing the text, in order to formulate another 
text (Freud’s book) that is also a manifestation of the conditions and 
contradictions of the times it was conceived in. This gap in the reception and 
analysis of the work suggests that Freud’s “Moses” offered something 
unsettling, especially for the time of its writing. Its proposal was such that at 
                                                          
141 Peter Sloterdijk, Derrida, An Egyptian: On the Problem of the Jewish Pyramid, Trans.: 
Wieland Hoban, Polity Press, 2009 
142 Said’s lecture has a story behind it that is telling of the tensions which it attempted to 
tackle. The Freud Institute in Vienna invited Said in 2000 to deliver the annual Freud 
lecture there in May 2001. Then, after Said, a Palestinian who was born in Cairo to a 
family from Jerusalem, was photographed throwing a pebble towards the Israeli 
border from a recently abandoned Israeli military base in south Lebanon, Said was 
informed that the lecture is cancelled due to “the political development in the 
Middle East and the consequences expected.”. Following this turn of events, the 
Freud Museum in London offered to host the talk, with Jacqueline Rose as a 
respondent and Christopher Bollas in charge of the introduction. The fact that this 
lecture became Edward Said's final book, and that it journeyed from Vienna to 
London, somewhat resonates some of the circumstances around Freud’s “Moses”. 
See: Edward W. Said, Freud and the Non-European, London and New York: Verso, 
2004 
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the time of its publication it was presenting an unattainable perspective – an 
anachronism. With this in mind, we can approach the book itself as an 
anachronism on this level, of an unattainable perspective that now when 
being introduced allows for a variety of perspectives and an abundance of 
potentialities to appear. The little library of books following Freud’s “Moses” 
includes those above mentioned books by Yerushalmi, Derrida, Said and 
Sloterdijk. These authors use different measures in order to attribute the 
radical proposals of the book to its author’s biography or to the field of 
knowledge he has developed (i.e. psychoanalysis), and include references 
to Freud’s own mythology. They focus on different aspects of the actuality of 
his “Moses” – that is, the way he attempted to narrate a story against the 
antagonism he was facing in Vienna in the 1930s, and by that to destabilize 
that antagonism. But again, these writers make use of Freud’s “Moses” 
much later than its original publication, and very late in their own writing. 
This anachronism demonstrates the temporality of Betrayal, suggesting that 
it might operate on much longer durations.  
The instigator of this list on some level is Yerushalmi‘s Freud’s Moses which 
tries to save Freud from denouncing his Judaism with his “Moses”. One 
senses in Yerushalmi’s book an attempt to include Freud in a diasporic 
Judaism alongside the Israeli form of ethnic Jewishness. The whole book 
operates as a series of missed encounters – for Yerushalmi, Freud is either 
too early with his intellectual proposals or too late with his political 
realizations. Freud’s own introduction to the first Hebrew translation of 
Totem and Taboo written in 1930 provides an alibi for Yerushalmi’s Freud: 
“No reader of [the Hebrew version of] this book will find it easy to put 
himself in the emotional position of an author who is ignorant of the 
language of holy writ, who is completely estranged from the religion of 
his fathers – as well as from every other religion – and who cannot 
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take a share in nationalist ideals, but who has yet never repudiated his 
people, who feels that he is in his essential nature a Jew and who has 
no desire to alter that nature. If the question were put to him: 'Since 
you have abandoned all these common characteristics of your 
countrymen, what is there left to you that is Jewish?' he would reply: 'A 
very great deal, and probably its very essence.' He could not now 
express that essence clearly in words; but some day, no doubt, it will 
become accessible to the scientific mind.”143 
Derrida responds to Yerushalmi in Archive Fever by way of analyzing Freud 
through psychoanalysis’s own founding myths. Attempting to do what Freud 
did to Moses, Derrida turns to Freud’s archive in order to address the notion 
of the archive. In the section dedicated to Yerushalmi’s book, Derrida 
explains that while the archive seems to point to the past, it “should call into 
question the coming of the future.” He writes: 
“It is a question of the future, the question of the future itself, the 
question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for 
tomorrow. The archive: if we want to know what that will have meant, 
we will only know in times to come; not tomorrow, but in times to 
come. Later on, or perhaps never.”144  
This disjunctive time that Derrida proposes calls into question not the past 
but the future. And it does so through a projection of the inconceivable future 
that any past has, and a reversal of it back to its past. Derrida’s archive 
therefore relates directly to Freud’s anachronism for it makes a connection 
                                                          
143 Sigmund Freud, “Preface to the Hebrew edition” [1930], in: Totem and Taboo [1913], 
Trans.: James Strachey, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961 p. xi. This preface was first 
published in German in Ges. Werke, 12, (1934), p. 385. It was then stated that a 
Hebrew translation was about to be published in Jerusalem by Stybel. Actually it was 
not published there until 1939, by Kirjcith Zefer. 
144 Derrida, Archive Fever, p. 36 
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through disunity rather than through a processional continuation of past and 
future. 
Edward Said reads Freud’s “Moses” as well in relation to the contemporary 
Jewish state, and as an opposition to it. Said brings the Jew back to its non-
European origin. His lecture confronts Yerushalmi’s thesis, and sees Freud’s 
“Moses” as a key characteristic in Freud, which preserves and expresses its 
non-European nature. He writes: 
“Quite differently from the spirit of Freud's deliberately provocative 
reminders that Judaism's founder was a non-Jew, and that Judaism 
begins in the realm of Egyptian, non-Jewish monotheism, Israeli 
legislation countervenes, represses, and even cancels Freud's 
carefully maintained opening out of Jewish identity towards its non-
Jewish background. The complex layers of the past, so to speak, have 
been eliminated by official Israel. 145 
As the state of Israel never existed during Freud’s lifetime, this direct 
comparison that Said is doing, should be understood exactly as 
anachronism in the sense developed here. This is not historical comparison, 
neither is it nostalgia for other times. What Said is doing is to position a 
perspective that is unattainable today (Freud’s “Moses”) and through it to 
observe real existing political circumstances and realities (the state of 
Israel). 
To continue this triangular movement between the original knowledge Freud 
produced through his “Moses” (fictionalism), the meaning of that proposal 
under the conditions Freud was confronting (anachronism), and the 
potentials this proposal has for us today – how we can use it, so to speak – 
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we turn to Sloterdijk’s Derrida the Egyptian. In this little book, the author 
goes through a set of writers who interpret dreams (biblical Joseph, Freud, 
Derrida), and finds in the architecture of the pyramid the form most suitable 
to describe Derrida’s deconstruction. He equates deconstruction to the 
ultimate structure of collapse saying:  
“’Egyptian’ is the term for all constructs that can be subjected to 
deconstruction – except for the pyramid, that most Egyptian of 
edifices. It stands in its place, unshakeable for all time, because its 
form is nothing other than the undeconstructible remainder of a 
construction that, following the plan of its architect, is built to look as it 
would after its own collapse.”146  
In Sloterdijk’s book, the figure of Moses is always in the background as the 
one who changed divinity itself. He abstracted it, turning idols into laws; he 
made it mobile, turning the Egyptian temple to the Ark of the Covenant; and 
he turned the prophet to a philologist rather than an architect when 
monuments were replaced by scrolls. The pyramid, a structure that is a 
collapse, is such a suggestive image that one is tempted to relate it directly 
to Freud and his intentions with this work. It can also be useful for describing 
psychoanalysis or Freud’s own life, but it might be most convincing in 
describing this triangular relation of anachronism and factionalism that 
Freud’s ”Moses” suggests. We have the fantastic analytical approach 
towards a myth as history and its direct relation to the contemporary political 
circumstances forming one axis. Then we have the potentials this proposal 
has for us today in relation to our contemporary political antagonisms 
forming a second axis. And then the third axis might be the direct relation 
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between the analysis of a myth as history from the past, and our current 
political circumstances. Each of these axes undermines an equation.  
What is formed here is a kind of a pyramid as Sloterdijk would have it. What 
Freud’s “Moses” provides us here is with a structure of destabilizing, a 
structure that is a collapse. This genealogy which stems from Freud’s 
“Moses,” with the debates and the traditions it has formed – from Yosef 
Hayim Yerushalmi’s Freud’s Moses (1991), Derrida’s Archive Fever (1998), 
Edward Said’s Freud and the Non-European (2004); and Peter Sloterdijk’s 
Derrida, an Egyptian (2009), highlight some of the unique characteristics of 
Freud’s proposal of fictionalism and anachronism in this way.  
 
Freud’s “Moses” and the Curatorial  
Facing the fundamental antagonism of his time, Freud the man came up with 
an anachronistic fictionalizing strategy in his book on Moses. Freud’s book is 
extremely valuable as a historical piece. Not that it proves or validates one 
history or theory or the other, but as a manifestation of what could be 
thought at that moment against its own internal logic and tensions. When 
Freud’s “Moses” unbalances the negation of Jew/German of its time by 
using anachronism and factionalism, it approaches this antagonism not by 
simply engaging with it through direct oppositions that are prescribed as pre-
designated positions in it. Instead of being confined to the antagonism’s 
logic, Freud opts to destabilize the opposition itself, and he does so from 
within the one of the variants of the equation.  
Freud’s “Moses” performs a Betrayal that proposes a complexity that we can 
call curatorial in that the complexity of analysis with composition, of concrete 
circumstances with myth, of internal contradictions that operate within 
opposite categories of a negation, are all orchestrated in a manner that 
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allows them to keep separated and contradictory while they operate 
together. With its anachronism and factionalism, what Freud’s “Moses” 
presents us with, is a potential curatorial strategy of destabilizing divisions 
inward. 
Freud’s “Moses” presents us with a Betrayal that destabilizes divisions 
inwards as a way of maintaining its subject, in this case, Jewishness, an 
open question.  
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Introduction 
Part from your friends at the station 
Enter the city in the morning with your coat buttoned up 
Look for a room, and when your friend knocks: 
Do not, o do not, open the door 
But 
Cover your tracks. 
 
Bertolt Brecht, Ten Poems from a Reader for Those who Live in Cities 
 
Betrayal in this chapter addresses Acting as an open ended question. With 
the curatorial perceived here as a model for performing interrelations, this 
chapter looks at Brecht’s unique proposal for what theatre could be and 
uses it to work out a form of Betrayal that comes into being through the 
curatorial. By applying Brechtian Acting to the curatorial, this chapter will 
consider the event of display, the role of curator and that of artists and 
critics, modes of viewing and material and immaterial presences, practices 
and modulations. It will consider ways of Acting in politics through the 
political forms that the curatorial enacts. 
Brecht’s Acting allows for a problematizing of Arendt’s Action and his 
formulation of Acting is considered here as a contribution to political theory. 
As an artist, his various techniques of politicization are instructive for the 
politicization of the curatorial. His development of a theatre of 
demonstrations rather than representations provides a precedent for the 
curatorial as it is proposed here. 
Betrayal in this chapter will be contemplated through the demonstrative 
qualities of Brechtian Acting and the open-endedness of Arendtian Action. 
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“The unpredictability which the act of making promises at least partially 
dispels it of a twofold nature,” Arendt writes:  
“it raises simultaneously out of the ‘darkness of the human heart,’ that 
is, the basic unreliability of men who never can guarantee today who 
they will be tomorrow, and out of the impossibility of foretelling the 
consequences of an act within a community of equals where 
everybody has the same capacity to act.”147 
The nature of this Action will be expanded through Bertolt Brecht’s notion of 
Acting. Arendtian Action holds a political promise that cannot be fulfilled in 
politics simply because we play political roles in society and in these roles 
we are not equals. Therefore, human actors can never guarantee who they 
are today as they are acting in conditions of inequality in the capacity to act. 
With this in mind, Betrayal is articulated in this chapter through the 
exploration of Acting in politics. The first of a series of shifts that this 
realization entails, is that we move from the realm of the political to that of 
real existing politics. Betrayal here would be proposed as a loyalty to acting 
in politics as an open question. In this respect, the open question here 
means the change that the action entails in the actor. Therefore Betrayal 
here does not solely relate to the nature of the action and its effects, but also 
to the carriers of the actions and the ways they perform it.     
Frederic Jameson opens his book “Brecht as Method” with an evaluation of 
Bertolt Brecht’s usefulness (Nützliches) for us after the implosion of real 
existing Socialism. He uses this German word “Nützliches” for the title of his 
prologue as direct reference to Brecht’s approach to the real existing politics 
of his time; namely the dead-end that communists all over the world were 
faced with after Stalin’s seizing power of the Soviet Union, the treaty with the 
                                                          
147 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 244 
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Nazis just before the beginning of the Second World War, and the realities of 
life under real existing Socialism: 
His ‘proposals’ and his lessons – the fables and the proverbs he 
delighted in offering – were more on the order of a method than a 
collection of facts, thoughts, convictions, first principles, and the like.” 
148  
This method, which will be explored further in this chapter in regards to 
Betrayal, was developed in relation to the need to act under real existing 
political conditions; it is informed by the reality of acting in politics. By that I 
mean that this form of acting we can take from Brecht does not only include 
the Arendtian Action which is comprised of text (true or false claims), and 
performance (enacting and enunciating). Brechtian Acting involves concrete 
politics and political conditions (acting-out and actualizing) as well. That third 
quality of actualizing and acting-out, which goes beyond true or false 
speech, and happy or unhappy speech-acts, actually precedes them as it 
relates to the real setting for any action. This is where Betrayal begins. For 
Jameson the feature which makes Brecht so urgent is exactly his activity:  
“because so many people seem immobilized in the institutions and the 
professionalization which seem to admit of no revolutionary change, 
not even of the evolutionary or reform-oriented kind. Stasis today, all 
over the world – in the twin condition of market and globalization, 
commodification and financial speculation – does not even take on a 
baleful religious sense of an implacable Nature; but it certainly seems 
to have outstripped any place of human agency, and to have rendered 
the latter obsolete.”149  
                                                          
148 Frederic Jameson, Brecht and Method, London and New York: Verso, 1998, p.2 
149 Jameson, Brecht and Method, p.4 
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This chapter will therefore consider Brecht as method in relation to a series 
of moves that come out of the elaboration of Action into Acting; from 
representation to model, vision to alignment, and individual to Dividual. All 
these will be further discussed throughout this chapter. The Betrayal 
Brechtian Acting proposes engages with the daily actions outside the 
construction of the political as arena or scene. This chapter will explore how 
the shift from the metaphor of the arena and the scene as the site of politics 
to other visual, physical and textual conceptions, enables us to use Brecht in 
order to expand Arendt’s notion of Action. This is Betrayal as loyalty to 
Acting as an open-ended question of self and public, actor and role, theatre 
and exhibition, identification and demonstration. Engaging with politics in the 
form of Acting, operating with relations of deceit and secret agency rather 
than transparency and equality. Through an examination of central concepts 
developed in the work of Hannah Arendt and Bertolt Brecht, this chapter will 
explore Betrayal as an expansion of political Action onto Acting in politics. 
 
Politics and the Political: “Writing the Truth” and “Lying in 
Politics”  
 
Many things that cannot be said in Germany about Germany can be 
said about Austria 
Bertolt Brecht150 
                                                          
150 Bertolt Brecht, “Writing the Truth: Five Difficulties,” in: Bertolt Brecht, Galileo, Ed.: Eric 
Bentley, Trans.: Charles Laughton, Grove Press, 1966, Appendix A: pp. 131-150. The 
first version of this essay was a contribution to a questionnaire in the Pariser 
Tageblatt, December 12, 1934, which bore the title “Poets Are to Tell the Truth.” In it 
Brecht proposed only three difficulties. The final version of this essay was first 
published in German in Unsere Zeit (Paris), VIII, Nos. 2/3 (April, 1935) pp. 23-24  
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The two notions of “Action” and “Acting,” have emerged to define almost 
opposing conceptions of what politics is. While the first suspends power 
relations as such since it precludes any obstacle or opacity from entering its 
vision of politics as a space of appearance, the latter encourages elaborate 
clandestine or masquerade tactics as part of its deployment of politics as the 
formation of manipulation embedded within real existing power relations.  
We can find an example for Arendt’s approach to politics when she applies 
her critique onto current events of her time. In an interview with her from 
1970, she complimented the student movement in the US for its moral drive:  
“As I see it, for the first time in a very long while a spontaneous 
political movement arose which not only did not simply carry on 
propaganda, but acted, and, moreover, acted almost exclusively from 
moral motives. Together with this moral factor, quite rare in what is 
usually considered a mere power of interest play, another experience 
new to our time entered the game of politics: It turned out that acting 
is fun. This generation discovered what the eighteenth century had 
called ‘public happiness,’ which means that when man takes part in 
public life he opens up for himself a dimension of human experience 
163 
 
that otherwise remains closed to him and that in some way 
constitutes a of complete ‘happiness’.”151  
In her embrace of some of the goals of the anti-war student movement, and 
more so their conduct, Arendt repeats her critique of those waging the war, 
which is basically a critique on the basis of morals. She makes this and not 
interest a position from which to act. Writing on the Pentagon Papers, the 
“United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967,” she determines from the 
start that the “basic issue raised by the Papers is deception.”152 This 
document, which was discovered and released by Daniel Ellsberg and the 
New York Times in 1971, is an internal study prepared by the US 
department of Defense on the American role in Indochina from the end of 
the Second World War until May 1968. For Arendt, The American disaster in 
Vietnam is one of self-deception. Most of Arendt’s essay Lying in Politics: 
Reflections on The Pentagon Papers,” revolves around an elaborate 
explanation of how the image of the state became the sole criteria for the 
benefit and power of the state. This, she explains, should be blamed on a 
mode of thinking generated by the rise of public relations managers and the 
                                                          
151 Hannah Arendt, “Thoughts on Politics and Revolution,” in: Crises of The Republic, Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, 1972, p. 203. This is an interview Arendt gave to journalist 
Adelbert Reif in the summer of 1970. Arendt’s praises here carry a striking 
resemblance to Alfred Döblin’s “To Know and to Change,”(Wissen und Verändern, 
1931), a text where he formulates a kind of Socialism outside the proletariat 
movement, as quoted by Walter Benjamin: “Socialism, according to Döblin, is 
'freedom, spontaneous association of human beings, refusal of all constraint, revolt 
against injustice and constraint; it is humanity, tolerance and peaceful intentions.” 
Benjamin comments that such a political stand is defined according to “opinions, 
intentions or predispositions”, but not according to any position within the 
production process. See: Walter Benjamin, “Author as Producer,” in: Understanding 
Brecht, Trans.: Anna Bostock, London and New York: Verso, 1998, pp. 92-93 
152 Hannah Arendt, “Lying in Politics: Reflections on The Pentagon Papers,” Crises of The 
Republic, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1972, p. 3. First appeared in: New York 
Review of Books, Volume 17, Number 8, November 18, 1971 
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acceptance in Washington DC of former communists reborn as 
conservatives. The core philosophical claim of the essay though states this:  
“Truth, even if it does not prevail in public, possesses an ineradicable 
primacy over all falsehood.”153  
With regards to politics what this means is that the deceiver wants to 
believe, making self-deceit the first outcome of this form of politics. Arendt 
claims that this makes lying in politics counterproductive because there is no 
point in “confusing people without convincing them.”154   
Here Arendt seems to address what is the property of the political as if it was 
that of politics. By this I mean that the claim that convincing is the main 
activity in politics, might be true when conceptualizing it in an abstract 
manner. But the reality of politics has to do with ways of dominating and 
consolidating power rather than with doing away with it. This means that the 
liberal logic of sovereign individual agents, each separated from the others 
but inseparable from itself, which Arendt follows, might be appropriate when 
discussing the political in its abstraction; but in reality, when we are playing 
roles on unequal terms, this mode of action cannot be found anywhere in 
politics. 
What Arendt claims is that through deliberation, exchange, and debate these 
agents come to conclusions and promote policies. These political agents are 
perceived as equal amongst themselves, speaking truthfully among 
themselves in the spaces designated for such speech. The classical setting 
                                                          
153 Arendt, “Lying in Politics”, p. 31 
154 Arendt, “Lying in Politics”, p. 31. See also Arendt’s 1967 essay “Truth and Politics,” in which 
she contrasts the two as antithetic terms: Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics,” in: 
The New Yorker, February 25, 1967 
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for such speech has been the theatre and the assembly, out of which came 
the institution of the parliament.155 
But what if not only the members deliberating are not equal and transparent 
to each other – what if the truth cannot present itself, what if there are 
difficulties in recognizing what the truth might be? Bertolt Brecht’s 1935 
essay “Writing the Truth: Five Difficulties” seems to address exactly these 
concerns. In this polemic treatise he depicts the difficulties a writer, and 
especially a poet of his time would be facing when attempting to write the 
truth. Brecht first asserts that courage to write the truth demands that those 
who are good admit that they are weak. This separation between morals 
(good) and power (weak) is of great significance in our discussion here as it 
delineates a place for politics that is embedded much more in historical 
reality than in morality. He writes:  
“It takes courage to say that the good were defeated not because 
they were good, but because they were weak”156    
His second point demands that we come to terms with the difficulty in finding 
the truth altogether. Although he claims dialectical materialism as the 
method of finding knowledge in this “age of perplexity and lightning 
changes,” he remarks that:  
                                                          
155 See: Richard Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization, W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1996, pp. 31-67 
156 Brecht, “Writing the Truth: Five Difficulties,” pp. 131-150. Benjamin provides us with the 
Brechtian dictum for an intellectual work saying: “He was the first to address to the 
intellectuals the far-reaching demand that they should not supply the production 
apparatus without, at the same time, within the limits of the possible, changing that 
apparatus in the direction of Socialism. 'The publication of the Versuche,' we read in 
the author's introduction to the series of texts published under that title, 'marks a 
point at which certain works are not so much intended to represent individual 
experiences (i.e. to have the character of finished works) as they are aimed at using 
(transforming) certain existing institutes and institutions.'”: See: Benjamin, “Author 
as Producer,” in: Understanding Brecht, p.93 
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“method is good in all inquiry, but it is possible to make discoveries 
without using any method – indeed, even without inquiry.”157 
The third point he makes is that a skill is needed for those who are ready to 
write the truth and are able to recognize it, so that they will be able to 
manipulate the truth as a weapon. For him truth “must be spoken with a view 
to the results it will produce in the sphere of action.”158 This is very different 
from Arendtian conceptualization of Action as an open-ended process and of 
truth as something that cannot be appropriated by a specific party. But 
Brecht sees truth as a means for a bigger truth, one which does not lie in 
description but in interpretation: 
“If one wishes successfully to write the truth about evil conditions, 
one must write it so that its avertible causes can be identified. If the 
preventable causes can be identified, the evil conditions can be 
fought.”159     
For Brecht, therefore, evil can be fought by Action upon analysis. Morals and 
power are not divorced in this scheme but are much more entangled in 
historical reality. Articulation, or the way of “identifying preventable causes,” 
in his words, is the way to reach the truth. The fourth point he makes relates 
to the constituency of truth, or as he phrases it:  
“…for us writers it is important for whom we tell the truth and who tells 
it to us”.160  
                                                          
157 Brecht, “Writing the Truth: Five Difficulties,” p. 137 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., p. 140 
160 Ibid. 
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Here the point is about teaching and learning by selecting those in whose 
hands the truth will be most effective. This makes truth to be a means for 
Action by those to whom we would offer our analysis. This point seems to 
resonate Benjamin’s “Author as Producer,” an address delivered at the 
Institute for the Study of Fascism, Paris, on April 27, 1934 (around the time 
Brecht was writing his “Writing the Truth”), where he introduces the concept 
of technique as a way of relating the work to the real existing political reality 
from which it emerges: “the rigid, isolated object (work, novel, book) is of no 
use whatsoever,” writes Benjamin. “It must be inserted into the context of 
living social relations.” For Benjamin, rather than asking, “What is the 
attitude of a work to the relations of production of its time?” we should ask, 
“What is its position in them?” This question directly concerns the function 
the work has within the literary relations of production of its time. It is 
concerned, in other words, directly with the literary technique of works.161 
“Cunning is necessary to spread the truth” Brecht concludes his fifth and 
final point on the difficulties of writing the truth. Here we arrive at Brecht’s 
own technique. Truth is suppressed and concealed, it is manipulated and 
coded. The conditions are such that truth is a threat on those dominating 
real existing political relations, therefore it cannot simply appear within them. 
Hence, Brecht’s technique is the understanding of the language of double-
meaning, of irony and role-playing, the usefulness of wit and framing 
choices, of allusions and allegories.  
But these attempts, Hannah Arendt herself claimed, have failed. For her 
Brecht was: 
“first and foremost, a poet – that is, someone who must say the 
unsayable, who must not remain silent on occasions when all are 
                                                          
161 Benjamin, “Author as Producer,” pp. 85-103  
168 
 
silent, and who must therefore be careful not to talk too much about 
things that all talk about.”162  
Brecht was therefore supposed to tell the silent truth out loud (He famously 
wrote in the poem “O Germany, Pale Mother!” (1933): “In your house / Lies 
are roared aloud. / But the truth / Must be silent. / Is it so?”).  
 
Morals and Power 
Arendt argues that the kind of indirect approach towards truth Brecht was 
practicing brought him to find usefulness even in Stalin no less.163 For his 
politics was a battle with his basic tendency for compassion, she says:  
“Compassion was doubtless the fiercest and most fundamental of 
Brecht's passions, hence the one he was most anxious to hide and 
also was least successful in hiding; it shines through almost every 
play he wrote.”164  
But not only compassions shines through his plays. This concealment of 
compassion, she claims, runs through them as well:  
“The leitmotiv was the fierce temptation to be good in a world and 
under circumstances that make goodness impossible and self-
defeating. The dramatic conflict in Brecht's plays is almost always the 
                                                          
162 Hannah Arendt, “Bertolt Brecht,” Men in Dark Times, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1967, 
p. 228 
163 Heiner Müller summarizes briefly the need for fables in relation to Stalin when referring 
the Brecht’s exile in the US: “Hollywood became the Weimar of German antifascist 
emigration. The necessity of keeping silent about Stalin, because his name stood for 
the Soviet Union as long as Hitler was in power, compelled the generality of the 
parable.” Heiner Müller, “Brecht vs. Brecht,” [1981] in: Germania, Ed.: Sylvère 
Lotringer, Trans.: Bernard and Caroline Schütze, Semiotext(e), 1990, p. 125  
164 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 235 
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same: Those who, compelled by compassion, set out to change the 
world cannot afford to be good.”165  
Here, Arendt claims, Brecht discovered instinctively the compassionate logic 
behind the murderous modern revolutionaries (which elsewhere she made 
clear were historical disasters).166 How not to be good, is then the teaching 
of Brecht’s plays. After all, being in politics demands doing bad for the sake 
of a greater good.167 Arendt demonstrates the tragic price of such logic 
through one of Brecht’s learning plays (Lehrstücke) “The Measures Taken” 
(Die Maßnahme, 1930),168 which shows how and for what reasons the 
innocent, the good, the humane, those who are outraged at injustice and 
come running to help, are the ones being killed. For the measure taken is 
the killing of a Party member by his comrades, and the play leaves no doubt 
that he was the best of them, humanly speaking. “Precisely because of his 
goodness, it turns out, he had become an obstacle to the revolution.”169  
Within the entangled relations of morals and power, Arendt here reveals her 
commitment to morals over power. We can observe how the way she argues 
against Brecht, proves more about her reasoning than it does about Brecht’s 
                                                          
165 Ibid., p. 236 
166 For the Arendtian pairings of the good English and American Revolutions versus the bad 
French and October Revolutions, see: Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 40-41 
167 Lenin describes leftism as the attempt to be good at the expense of taking power. See:  
Vladimir Lenin, “’Left-Wing’ Communism: an Infantile Disorder” [1920], in: Collected 
Works, Progress Publishers, Trans.: Julius Katzer, USSR, 1964, Volume 31, pp. 17–118. 
See also: https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/lwc/index.htm [Last 
retrieved: 15.10.2015]. 
168 The title of Brecht’s play Maßnahme, is the same as the term Carl Schmitt uses in his 
famous tractate “Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty” 
[1922], to describe the concept of the state of exception through executive measures 
(Maßnahme) as opposed to the concept of law. See also: Eva Horn, “Actors/Agents: 
Bertolt Brecht and the Politics of Secrecy” in Grey Room, Grey Room, Inc. and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Summer 2006, No. 24, p. 42 
169 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, p. 241 
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own commitments. If politics, as Brecht shows us, involves a constant 
negotiation between power and morals as the two are entangled together, 
Arendt seems to make claims from outside politics. She uses a moral 
standpoint regarding issues of power. The entanglement of politics is 
resolved by her as she turns the relation between the two into a dichotomy. 
By presenting it as a dichotomy and by choosing a side in this scheme, 
Arendt enables us to see the limits of her own proposal when applied to real 
existing politics.   
Brecht would tell us: strategize, organize: “the good were defeated not 
because they were good, but because they were weak.” He would say that 
“the truth must be silent”, and therefore “cunning is necessary to spread the 
truth.” These claims of his we should attend to not as the declarations of a 
party organizer, but as an artist who developed a technique in politics. 
Walter Benjamin saw in the form of “The Measures Taken” a peak 
achievement of both musical and literary technique, by which “a concert 
transforms into a political meeting.”170 Benjamin quotes Brecht to explain 
where he stands in relation to the question of production:  
“’This confusion among musicians, writers and critics about their 
situation,’ says Brecht, ‘has enormous consequences, which receive 
far too little attention. Believing themselves to be in possession of an 
apparatus which in reality possesses them, they defend an apparatus 
over which they no longer have control, which is no longer, as they still 
believe, a means for the producers but has become a means to be 
used against the producers.’” 171 
                                                          
170 In this respect we can think of the theatre in Arendtian terms as a possible space of 
appearance. 
171 See Benjamin paraphrasing Hans Eisler and quoting Brecht in: Benjamin,  “Author as 
Producer,” pp. 96-99 
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So the question is not only of how to say the truth, but how the work itself 
needs to alter (control) the given conditions of its reception (apparatus). 
“Sites of articulation” (means for the producers) need to be developed. Sites 
of articulation will be further developed in this chapter following Benjamin’s 
proposal here. But already at this stage, we can say that the curatorial 
cannot amount to mere curating as practicing an administration of meaning 
and value in the service of the institution (“means to be used against the 
producers” according to Brecht/Benjamin here). The ability of the curatorial 
to demonstrate political relations through “sites of articulation,” provides 
means for the producers not only for practitioners in the field of cultural 
production but more so for this work to be considered a form of production of 
political meaning.   
 
Convincing and Confusing 
We are much less Greeks than we believe. We are neither in the 
amphitheater, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine, invested 
by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part 
of its mechanism.  
Michel Foucault172 
The shift from what the political proposes to what is needed in real existing 
politics invites an elaboration of Arendtian Action by way of Brechtian Acting. 
The realities we are faced with in politics today demonstrate how the notions 
of deliberation and linear claim-making fall short. The current convergence of 
two realities of politics seems to suggest the need for an expansion of Action 
into Acting; I will present them in a discussion of Surkov’s non-linear political 
domination and Lazzarato’s a-signifying semiotics which will be discussed 
                                                          
172 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Trans.: Alan Sheridan, 
Vintage Books, 1977, p. 217 
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later. The first is a form of political domination developed in Russia today 
and is widespread in contemporary real existing democracies; the second is 
an analysis of how control and the transmission of signals are intertwined 
already on the level of pulses, frequencies and pitch, prior to any 
decipherable meaning. Brecht’s method seems to offer a way of working 
with and against them both. 
When Arendt favors convincing your equal peers over confusing your 
subjects, she claims that lying is inefficient for those who rule. What is 
missing here is an understanding of the realm of meaning in which a claim is 
not simply either true or false. What is missing is exactly the political work of 
curatorial articulation that permits claims to appear as true or false. Unlike 
Mouffe and Laclau’s articulation of chain of equivalence, curatorial 
articulation provides an internal relation between claims and suggests the 
claims themselves as relations. At the same time, similar to Mouffe and 
Laclau’s proposal of articulation, it provides a site for a claim to appear, to be 
presented and critiqued. Brecht’s method on the other hand seems useful 
exactly because he was able to articulate a mode of Acting under conditions 
which undermine people’s perception of the world.  
The taunting reality of domination which we are so familiar with today 
involves a strategy of power that keeps any opposition constantly confused – 
scattered into identities, any attempt at wide struggles seems to recreate 
itself as a microcosm of those pre-designated identities and their 
antagonisms. You never know what the enemy is up to or even who they are 
– you may be the enemy. That is the basic strategy of political domination 
we are faced with today and it involves social media and authoritarian 
control, identity politics and deep privatization processes. Therefore, in order 
to rule, conflict itself need not be decided for one side or the other but should 
be regarded as a platform to be used for consolidating power and 
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establishing a constant state of destabilized perception in order to manage 
and control.173 
Coming from business strategy, the terms “disruptive innovation” or 
“disruption,” present a mode of domination based on constant de-stabilizing. 
Innovation here is used as a way of controlling the market,174 but it can also 
prove efficient for political domination outside of markets. The Israeli 
disengagement from Gaza in 2005 was a disruptive military move that 
allowed Israel to keep its disproportionate power over the Palestinians and 
continue its domination. The looming annexation of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories in the West Bank today appears to be in direct continuation with 
the disengagement. In Russia, the whole ‘managed democracy’ doctrine 
wherein Putin and Medvedev switched roles as President and Prime 
Minister, accompanied by the recent ‘non-linear war’ in the Ukraine are all 
disruptive policies. Vladislav Surkov who was nicknamed ‘Putin’s Rasputin’ 
has been identified as responsible for all this. Peter Pomerantsev describes 
the way that Surkov has developed the ‘sovereign democracy’, in which 
democratic institutions are maintained without any democratic freedoms, as 
a method of domination by activating conditions of extreme volatility. 
Pomerantsev described Surkov’s disruptive politics thus:  
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Apple and the likes. See: Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies, pp. 19-48 
174 See: Clayton Christensen The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great 
Firms to Fail, Harvard Business Review Press, 1997, and: Geoff Nunberg, “From TED 
Talks To Taco Bell, Abuzz With Silicon Valley-Style 'Disruption'”, Fresh Air, NPR, 
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“In contemporary Russia, unlike the old USSR or present-day North 
Korea, the stage is constantly changing: the country is a dictatorship in 
the morning, a democracy at lunch, an oligarchy by suppertime, while, 
backstage, oil companies are expropriated, journalists killed, billions 
siphoned away. Surkov is at the center of the show, sponsoring 
nationalist skinheads one moment, backing human rights groups the 
next. It’s a strategy of power based on keeping any opposition there 
may be constantly confused, a ceaseless shape-shifting that is 
unstoppable because it’s indefinable.”175  
Moreover, this platform on which politics takes place is not merely the 
skewed and manipulated sphere of public opinion under external corporate 
and state data mining and control. There is another internal element to it 
which Maurizio Lazzarato defines as ‘machinic enslavement.’ This is not only 
our subjugation to any other agent’s manipulation but a systemic activation 
which operates on an a-signifying semiotic level. This dual subjugation to 
signifying and a-signifying semiotics determines the realm of meaning itself:  
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“…sign production machines which have direct, unmediated impact on 
the real and on the body without being routed through a signification or 
a representation.”176  
These, Lazzarato explains, include money, radio, television, internet, 
science, music and so on. These are sign production machines that appeal 
not to the consciousness, but to the nervous system, the affects, the 
emotions. Following Walter Benjamin, Lazzarato claims that meaning is 
organized industrially rather than theatrically, transforming politics into a 
trans-visual realm:177  
“Language’s power to act, as exercised in the Greek polis and an 
assumption still implicit in all these theories since Hannah Arendt, is 
no longer sufficient to describe the ‘political word’. In the contemporary 
public arena, the production of the world is organized ‘industrially’ 
rather than ‘theatrically’. The process of subjectivation or of 
individuation cannot be reduced to ‘social subjugation by completely 
skipping all reference to ‘machinic enslavement’. Paradoxically 
enough, all the contemporary political and linguistic theories that refer 
                                                          
176 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Semiotic Pluralism and the New Government of Signs,” in: transversal: 
The Language of Things, Trans.: Mary O’Neill, EIPCP June 2006: 
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177 “Since the innovations of camera and recording equipment make it possible for the orator 
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function of the professional actor but likewise the function of those who also exhibit 
themselves before this mechanical equipment, those who govern. Though their tasks 
may be different, the change affects equally the actor and the ruler. The trend is 
toward establishing controllable and transferable skills under certain social 
conditions. This results in a new selection, a selection before the equipment from 
which the star and the dictator emerge victorious.” Writes Benjamin. See: footnote 
no. 12 in: Walter Benjamin, “The Artwork in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” 
[1935], in: Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, Ed.: Hannah Arendt, Trans.: Harry Zohn, 
Schocken Books 1969, pp. 219-253 
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either directly or indirectly to the polis and/or to the theatre, place us in 
a pre-capitalist situation.”178 
 
The Exhibition and the Theatre 
The plot is a model, not a chronicle. 
Heiner Müller179 
With these crucial insights in mind, the curatorial engages with these 
modalities of seeing and meaning by way of acting-out and actualizing. 
Here, it is exactly Brecht’s method which proves useful in engaging with 
politics. 
Roland Barthes describes Brecht’s approach to representation as a relation 
to reality that produces the position of the viewer by which scenes are laid 
out: “erecting a meaning but manifesting the production of that meaning, 
they accomplish the coincidence of the visual and the ideal découpages.”180 
Barthes describes the theatre away from the acoustics model and as part of 
the world of geometry, making it less about the arena and about 
connections:  
                                                          
178 Lazzarato, “Semiotic Pluralism and the New Government of Signs”  
179 Heiner Müller, “The Geste of Citation: Three Points (On Philictetes)” [1978], In: Germania, 
Semiotext(e), 1990, p. 177 
180 Roland Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein” in: Image, Music, Text, Ed. and Trans.: 
Stephen Heath, The Noonday Press, 1977, p. 71. Barthes describes representation as 
a relation between reality and a subject: “representation is not defined directly by 
imitation: even if one gets rid of notions of the ‘real’, or the vraisemblable’, of the 
‘copy’, there will still be representation for so long as a subject (author, reader, 
spectator or voyeur) casts his gaze towards a horizon on which he cuts out the base 
of a triangle, his eye (or his mind) forming the apex.” Barthes, p. 69 
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“The theatre is precisely that practice which calculates the place of 
things as they are observed.”181 
The place, position, relation of things, as they are observed, considered, 
present would be the curatorial sensibility that we are looking to define when 
we speak of alignments. This lends itself to manifest Betrayal as the 
negotiation on what the situation itself is about. Geometry here leaves the 
relations between displayed objects in a given space and moves on to 
suggest affinities and connectedness that undermines any given narrative 
that would aim to give a definite calculation of the place of things as they are 
observed. Barthes emphasises the relation between theatre and painting 
using Diderot’s aesthetic theory which rests on pictorial tableau: 
“…the perfect play is a succession of tableaux, that is, a gallery, an 
exhibition; the stage offers the spectator ‘as many real tableaux as 
there are in the action moments favorable to the painter’”182 
The tableau is the form of the scene in Epic Theatre. It is much more about 
exhibition as the actualization of gestures than it is about theatre as 
narrative. Unlike Arendt who sees in the narrative the form of political action, 
Brecht’s Epic Theatre does not “develop actions but represent conditions,” 
Walter Benjamin explains: 
“…it obtains its 'conditions' by allowing the actions to be interrupted. 
Let me remind you of the 'songs', whose principal function consists in 
interrupting the action. Here, then – that is to say, with the principle of 
interruption the epic theatre adopts a technique which has become 
                                                          
181 Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,” p. 69. Barthes writes: “In the theatre, in the cinema, 
in traditional literature, things are always seen from somewhere. Here we have the 
geometrical foundation of representation.” Ibid., p. 76 
182 Barthes, p. 70 
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familiar to you in recent years through film and radio, photography 
and the press. I speak of the technique of montage, for montage 
interrupts the context into which it is inserted.”183 
So for Brecht it is the setting of a situation rather than the narrative that is his 
main concern. Instead of convincing by deliberation, politics is perceived by 
him as performing parts that are assigned from outside as part of the 
apparatuses of political control. Power relations for Brecht are never 
suspended. By exploring actions as experiments, Brecht’s notion of Acting 
performs a Betrayal that engages with real existing politics of deceit and 
manipulation, cynicism and non-linear control patterns, domination and 
confusion. 
These concerns harken back to the curatorial in an unexpected manner. A 
whole set of considerations present themselves when applying Brechtian 
Acting onto the curatorial: from the event of display, the role of curator and 
that of artists and critics, from viewing to material and immaterial presences, 
signifying and a-signifying technologies, to practices and modulations – 
making it imperative to consider not only the political forms that the curatorial 
enacts but also the ways it is Acting politics. From publics, to meanings, to 
demonstrative articulations, the presence of the model modulates the reality 
it depicts.  
 
 
                                                          
183 Benjamin, “Author as Producer,” p. 99. In her portrait of Brecht, Arendt devotes all of her 
attention to Brecht as a poet rather than Brecht as playwright, dramaturge and 
theorist of theatre. For Arendt’s formulation of action and storytelling see: Arendt, 
The Human Condition, pp. 191-192  
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Action / Acting 
Real power begins where secrecy begins  
Hannah Arendt184 
By expanding Hannah Arendt’s notion of Action in The Human Condition 
(1958) through Bertolt Brecht’s articulation of Acting (in his learning plays 
and Epic Theatre), we engage with Betrayal as a mode of Acting in politics. 
Hannah Arendt’s influential proposal of Action (praxis, distinguished from 
fabrication poiesis), as a mode of human togetherness, holding the 
unpredictable power of promise, is a charismatic proposal she has put 
forward in her 1958 book The Human Condition. As she separates it from 
work and labor, Arendt proposes Action as the core of human agency. Labor 
and work have an end and a limit. They show our sameness and the natural 
constraints imposed on all of us by biological survival needs. For Arendt, 
these realms cover our behavior, the roles we perform and the functions we 
fulfil even when the products of our toil bear the mark of their makers. Only 
in Action and speech, in interacting with others through words and deeds, 
can individuals reveal their personality and affirm their unique identities, she 
says. This is an endless, irreversible and unpredictable human capacity: 
“The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the 
outcome and end of any action is simply that action has no end.”185  
The performative aspect of Betrayal is related both to Action and to Acting – 
positioning oneself in the world as a political actor. The open endedness of 
Arendtian Action (“the impossibility of foretelling the consequences of an 
act”), relates to Betrayal not because of the ‘darkness of the human heart’ 
(the basic unreliability of men who never can guarantee today who they will 
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be tomorrow), but because already the action itself alters its carrier. The 
political actor performs this knowledge. To be performed in the realm of 
politics as an external and internal operation, Betrayal has to apply both 
public and secret agency. By that it re-politicizes the political, bringing it back 
into real existing politics.  
Arendt writes of the way action has to do with actualizing the political: “It is in 
this insistence on the living deed and the spoken word as the greatest 
achievements of which human beings are capable that was conceptualized 
in Aristotle’s notion of energeia (“actuality”), with which he designated all 
activities that do not pursue an end (are ateleis) and leave no work behind 
(no par autas ergo), but exhaust their full meaning in the performance 
itself.”186 For Arendt, the meaning of these instances of action and speech 
lies in the activity itself. Arendt’s idea on the meaning of political Action being 
embedded in the performance itself, envisions an open and transparent 
space of appearance, of public agency:  
“the implicit manifestation of the agent and speaker, is so indissolubly 
tied to the living flux of acting and speaking that it can be represented 
and ‘reified’ only through a kind of repetition, the imitation or mimesis, 
which according to Aristotle prevails in all arts but is actually 
appropriate only to the drama, whose very name (from the Greek verb 
dran, "to act") indicates that playacting actually is an imitation of 
acting.”187  
                                                          
186 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 206 
187 Ibid., p. 187. We see here how the scheme of imitation for Arendt relates to representation 
through the presence of the actor, while if we compare this to Barthes (as quoted 
above in footnote 32), we see that representation has to do with a point of view. See 
also: Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,” p. 69 
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While Arendt claims that playacting is an imitation of Action, Brecht would 
propose the opposite – that there is no Action without playacting. And since 
playacting involves staging, rehearsal, simulation, dramaturgy, 
pronunciation, text, these techniques call for a re-evaluation of Action. No 
longer is it a spontaneous action to itself, but rather a premeditated, strategic 
operation that involves a whole set of techniques. In addition, following the 
insights brought forth by Lazzarato’s notion of ‘machinic enslavement,’ the 
political capacity of Action can shift drastically and we find that the a-
signifying semiotics of machines is acting on us. Already with newspapers 
and their lines of distribution, there is meaning generated through 
modulation. The meaning of these modulations is actualized through sites of 
articulation. For this, Brechtian acting has to internalize the Acting in politics. 
Brecht writes: 
“The public’s opinion of the profession of actor as an absurd and 
outrageous, and by that very outrageousness a noteworthy one – 
belongs to the means of production of the actor itself. He must do 
something with this opinion. The actor has then to adopt this opinion of 
the public about himself.”188 
Brecht instructs us to operate in real-existing politics in which we are not the 
ones determining our role, even when we’re playing actors. We perform our 
role on various levels, some of which – following Lazzarato – are a-signifying 
transmissions. Voice, language, gesture, appearance, resemblance, accent 
etc. all relate directly to the technique of Acting which involves not only a live 
                                                          
188 Quoted in: Jameson, Brecht and Method, p.25. Here we see an interrelation between the 
playacting and the point of view on it, that calls for another way of Acting. Benjamin 
explains Epic Theatre’s function thus: “It brings the action to a standstill in mid-
course and thereby compels the spectator to take up a position towards the action, 
and the actor to take up a position towards his part.” Walter Benjamin, “Author as 
Producer,” p. 100 
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performance with direct and immediate effect, but all sorts of mediated 
apparatuses. 
 
Representation and Demonstrat ion 
The text is pre-ideological; its language does not articulate the fruits of 
thinking but rather scans the authenticity of the first glimpse of 
something unknown, the horror in the face of the first appearance of 
the new. 
Heiner Müller189 
What this means is that not only the actor should try to demonstrate to the 
audience that we are all actors, but that Acting is an inseparable dimension 
of social and everyday life. While Arendt would claim that acting in drama is 
an imitation of Action (“the play-acting is actually an imitation of acting”), 
Brecht opts for an opposite scenario by which action in the world, in real 
existing politics, is a form of Acting. Play-acting is for Arendt an inferior 
capacity of man, compared to Action in politics. What Brecht’s method 
allows us to explore is how Action in politics cannot do without forms of play-
acting. 
If act and deed are an end in themselves, then drama, the acting in theatre 
is a mere contained and illustrative reference to this quality. It is a 
reenactment. An action after-the-fact, out of sync with the political, with 
reality. But for Brecht Acting holds the meaning of political action in reality. 
Acting is embodied storytelling, it is the acting-out of real existing politics.190 
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This makes Brechtian Acting a form of acting without theatre. Brecht’s notion 
of acting as a mode of secret agency, complicates the Arendtian Action as it 
performs it with the understanding of politics as a field in which positions are 
being played by actors. Actors therefore demonstrate the knowledge of 
meaning, as Barthes puts it:  
“Since the tableau is the presentation of an ideal meaning, the actor 
must present the very knowledge of the meaning […] This knowledge 
which the actor must demonstrate – by an unwonted supplement – is, 
however, neither his human knowledge (his tears must not refer 
simply to the state of feeling of the Downcast) nor his knowledge as 
actor (he must not show that he knows how to act well). The actor 
must prove that he is not enslaved to the spectator (bogged down in 
‘reality’, in ‘humanity’), that he guides meaning towards its ideality – a 
sovereignty of the actor, master of meaning, which is evident in 
Brecht, since he theorized it under the term ‘distanciation’.”191 
The actor is the master of meaning in the sense that he presents Acting. 
Brecht’s Lehrstück-Theorie in which the actors are speaking their lines not 
as if presenting their own convictions but “like a quotation” as he says, is 
therefore a direct engagement with reality, not a mere mimicry of it. Brecht’s 
Acting provides here exactly the way for politicizing the field of politics itself. 
The learning-play is based on the assumption that the actor can be politically 
influenced by enacting certain behaviors, performing certain gestures, 
adopting certain attitudes, repeating certain utterances.  
Acting itself is for Brecht a form of political reflection that explores and 
criticizes political patterns by performing them as a role. This form of indirect 
speech is exercised through presenting a standpoint without really sharing it. 
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The subject becomes a political subject to the extent that she/he is able to 
play-act, to present and perform a certain position and by this performance 
explore its consequences. Political agency is thus linked to the ability to 
distance oneself from the position one affirms.  
Eva Horn makes the connection between actors and agents in Brecht’s 
scheme of Acting, saying that Brecht focuses on the position and the tactics 
of the subject in the jungle of secrecy, she explains how he emphasizes the 
need for tactical clandestinity, instead of naively criticizing this secretive side 
of politics in the name of authenticity and frankness:  
“Brecht links his analysis of the tactics and ethics of secret agitation to 
a theory of theatricality as an aesthetical and political practice. 
Brecht’s idea of theatricality is not limited to the aesthetic realm of the 
stage but it exposes the dimension of playacting and dissimulation in 
all political activity.”192 
For the politics of change and of justice to be effective, it has to operate as 
politics, not as morals. Therefore, it cannot succeed without ruses, secret 
subversion and tactical alliances with the enemy. “Political work cannot 
dispense with techniques of acting, dissimulating and deception.” Horn adds. 
The political actor is “caught between truthfulness and play-acting, between 
self-effacement and heroic commitment, between the idealism of 
revolutionary change and the ruthlessness of clandestine activity”.193 To take 
Horn’s claim about Brecht’s point further, we can say that an action that can 
claim authenticity and transparency, which operates solely on moral 
grounds, is not an action in politics. 
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This is the complication of the political with politics that Brecht’s Acting is 
suggesting.194 Brecht’s Lehrstuck-theorie not only implies politics itself as a 
form of play-acting, but the audience plays a key role as well, as he himself 
writes:  
“At no moment must he go so far as to be wholly transformed into the 
character played. The verdict: ‘he didn’t act Lear, he was Lear’ would 
be an annihilating blow to him. He has just to show the character, or 
rather he has to do more than just get into it; this does not mean that if 
he is playing passionate parts he must himself remain cold. It is only 
that his feelings must not at bottom be those of the character, so that 
the audience’s may not at bottom be those of the character either. The 
audience must have complete freedom here.”195 
Betrayal as an actualization of political potentialities is suggested here as 
Action by Acting. Acting therefore would mean engaging with a role in real 
existing politics, while withdrawing from it through performing it. The already-
                                                          
194 When writing on Brecht, Arendt refers to his personal preference of anonymity and 
ordinariness in his daily conduct. Arendt writes of the freedom this mode of action 
gave him as she connects this personal trop to his later Communist poetry which she 
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similar argument to Barthes’s. See also: Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,” p. 69 
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embodied political realities in which we act, provide the setting for Acting as 
a mode of Betrayal. With Brechtian Acting as a mode of Betrayal we can re-
evaluate Arendtian Action in real existing politics, and see the usage it might 
have beyond the declared direct and transparent meaning it might have in 
the political.  
If Betrayal turns Action into Acting in the sense that it makes apparent that 
there is a role that is being played, an actor who is in character, and a point 
of view that is part of these, it means that it addresses the question of 
specificity and generalization, social role and social actor, presence and 
representation. We can therefore consider how the curatorial can ignite not 
only the political dimension of a project on display, but also its potential as it 
actually acts in politics.  
Brecht’s notion of ‘Conceptual intervention’ (eingreifendes Denken)196 
describes how an intellectual endeavour or an artistic project aims to have 
consequences, when it is no longer simply cultural or intellectual but it 
operates as part of a political praxis. Conceptual intervention can be also 
used in reverse, with a political praxis attempting to have consequences 
while it takes hiding as an artistic or intellectual project.  
With the decline of liberal politics, we have encountered a reality in which the 
curatorial found itself hosting more and more projects that aimed directly at 
politics. It is its demonstrative character that allowed the curatorial, which 
anyway operates within a larger aesthetic economy of appearances, to find 
its products offering not only proposals, but actually politically effective 
projects in the realm of politics. A variety of conversions of projects that 
aimed for political power into cultural proposals marks the lines of retreat 
from politics to the political. What this enabled was to keep these projects 
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relevant as potentials. We can name this as one of the reasons for the brutal 
attack on the arts and humanities in industrial countries in recent years. Any 
hint that these potentialities can be activated in real existing politics is 
immediately retaliated today. We can see this in the sanctions put on faculty 
members and artistic directors who embody these links in their work in the 
academic and cultural fields.197 The fact that secret agency is developed and 
that demonstrations on politics are possible in these fields, is exactly why the 
state cannot allow it to gain real power. These experiments of clandestine 
agitations, these gestures of a secret-agency performed, apply Brechtian 
Acting on Arendtian Action. Betrayal thus appears as an ongoing practice of 
curating political actuality into politics. 
Gastus, the gestural which Brecht was preoccupied with, involves 
demonstration rather than representation. Brecht’s theatre demonstrates the 
unrepresentability of the social and political. In it, acting involves a change in 
behavior. Changing is a mental mode which includes the joy of learning. We 
enjoy seeing the actor change. The recurring change in modes from farce to 
drama in Brecht involves our own joy of change in itself. That is why Brecht 
would use peasants as those who always anticipate the next season, says 
Jameson. For the stirring of historical evolution, as he puts it, is worth 
waiting for, even within defeat. Change, is therefore a main field of 
exploration for Brecht, explains Jameson:  
                                                          
197 Examples from recent years are abound: from Ariella Azoulay being denied tenure in Israel, 
to Jack Persekian being fired from the position of artistic director of the Sharjah 
Biennial, to Peter Pál Pelbart being threatened with firing by The Pontifical Catholic 
University of São Paulo, to US professor Steve Salaita being fired from the University 
of Illinois. 
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“Running abreast of change, catching up with it, espousing its 
tendencies in such a way as to begin to inflect its vectors in your own 
direction – such is Brechtian pedagogy”198 
Here Acting takes from Action the embodiment of change. Not merely 
performing one stage in the process of change (sequential procession), but 
being the change (divided and repeating, different from its own self). Brecht, 
Says Jameson, sees change an inevitable: 
“…the historical layering of ‘Brecht’ as such – now folds back into the 
sheerest celebration of change, change as always revolutionary, as 
the very inner truth of revolution itself. This is what the dialecticians 
have always understood and clasped to their hearts.”199  
This inevitability of change, which Acting actualizes, requires articulation, 
which the curatorial provides for through sites and instances. 
 
From Spaces of Appearance to Sites of Articulation  
Show that you are showing! Among all the varied attitudes  
Which you show when showing how men play their parts  
The attitude of showing must never be forgotten.  
All attitudes must be based on the attitude of showing  
This is how to practice: before you show the way  
A man betrays someone, or is seized by jealousy  
Or concludes a deal, first look  
At the audience, as if you wish to say:  
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‘Now take note, this man is now betraying someone and this  
is how he does it.  
This is what he is like when jealousy seizes him, and this  
Is how he deals with dealing.’ In this way  
Your attitude will keep the attitude of showing  
Of putting forward what has been made ready, of finishing off  
Of continually going further. So show  
That what you show is something you show every night,  
have often shown before  
And your playing will resemble a weaver’s weaving, the  
work of a  
Craftsman. And all that goes with showing  
Like your continual concern to  
Make watching simpler, always to ensure the best  
View of every episode - that too you should make visible.  
Then  
All this betraying and dealing and  
Being seized by jealousy will be as it were  
Imbued with something of the quality of a  
Daily operation, for instance eating, saying Good Morning  
and  
Doing one’s work. (For you are working, aren’t you?) And  
behind your  
Stage parts you yourselves must still be visible, as those who  
Are playing them. 
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Bertolt Brecht, “Showing Has to Be Shown”200 
 
Among its different features, what Brecht’s Acting contests, is the belief that 
truth simply presents itself. What it suggests is sites for articulating the truth, 
rather than spaces for it to simply appear in. Arendt defines Action in relation 
to the space of appearance; that space in which we appear together 
politically:  
“It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, 
the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where 
men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things, but to make 
their appearance explicitly.”201  
Wherever individuals gather together politically, “wherever people gather 
together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not 
forever”, says Arendt.  
Arendt suggests a transparent, open and free political space that is 
actualized momentarily. In reality, the space of appearance is available only 
as a horizon. It can be realized only when the political enters politics and that 
is exactly when it gets muddled. Moreover, her notion of Action, which at the 
time of the Cold War when it was conceived, aimed to break away from the 
stagnated standoff of the politics of the time, today comes off as a much 
more complicated tool to use. Lacking any of the institutions that then were 
perceived as blocking political engagement, if one would try to apply 
Arendt’s notion of Action directly to politics today, the outcome will hardly 
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have any political meaning to benefit those carrying the action (other than 
purist elation).  
This was the case with the encampments of the Occupy movement in 2011, 
where the long awaited space of appearance had appeared but with no 
political effect. This is due to the fact that this has been achieved in an 
already totally different setting, both economically and politically than the one 
envisioned (i.e. the polis).202 The image of the Occupy Wall Street protestors 
taking over Times Square in New York on 15 October 2011, demonstrates 
this trap. A few thousands took the square, filling it by standing between the 
screens of ads and live TV broadcasts, looking at themselves being 
portrayed on these screens. The news ticker stating: “Occupy Wall Street 
Movement Goes Worldwide” and the meaning of this is shown to us – 
people standing together in the square in a feedback loop of their own image 
standing together in the square. The striking resemblance of this image with 
that of the celebrations following the assassination of Osama Bin Laden on 2 
May 2011, is telling. Here, again, a crowd fills the square, enjoying its 
images transmitted back at itself. The news ticker states: “Osama Bin Laden 
Killed; ID Confirmed by DNA Testing.” The pairing of these two images 
articulates the inability of spaces of appearance to overcome the new media 
settings of a-signifying semiotics. 
Therefore, to read Arendt’s Action in a useful way today, we would need to 
read her against herself. We would have to conceive the political from the 
contingency of politics. It is exactly here that Brecht’s Acting is useful for 
thinking Arendtian spaces of appearance as site of articulation.  
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In his “Short Organum for the Theatre” Brecht proposed the actor as the one 
learning through the process of Acting – social divides and roles, political 
antagonisms and positions. Brecht writes:  
“this is a way of treating society as if all its actions were performed as 
experiments.”203  
Brecht’s Acting therefore, serves as both political reflection and Action, 
exploring and criticizing political patterns by performing them as if they were 
a role.  This form of Acting, this theatre of gestures for political Action, has its 
performance embedded in clandestine agitation as well as in forms of 
demonstration. This ‘showing that has to be shown,’ is the Brechtian 
formulation that sees in theatre a demonstrative rather than representational 
site of articulation, Jameson explains.204  
This is where the curatorial becomes the site of Brechtian Acting. The 
curatorial holds a demonstrative potential by the fact that it is engaged in 
creating sets of relations – it produces sites of articulation through 
exhibitions, educational and other programs, discussions, screenings, 
conversations, seminars etc. These sites of articulation show how things are 
shown, they articulate that which can now be contested and critiqued. This is 
done through their demonstrative potential to create sets of relations. This is 
how the curatorial brings spaces of appearance into real existing politics as 
sites of articulation.  
Jameson ponders how is it that Brecht, who is considered the theatre figure 
most identified with the proletariat struggles of the first half of the twentieth 
                                                          
203 See fragment no. 52 in: Bertolt Brecht, “A Short Organum for the Theatre,” p. 195 
204 Jameson sees this as Brecht’s pedagogy: “Brecht’s pedagogy always involves pedagogy 
itself; that it was self-referential as well as referential.” Jameson, Brecht and Method, 
p. 152  
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century, actually never staged the working class in his plays. His project 
involves demonstrative strategies, not representational ones. Therefore, in 
order to address the proletariat – the revolutionary subject – Brecht turns to 
the portrayal of businessman, peasants and the unemployed.205  
If we take Lazzarato’s claim that meaning is organized politically in an 
industrial rather than theatrical manner, it puts into question the possibility 
for reflection outside machinic enslavement. This means that the political 
has to be thought from politics and not from outside of it. Metaphors of 
theatrical representation seem to have no meaning in this reality. But Acting 
as a political Action seems to hold a double meaning here; as much as it is 
practiced as a secret agency, it carries a demonstrative quality. In Brechtian 
theatrical terms, it is both a learning experience for the actors as it is a re-
enactment of real existing politics.    
 
Demonstration and Irrepresentability 
What Brecht’s Acting tackles is political Action under conditions of extreme 
abstraction of the social and immense concretization of behavioral patterns 
in the realm of the mundane. Today, through computing and genetic 
sciences, our understanding of the social relies on behavioral patterns. The 
metaphors of “DNA” and “processor” are examples for the way these 
sciences inform our understanding of the world. The abstraction of social life 
involves codes and algorithms taking over our imagination of what the social 
might be. They mark the internalization of surveillance and control as 
providers of systemic predictability. These models for predictability are 
required especially by those threatened to be affected by the reality of 
volatility and precarity. This abstraction is not new. It is simply being 
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concretized in different ways each time. The example for the abstraction of 
the social would be the perpetual transformation of money into capital. This 
is a key feature of our social and political reality for centuries. Brecht’s 
scenes seem to confront “how to express the economic – or, even better, the 
particular realities and dynamics of money as such – in and through 
narrative,”206 says Jameson. In Brechtian pedagogy, Jameson explains, 
understanding how capitalism works is inseparable from showing how it 
works.207 Businessman, peasants, and the unemployed, experience 
economics in the modern sense in which this dynamism circulates through 
politics. Money as a system of concrete abstractions demands that the 
proletariat be converted to other groups, for the sake of the demonstration. 
The irrepresentability of money is key in Brecht’s plays as it appears as an 
absence for the poor and as capital for the rich. 208  This is not the idea of 
representing capitalism, but of acting out its meaning.  
The demonstrative quality of the curatorial’s sites of articulation raises 
questions for the relations between the concrete and the abstract. Exploring 
these relations could be demonstrative when we come to assess Betrayal as 
the move from the political back into politics. Going back to the 
irrepresentability of money, we can use the Marxian scheme to see money 
as the commodity of all commodities – that which all concrete things can be 
                                                          
206 Jameson, Brecht and Method, p. 13 
207 Ibid., p. 149 
208 This is the meaning of the Brechtian technique for demonstrating how people act in real 
existing politics. The acting articulates all acts as staged ones. These are staged in 
society and articulated politically through Acting. Barthes writes: “The subject is a 
false articulation: why this subject in preference to another? The work only begins 
with the tableau, when the meaning is set into the gesture and the co-ordination of 
gestures.” Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein,” p. 76. See also: Müller, “The Geste 
of Citation: Three Points (On Philictetes)”, Germania, p. 177 
195 
 
converted into by the power of abstraction. We can even add to this the fact 
that this abstraction is managed (through credit, loans, interest etc.).  
In Capital, Marx highlights convertibility as a process of shifts between the 
concrete and the abstract, writing:  
“The circulation M-C-M [Money-Commodity-Money] presents itself in 
abridged form, in its final result without any intermediate stage, in a 
concise style, so to speak, as M-M, i.e., money which is worth more 
money, value which is greater than itself.”209  
This process of money-making-more-money is what we call capital. The 
interesting thing is that today things are literally made of money, meaning 
that their price defines them (they are valuable because they are expensive 
and not vice versa). 210 
But once we have finance, we realize that suddenly real exchange money 
which is used to purchase things and services with, is different. Credit 
banking money is supposedly doing the M-M on the endless abstract levels 
of financial alchemy, but money as means of payment is expelled from this 
system. Those who deal with this daily form of money, which is used for 
actual things, know that this money is limited. It can never leave the concrete 
and become abstract – it can never make more money.211  
This irreversible conversion between the two money systems can 
demonstrate the relations between the political and politics, and the way the 
curatorial can operate between them. On the one hand of course the two 
                                                          
209 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976, pp. 256-257 
210 This has a long history which basically relates to the economic shift from value to price. 
See: David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, 2005 
211 Lazzarato describes this as figurative and non-figurative money. See: Lazzarato, “Semiotic 
Pluralism and the New Government of Signs”  
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fields are related and operate in relation to each other. On the other hand, 
they behave very differently. When we take the curatorial into account, we 
see how the concrete deployment of relations, the contingent reality that is 
the curatorial, demands a set of operations that are political but at the same 
time are operating against the political. The curatorial would be this 
potentiality that is demonstrated by making a relation sensible. This is the 
Betrayal of the curatorial as method; it oscillates between model and event, 
between concept and reality, but it is embedded in real existing politics (a set 
time and space, institution, artefacts, publics, staff, etc.).  
We can find also here Brecht’s method. For Jameson, Brechtian method 
would be the measuring of ideology through its consequences: 
“he does not offer us a positive theory of the consequences and the 
interests at work in ideology but, rather, a negative one: where the 
crucial term and leitmotiv […] is indeed the key word ‘folgenlos’, 
’without consequences’. What is thus ideological about a particular 
work of art or a philosophical school alike is that it should have no 
consequences, that it should be designed to avoid having 
consequences.”212 
Here he follows Benjamin who explains Epic Theatre as operating on the 
level of demonstrating rather than narrative, and the mode of its scenes 
characterized by actualizing rather than identifying: 
“These conditions are, in one form or another, the conditions of our 
life. Yet they are not brought close to the spectator; they are distanced 
from him. He recognizes them as real - not, as in the theatre of 
naturalism, with complacency, but with astonishment. Epic theatre 
                                                          
212 Jameson, Brecht and Method, p. 159 
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does not reproduce conditions; rather, it discloses, it uncovers 
them.”213  
The curatorial as method is that which moves between the abstract and the 
concretized, the concrete and the conceptualized. Therefore its way of 
operation will always demand a reevaluation of the possibility for the political 
to be converted into politics. This is the reason why so many times we have 
curatorial projects that might offer a tremendous conceptual proposal that 
then collapses when it comes to the actual materials and utterances that are 
aligned together in it. By way of negation, these instances exemplify this 
structural quality of the curatorial between concrete and abstract. The 
political cannot be converted directly into politics. Politics has a philosophy of 
its own – Betrayal. 
Therefore, when we come to describe the sites of articulation, we can use 
the exhibition as a possible entry point. As much as we would consider it a 
limited manifestation of the curatorial, we can observe in the exhibition, the 
underlying formation that the curatorial activates. Its geometry is that of a 
model of relations. The idea of the model as existing in reality and in relation 
to reality would be of use here. The exhibition obtains the status of a model, 
not so much with reference to mere scale but more with regards to the 
setting of relations that are demonstrated. Therefore the exhibition, enacting 
strategies and their deployment in the visual field, can be conceived as a 
model.  
This is true to the exhibition’s ability to take thought and inscribe itself in 
another space by other means. It is also true to the exhibition’s potential to 
transform a cultural institution into a site where certain actions and 
reflections of political and philosophical order can be grasped. Being that 
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medium of transformation, the exhibition is a model – although one of many 
(like publishing, screenings, seminars, conversations, performances, 
readings etc.)  – for curatorial sites of articulation.  
 
Actualizing the Potentialities of the Guillotine  
Barthes describes Brecht’s theatre as scenes which are laid out, the play is 
a series of tableaux, simultaneously impressive (event) and reflexive 
(model), or as Barthes calls it “dispensing equally pleasure and 
instruction”.214 Following this, rather than searching for its representational 
meaning, what the exhibition offers for a conceptualization of the curatorial, 
is its demonstrative quality:  
“Brecht indicated clearly that in epic theatre (which proceeds by 
successive tableaux) all the burden of meaning and pleasure bears on 
each scene, not on the whole. At the level of the play itself, there is no 
development, no maturation; there is indeed an ideal meaning (given 
straight in every tableau), but there is no final meaning, nothing but a 
series of segmentations each of which possesses a sufficient 
demonstrative power.”215 
Here, Barthes’s formulation of Brechtian Acting considers it as a series of 
demonstrations. When we relate Action to Acting in this manner, it moves 
away from the narrative that Arendt locates it in, and into the pictorial, the 
visual. The scene articulates the geometrical alignment. From my 
experience with curating, I can offer an example for this. In an exhibition 
titled The Rear for the First Herzliya Biennial, which I was commissioned as 
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curator and which opened in late 2007, there was an open-air section. It took 
place in a suburban city center not far from the Herzliya Museum of 
Contemporary Art, part of the Metropolitan of Tel Aviv-Jaffa.  As part of this 
open-air section, we installed a piece by the artist Ariel Kleiner in a 
roundabout at a junction in the center of the city. This piece consisted of a 
real-size guillotine. Kleiner was invited to develop and build this piece 
following the 2006 war against Lebanon. For him, as well as for myself at 
that time, the guillotine was installed as a symbol for the power of the people 
– a plasticization of the heritage of the French revolution. At the time, we 
saw the display of the guillotine as a condemnation of a crazed regime that 
killed civilians indiscriminately the previous summer.  
When we opened the show, we were ready for questions from city officials 
regarding the specific political gesture against the government. We saw a 
direct relation between the political and politics being performed by the piece 
right at the center of the city. The reaction was not what we expected. The 
city officials, as well as the general public, reacted excitedly at the presence 
of an ancient artefact. People were photographing themselves with the 
sculpture using their mobile phones. For them, it seems, the object did not 
invite a reestablishment of popular judgment and a reconstruction of the rule 
of the people. It was merely a spectacle. Politically, it was akin to an 
archaeological exhibit. This is how it operated for them.  
A few years later, Kleiner’s guillotine was shown again – this time its 
meaning changed again. On 10 August 2011, three weeks into the biggest 
popular protests Israel had known, with one hundred and twenty 
encampments for social justice around the country. We installed Kleiner’s 
real-size guillotine on the first and biggest of these encampment, on 
Rothschild Boulevard in the financial district in Tel Aviv. The piece was 
installed in the middle of the encampment facing the head offices of the 
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biggest banks in the country. Hours after it was installed on site, the 
guillotine was suddenly taken by the police and confiscated. The next day, 
images of the guillotine appeared on the front pages of all daily newspapers 
and was debated on TV and radio news shows.  
The permitted scope of conversation on Israeli media is narrow and this 
incident proved it again: no one protected the right for freedom of speech in 
relation to the guillotine and no one supported its proposal. Most 
commentators were alarmed by the fact that the piece had “crossed the line” 
so to speak. The interesting thing was though, that all commentators 
accepted the fact that it did something – it resonated with a symbolic 
violence. The work of articulation made by the social justice movement in the 
weeks prior to installing the guillotine on Rothschild Boulevard, 
contextualized the guillotine as a potential political proposal.  
It is not a mere change of context that produced new meaning to the 
guillotine. What happened between 2007 and 2011 is that an object 
suddenly became an idea. From a historical point of view, it became actively 
political. But there were other things as well that appeared through the 
actualization of potentiality here – suddenly the guillotine evoked something 
we knew we did not have in the nation state – a revolutionary past. This act 
of mounting the piece informed the whole vocabulary around the proposition 
of the guillotine. Unlike physical violence, which seems for the movement to 
be counter-productive (especially under the conditions of hyper-violent state 
apparatuses), it was obvious that symbolic violence can be a powerful tool in 
the hands of the social justice movement. It highlighted the fact that the 
guillotine is a symbol and a device that belongs to the people. With all its 
crimes, and against the logic it operates upon, the state of Israel, through the 
silencing actions of its police, made us aware of the revolution we did not 
know we were part of.  
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Legality and violence are plasticized in the guillotine as it restaged a set of 
structures of judgment – the tribunal, the constitution, citizenry and the 
revolution. Kleiner’s guillotine superseded the protocols of its making as an 
art object and triggered an unattainable perspective, which its removal only 
amplified. This perspective is the revolution we were already part of, but 
never had gone through. We in Israel did not originate from a revolution, we 
do not have it in our political heritage. Our notion of citizenship does not 
come from the fight for citizenry, for the construction of civil society. The 
state of Israel came first and it granted citizenship based on ethnic 
background – a state for the Jews. The guillotine is loyal to citizenry, beyond 
the protocols of allegiance to the Israeli nation state. It constitutes a loyalty 
to the republic to come – that of Jews and Arabs. The republic that was 
already born in the revolution we did not yet have. 
The encampments of the movement for social justice aimed to ignite those 
Arendtian spaces of appearance, and in a limited and temporary manner so 
they did. But no new order emerged out of them. And if there was one, it was 
not to the better. They were not able to change real existing politics. Being 
an autonomist and reformist mix, the encampments of the movement were 
incompetent when it came to real existing politics. Lacking organizational 
tactics (means, ends), they were only effective in generating a tremendously 
fierce backfire from the state and the police. And yet, as much as these 
spaces might have been a failure in this respect of political effectiveness, 
their failure makes them effective sites of articulation for the potentials and 
the shortcomings of social movements that reject Acting in politics. 
The main tension these sites articulated was that of universality and more 
specifically its lack therein. By that I mean that the movement was basically 
too entrenched in the logic enforced by real existing politics under 
neoliberalism, to propose a universality (such as that of the proletariat, for 
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example), and at the same time it was too detached from real existing 
politics in that it did not aim and did not manage to mobilize and organize in 
real existing politics (through institutions, unions, parties). In their failure, 
what was articulated by these sites was exactly the need to return from the 
political back to politics. This is the knowledge of meaning that they 
demonstrated for the participants who acted in them. 
By exploring actions as experiments, Brecht’s notion of Acting performs a 
Betrayal that engages with concrete politics of deceit, cynicism, non-linear 
control patterns and confusion. The move from vision, from things simply 
showing themselves, to demonstration – the construction of a knowledge of 
meaning, a geometry of relations – is the move that Acting makes in relation 
to Action. With it, it constructs a politics outside the metaphors of the arena 
or scene, one which is present in our daily activities under concrete 
conditions in which we perform our assigned roles. 
For Brecht, the mechanism which needs attention is that of the reproduction 
of power. What is being learned in Brecht’s learning plays is the knowledge 
of what it means to act. Considering Brecht’s Acting in relation to Arendt, 
means transporting Arendt’s Action in the world of the visually present into 
Acting on and in relation to the visual but also to that which is not visible to 
us. By agitating these two concepts one against the other the metaphor of 
the arena and the scene as the site of politics, shifts to other trans-visual, 
physical and textual conceptions.  
 
Re-politicising the Mesoscopic Field 
If we return to Lazzarato’s a-signifying semiotics, it explains to us how both 
technologies of control and financial abstraction operate on sub-visual 
levels. The microscopic and the telescopic have been dominating our 
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political imagination for a long time now; the common use of DNA and 
networks as metaphors for coded world systems and galaxies, suggests a 
world in which human scale is simply irrelevant. Today, it is common to 
discuss the sensation that the political and economic forces either operate 
on large or tiny levels, but on no account do they fit the world perceived by 
us. Our inability to correlate the direct effects of these forces on us (somatic, 
mental, social), with a visual field perceivable by us, make for one of the key 
obstacles of our political imagination. Jonathan Crary explains this: 
“To be preoccupied with the aesthetic properties of digital imagery, as 
are many theorists and critics, is to evade the subordination of the 
image to a broad field of non-visual operations and requirements.”216  
From genetic manipulation to algorithm domination and image meta-data, 
one would be right to assume that what we see does not tell us much about 
the world around us today. And yet, while constantly considering non-visual 
operations, we are compelled to perform and produce analytical, poetic and 
political actions exactly by insisting on the mesoscopic – that visual scale 
between the micro and the macro, the one we also inhabit, the one in which 
the exhibition takes place. The ways in which we articulate the meaning of 
what we see in the mesoscopic field today relate directly to those invisible 
things called finance and surveillance, economy and politics.  
Mark Hayward calls ‘neoliberal optics’ the meshing together of entertainment 
and surveillance to a degree that makes them inseparable. The underlying 
logic of this mesoscopic optical reality produces images through distributed 
                                                          
216 Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep, London and New York: Verso, 
2013, 47. Even before smartphone cameras, Giorgio Agamben wrote that “Today 
there is not even a single instant in which the life of individuals is not modelled, 
contaminated or controlled by some apparatus.” Giorgio Agamben, What is an 
Apparatus?, Trans.: David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, Stanford University Press, 
2009, p. 21 
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and networked technologies that constrain and manage forms of subjectivity 
conducive to neoliberal governance. As Hayward put it “neoliberal optics 
operates through technologies of subjective affective engagement and 
subjective extension fragmentation.”217  
When bringing this understanding into the curatorial we see how there needs 
to be, even on the level of the exhibition itself, a move from representation to 
demonstration. Thus exploring the ways in which the exhibition operates as 
a model of relations between the concrete and abstract, material and 
immaterial, allegorical and practical, and how these relations operate within 
its different elements themselves. By moving from visualizing the political as 
a scene to articulating new techniques for politics, we can conceive of what 
Brechtian Betrayal might mean.  
We see already that Arendt together with Brecht provides us with an 
implicated model of politics and the sites for its articulation. But unlike 
Arendtian conception of Action as a breaking through from power relations, 
what Brechtian Acting suggests is learning and operating within power 
relations as an inevitable element of politics.  
                                                          
217 See: Mark Hayward, “ATMs, Teleprompters and Photobooths: A Short History of Neoliberal 
Optics,” in: New Formations: Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics, Volume 80-81, 2013, 
pp. 194-208. The precursors for these technologies of semiotic pluralism include the 
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From mere play-acting through appearance, we move to acting-out in politics 
through sites of articulation.218 To give an example of Brechtian articulation 
through Acting we can take the scene in Jean-Luc Godard’s La Chinoise 
(1967), where Jean-Pierre Léaud is being interviewed as Guillaume, a 
member of a summer-break Maoists students’ cell in Paris. Behind him in 
the scene is a wall with posters and newspaper clips, as he is shown in 
close up, answering an inaudible question: 
“An actor? It’s hard to say. (Silence. An inaudible question) Yes. Yes. 
I’m an actor. (Guillaume pauses and looks down. He picks up his 
head). I’ll show you something. It will give you an idea of what is 
theatre. (Guillaume picks up a roll of bandages and starts covering his 
head). Young Chinese students protested in Moscow and of course 
the Russian police beat them up. (Guillaume continues to cover his 
face with the bandage. His eyes are already covered by it). The next 
day, in protest, the Chinese met in front of their embassy with all the 
Western reporters, guys from ‘Life’, ‘France Soir’ and so on. (Now 
Guillaume‘s whole face is covered with the bandage). And a young 
Chinese student came up, his face covered with bandages, and 
started yelling (Guillaume begins to shout with his covered face aimed 
directly at the camera). ‘Look what they did to me. Look what the dirty 
revisionists did’. (Guillaume turns his covered face to the interviewer). 
So the reporters rushed over and began taking photos as he removed 
                                                          
218 These techniques resemble those of the ‘spect-actor’ of the Theatre of The Oppressed. 
Relevant here are also the techniques which were developed by Augusto Boal with 
various collaborators and include in addition to Theatre of The Oppressed also 
Invisible Theatre and Newspaper Theatre. These are all projects that do not aim to 
reconstruct a public space or sphere, but rather to develop the learning in life of 
what is politics. These techniques demonstrate and reflect politics, not represent 
politics. See: Augusto Boal, Theatre of The Oppressed [1979], Trans.: Charles A. 
McBride. Theatre Communications Group, 1993.  
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his bandages. They expected a cut face, covered with blood or 
something. (Guillaume starts taking the bandage off). And he carefully 
removed his bandages as they took photos. (Slowly Guillaume’s face 
is uncovered). When they were all off, they realized his face was 
alright. So the reporters began yelling ‘this Chinaman’s a fake. He’s a 
clown, what is this?’. But they hadn’t understood. They didn’t realize it 
was theatre, real Theatre; A reflection on reality like Brecht or 
Shakespeare.”    
From the beginning of the scene Guillaume, the fictional French Maoist 
student, and Jean-Pierre Léaud, the actor, are both present in the interview 
(“An actor? It’s hard to say. Yes. Yes. I’m an actor”). So there is a role being 
played here and that role is not only that of Guillaume, the French student, 
but of Léaud as actor as well. Guillaume/Léaud’s performance of the actions 
of the Chinese student in front of the camera presents us what Acting might 
mean. The power of demonstration rather than representation is being 
highlighted by Guillaume/Léaud and the Chinese student himself in the 
story. Acting is demonstrating, it operates within a site of articulation (the 
presence of the foreign media in the story and the interviewer/director of La 
Chinoise). It is not a representation in a space of appearance. Acting here is 
the demonstration of a relation to truth, and acting-out of a role. But this 
truth, when regarded as representation (the foreign media’s expectations) 
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equates to a lie, a deceit, and the person playing the role is perceived a fake 
(the foreign media’s response).219 
 
Refusal After the Fact 
“…Over time the movement of the yielding water 
Will overcome the strongest stone. 
What’s hard – can you understand? – must always give way.” 
Bertolt Brecht, from the Svendborg poems, 1936-1939 
A key element in Arendt’s notion of Action as well as that of spaces of 
appearance, which was already hinted at, is that they both suggest the 
possibility of freezing power relations, or acting outside of a set of given 
power relations. These concepts allow us to assume that we are not always 
already subjected to power mechanisms.  
                                                          
219 Deleuze described what later on happened to Godard’s cinema thus: “Man is in the world 
as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction of which man has been 
dispossessed can be replaced only by belief. Only belief in the world can reconnect 
man to what he sees and hears. […] Belief, even in the case of holy characters, Mary, 
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Godard, the ideal of knowledge, the Socratic ideal which is still present in Rossellini, 
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enough to go to live in the sky, be it the sky of art and painting, to find reasons to 
believe (Passion)? Or shouldn’t we invent a ‘medium level’ between earth and sky 
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another world, or in a transformed world. It is only, it is simply believing in the body. 
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the first name.” Deleuze, Cinema 2, pp. 172-173 
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Arendt’s judgment of Brecht regarding his convenient (to her mind) choice to 
move to the DDR, present us with the limits of this possibility for action 
outside power relations. When writing about Brecht’s life she describes how 
his later years were a derailment from his former days as someone who was 
able to say ‘No!,’ at least in his writing:  
“This was the wisdom of his ‘Mr. Keuner,’ who, however, around 1930 
was still a bit more fastidious in the choice of his means than his 
author twenty years later. In dark times, so one of the stories goes, 
there came an agent of the rulers to the home of a man who ‘had 
learnt how to say no.’ The agent claimed the man's home and food as 
his own and asked him, ‘Will you wait upon me?’ The man put him to 
bed, covered him with a blanket, guarded his sleep, and obeyed him 
for seven years. But whatever he did, he never spoke a single word. 
After the seven years were over, the agent had grown fat with eating, 
sleeping, and giving orders, and he died. The man wrapped him in the 
rotten blanket, threw him out of the house, washed the bed, painted 
the walls, sighed with relief, and answered, ‘No’.”220    
Arendt is reading this story literally as a story of refusal (unlike the author 
who complied with power, his storyteller Herr Keuner was “more fastidious in 
the choice of his means”). But the purist ‘No’, that can be uttered outside the 
contingency of power relations (after the agent is already dead), is exactly 
what Brecht’s Herr Keuner is ridiculing in this story. Only after the fact, the 
man can say ‘No’ out loud. It might be that this was his sentiment and plan 
all along, but according to the story it was the fact that the agent “had grown 
fat with eating, sleeping, and giving orders,” which killed him. Complacency 
(to the extent of smothering), and not refusal (passive or active), is what the 
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man in the story is actually executing towards the agent. Him uttering the 
‘No!’ at the end, positions the possibility of a final, direct and transparent 
action, as something possible only after the fact, outside power relations, 
therefore outside politics.221  
While Brecht suggests working with opacity, Arendt proposes transparency. 
This very charismatic proposal by Arendt had immense influence on groups 
and organizations that have operated outside of politics, opting for ‘direct 
action.’ This can be found in the increase in interest in her work especially 
around humanitarian projects that faced the need to work with government, 
and by activists who were challenging traditional political forms of 
organizing.222 Especially since the rise of networked online platforms in the 
last decade, this option seemed effective in bringing together people, a 
phenomena that culminated with the world wide movement for social justice.   
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justify his actions. In this respect, this reading brings this short Herr Keuner story 
closer to Herman Melville’s story of “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street,” 
and especially to the influential reading of it by Deleuze. In “Bartleby; or, The 
Formula,” which was written as an afterward for the then new French edition of the 
story in 1989, Deleuze emphasized the passive resistance and non-conflictual politics 
in Bartleby’s famous words “I would prefer not to.” See: Deleuze, Essays Critical and 
Clinical, pp. 68-90 
222  See for example the use of Arendtian formulations of “the right to have rights” (Arendt, 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 296), by “Medecines Sans Frontieres” regarding the 
political dilemmas they were facing in Ethiopia in the 1980s, in: Eyal Weizman, The 
Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza, London and 
New York: Verso, 2011, pp. 27-64; and: Ariella Azoulay, “Palestine as Symptom, 
Palestine as Hope: Revising Human Rights Discourse”, Critical Inquiry, Volume 40 
Issue 4, Summer 2014, University of Chicago Press, pp. 332-364. References to 
Arendtian terminology of public happiness, spaces of appearance and political action 
can be found in relation to Occupy Wall Street and political activism, in: April Carter, 
Direct Action and Democracy Today, Polity Press, 2005; and: Roger Berkowitz, “The 
Politics of Anti-Political Protest: What to Make of OWS,” in: Democracy: Journal of 
Ideas, 20.10.2011: http://www.democracyjournal.org/arguments/2011/10/ows-and-
the-politics-of-anti-politics.php?page=all [Last retrieved: 15.10.2015] 
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But Betrayal does not subscribe to ‘direct action’ as the only mode of political 
action (which is somewhat implicated in Arendt’s stand). With its imagined 
transparency and suspension of power relations, this form of activism has 
proven to be politically limited and ineffective. Once an action engages with 
politics without withdrawing from the logic of the setting with which it 
engages, this action finds itself trapped with reinforcing existing power. On 
the tactical level, direct action may prove to be efficient to some extent, but 
on a strategic level, the outcome would be very different from the cause it 
aimed for. This is a symptomatic condition to the direct action mode of 
neoliberal political engagement. Being that there are objective conditions 
(resources, employment, judicial system, media, military and so on), which 
the direct action has no control over, we see how time and time again the 
result of a tactical victory is a strategic defeat (be it in Israel, Egypt or the 
Ukraine). It comes from a long tradition of the Left wanting to dispense with 
power altogether. ‘We’ll take power to decompose power’ the saying goes. 
The idea that we can do away with power relations contributed among other 
things to the embrace of ‘networked’ system. These in turn proved to be 
systems for the consolidation of control by those already in power.223  
 
The Violence of Disavowing Power Relations 
The implosion of the Soviet bloc brought a new political paradigm which was 
presented as an inevitable conclusion of world events and entailed a denial 
of power relations – no longer dialectical negations, antagonisms and 
contradictions. Yet, this scheme proved not only to be untrue, but to be 
extremely harmful. The upheavals since the end of the Cold War – from the 
                                                          
223 See for example: Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism; and: Jodi 
Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: Communicative Capitalism and Left 
Politics, Duke University Press, 2009 
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Balkans to Afghanistan, from the Twin Towers to Tahrir Square, from Kyiv to 
Gaza – prove that the denial of power relations which was suggested by the 
new paradigm unleashed extreme violence. The paradigm that prevailed 
was that the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the good won. This 
formulation mixed together power and morals to such an extent that it made 
them inseparable. With morals and power being one and the same, a new 
paradigm was proposed which perceived an order devoid of power relations. 
Some of these atrocious conflicts that reemerged in the 1990s did not begin 
at the end of the Cold War, but had long histories that simply took new 
forms. What was unique was the sudden lack for political context and 
vocabulary to explain them. One of these is the Israeli Occupation of 
Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza. The key transitional post-
Cold War event in relation to this conflict was the Oslo Accords. These were 
bilateral agreements between two disproportional entities – the state of 
Israel and the PLO. The agreement fueled the belief that power relations – 
historical, economic, political, cultural and military – can be suspended 
rather than addressed directly and re-organized. The Occupation was going 
to be managed from now on.  
When this scenario exploded with the continuation of the Occupation and 
settlements, and with the attacks of suicide bombers in the mid 1990s and 
mid 2000s, left politics seemed to have retreated further from politics and 
into forms of direct action, the main one being humanitarian discourse. Here, 
there was no longer a political project anymore. Even Palestinian self-
determination, a political project which in itself was a retreat from the 
Palestinian revolution that aimed for a total change of power relations within 
Arab societies (for women, workers, religious and ethnic minorities), was 
pretty much forgotten by the Israeli left in favor of Humanitarian reasoning 
(which actually allows for the continuation of the Occupation by managing 
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the level and amount of wrongs); instead of ending the Occupation we have 
tactics to manage the conflict. The traditional patterns of class struggle and 
joint Jewish-Arab politics were renounced willingly in favor of social 
movements, of lack of organization as a way of avoiding totalitarian threats, 
of excessive political skepticism, of realpolitik in the form of de-politicized 
human rights discourse.224 These all left us with refusal and withdrawal as 
the only viable tools to be executed by individuals, not publics.  
The current activist move in relation to Israel-Palestine – the call for cultural, 
academic and economic boycott, disinvestment and sanction of Israel 
(BDS), seems to express these tensions. We can identify with the demands 
of the call to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and to enable the 
return of Palestinian refugees, but still find the BDS to be a symptom of post-
Oslo dependency on the International community, or better said, individuals 
with international stature. “Gone are the days when solidarity formations 
worked with Palestinian communities in the diaspora, the PLO, and kindred 
Palestinian political parties.” write Mezna Qato and Kareem Rabie “Instead, 
and in part because there is no longer a Palestinian representative body” 
they explain: 
“Palestinian solidarity now almost exclusively interfaces with large civil 
society umbrella groups and NGOs in Palestine, and with only a few 
exceptions – including the US Joint Struggle Delegation to the World 
Social Forum Free Palestine in Porto Alegre, and student 
collaborations with other campus movements – they do not have a 
sufficiently direct relationship with progressive formations in Palestine 
or Palestinian communities in exile. Such disconnects are linked to 
other problems. Increasingly, the movement seems composed of 
                                                          
224 See for example the humanitarian management of the Gaza Strip as described in: 
Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils, pp. 81-86 
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constellations of well-known figures – academics, artists and poets, 
journalists, activists, Twitterers – who generate thinking and rhetoric 
that becomes associated with them as individuals. In the past, this 
kind of thinking was collectively deliberated and determined. Such 
people clearly contribute to advancing the Palestinian cause, and 
there is much to laud in the decentralized work of countless Palestine 
organizers. But the way the abundance of voices maps onto the wider 
strategy of public engagement here has had the unintended 
consequence of crowding out collective work.”225   
Because it is actually based on individual moral positions and not on a 
political project of strategizing new Jewish-Arab subjectivities in Palestine, 
the BDS reflects the destruction not only of a Jewish-Arab common political 
project, but also the collapse a Palestinian project of solidarity. The Oslo 
doctrine which opted for a regulated partition with total disregard of the 
disproportion in power, generated a devastating effect in actual politics for 
both Israelis and Palestinians. Instead of resolving the conflict, the aftermath 
of the Oslo accords followed the lines of the Friend/Enemy formation with 
intensifying hostility. Due to lack of influential organization in politics, refusal, 
therefore, seems today to be the option most available for individuals.  
The strategy of withdrawal was explored by Paolo Virno in his A Grammar of 
the Multitude, as he was looking for a way to activate the divide that exists 
today between labor and politics. But this withdrawal he speaks of already 
promises a ‘new alliance. Virno formulates his aim in the form of a question 
                                                          
225 Mezna Qato and Kareem Rabie, “Against the Law,” Jacobin, Issue 10, Spring 2013, pp. 75-
78 
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asking whether it is possible to “unite that which today is divided, that is, 
Intellect and political Action”226 
Brecht seems to suggest a different way of engagement, one that embodies 
the divide rather than withdraws from it. If we take Benjamin’s question of 
technique as presented in his “The Author as Producer,” we will see that 
when we contemplate a work in relation to its own position within the 
production relations of its time, Brecht provides a striking reference also for 
us today. Benjamin writes: 
“A writer who does not teach other writers teaches nobody. The crucial 
point, therefore, is that a writer's production must have the character of 
a model: it must be able to instruct other writers in their production 
and, secondly, it must be able to place an improved apparatus at their 
disposal. This apparatus will be the better, the more consumers it 
brings in contact with the production process – in short, the more 
readers or spectators it turns into collaborators. We already possess a 
model of this kind, of which, however, I cannot speak here in any 
detail. It is Brecht's epic theatre.”227 
 
A Community of Divided Subjects  
As we have observed, this theatre relates not only to the performance of the 
self but also to the general performance of immaterial labor under the 
supremacy of machinic enslavement. As it is imbued with collaborative work 
and is operated as a social demonstration for a political gathering so to 
speak, Brecht’s theatre provides, as Jameson himself hints, an opening to a 
                                                          
226 Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude, p. 68 
227 Benjamin, “Author as Producer,”  p. 98 
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realm in which “individuality is not effaced but complemented by 
collectivity.”228 This mode of operation is a level of being which is not the 
caricature of faceless and monolithic anonymous crowds and is neither the 
icon of individual genius author. This is what Gilles Deleuze called ‘Dividual’ 
when writing on the cinema of Sergei Eisenstein. Deleuze explained that in 
his films, Eisenstein was able “to reach the Dividual, that is, to individuate a 
mass as such, instead of leaving it in a qualitative homogeneity or reducing it 
to a quantitative divisibility.”229 Cinema does not have the individual as its 
subject, nor a plot or history as its object, Deleuze says. Its subject is the 
masses, the individuation of mass. 
The in-dividual holds a double meaning – it refers to something being 
indivisible, a singular thing that cannot be divided, but it also indicates 
separateness, as in the term individualism: at the same time inseparable 
from oneself and separated from the rest. Therefore, the individual, the 
cornerstone of liberal, deliberative representational worldviews, is in itself a 
negation – but a negation of what? We can say that the actual thing that is 
already there is the dividual. That which is always already part of something 
else, which is not separated from the rest but is separable from itself. The 
dividual maps a whole different possibility for subjectivity and for politics. 
We would claim that through its various operations of technique, Brechtian 
theatre does constitute the Dividual. For the demonstration by the Gestus 
itself already proposes that any action is divided in itself (self/society), and 
Acting in both the learning play and Epic Theatre demonstrates this divide 
through its own division (actor/character). This knowledge of meaning 
performs Betrayal as loyalty to Acting in politics. These divides of 
                                                          
228 Jameson, Brecht and Method, p. 10 
229 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 162 
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self/society, and actor/character are experienced by us all political actors as 
we operate as divided-subjects. John Rajchman sketched out a community 
of divided-subjects as sharing an unrest, a discomfort:  
“How we might be brought together not by prudence, abstract duty or 
calculated interest alone, but in our sharing the ‘structure’ of 
repression or the law which each makes his or her own according to 
the contingencies of his or her fortune – the structure of the 
‘decentered’ subject and its response to the real. What sort of 
community can we have as divided subjects?”230  
Brecht’s famous saying that the important thing in politics is not private 
thinking but “the art of thinking inside other people's heads,”231 seems to 
suggest this shift from spaces of appearance that are provided by individuals 
for individuals, to sites of articulation that are produced by and produce the 
Dividual. The disintegration of performer/spectator relations, is here a 
Betrayal of display and vision that is articulated as loyalty to demonstration 
as political Action. 
Deleuze went on later to describe the Dividual in more detailed (and mainly 
in negative terms) as a new level of being in machinic enslavement under 
capitalism. In “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” he outlines the 
Dividual to denote the collapse of the individual. Deleuze describes it as a 
product of societies in which: 
                                                          
230 John Rajchman, Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Ethics, Routledge, 
Chapman and Hall, 1991, p. 70. Mouffe concludes The Democratic Paradox with this 
quote from John Rajchman as he depicts Freud’s ethical concern which does not 
revolve around duty and obligation, but rather around this shared discomfort. This, 
for Mouffe, constitutes the ethics of a pluralist democracy. See: Mouffe, Democratic 
Paradox, pp. 138-139   
231 Quoted in: Benjamin,  “Author as Producer,” p. 92 
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“the key thing is no longer a signature or number but a code: codes 
are passwords, whereas disciplinary societies are ruled (when it 
comes to integration or resistance) by precepts. The digital language 
of control is made up of codes indicating whether access to some 
information should be allowed or denied. We’re no longer dealing 
with a duality of mass and individual. Individuals become ‘dividuals,’ 
and masses become samples, data, markets, or ‘banks.’” 232  
In this late text, Deleuze describes a shift from the Foucauldian disciplinary 
societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This order, which 
Deleuze explains is analogical to the prison, proposed itself through the 
organization of vast spaces of enclosure: Individuals are always going from 
one closed site to another, each with its own laws: first of all the family, then 
school (“you’re not at home, you know”), then the barracks (“you’re not at 
school, you know”), then the factory, hospital from time to time, maybe 
prison, the model site of confinement. 233 
With the shift to the societies of control, Deleuze says the crisis that occurs 
involves all environments of enclosure: prison, hospital, factory, school, and 
family. These environments of enclosure seep into one another – you never 
finish school, you never leave the family, you never finish the army, and you 
are never out of the hospital, never out of prison, never out of the factory. 
The Dividual is this dissected entity, roaming through networks. He 
continues: 
                                                          
232 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” [1990], in: Gilles Deleuze, 
Negotiations, Trans.: Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 
177-182. Originally published in a slightly different translation in October, Vol. 59 
(Winter 1992), pp. 3-7  
233 Deleuze, “Postscript,” p. 177 
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“Félix Guattari has imagined a town where anyone can leave their flat, 
their street, their neighbourhood, using their (dividual) electronic card 
that opens this or that barrier; but the card may also be rejected on a 
particular day, or between certain times of day; it doesn’t depend on 
the barrier but on the computer that is making sure everyone is in a 
permissible place, and effecting a universal modulation.” 234 
Converged through production protocols and the debt economy, the Dividual 
is in constant negotiation. A non-fixed and mobile flow, always partial, the 
Dividual is in the process of subjectivation. As an open form to all sorts of 
hybridizations, the Dividual is a matter of constant production, a polyphony. 
Not an entity unto itself apart from all the rest, but rather already in relation, 
always part of something. The Dividual is a subjectivity that is always 
already part of a presence.235 
The autonomy that was lost already by the individual through its processes 
of subjugation, is not reasserted by the Dividual. The Dividual lets go of any 
such attempt to reconstruct an autonomy. Rather it operates as a relation. It 
is a mode of being that is produced by the current economic and political 
conditions. Therefore, the question it raises for any project of cultural 
production is: where is it positioned in relation to it? The curatorial seems to 
                                                          
234 Deleuze, “Postscript,” pp. 180-181  
235 Structured under the conditions of the society of control, the Dividual actually holds a 
resistive potential within its logic, as it offers itself to be an open subject. Fred Moten 
and Stefano Harney quote Édouard Glissant when they propose “to consent not to 
be a single being.” See: Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The Undercommons: 
Fugitive Planning & Black Study, Wivenhoe / New York / Port Watson: Minor 
Compositions, 2013, p. 154. In the USSR, claims Boris Groys, for the Soviets “only that 
which is contradictory in itself may be regarded as living, and as capable of life. The 
living being itself is understood as a certain logical figure – namely, the figure of 
paradox”. See: Boris Groys, The Communist Postscript, Trans.: Thomas H. Ford, 
London and New York: Verso, 2009, pp. 63-96.  
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lend itself to the Dividual for a number of reasons which would be outlined 
now.   
   
Brecht and the Curatorial  
The curatorial entails orchestrating a polyphony as a polyphony. This is 
neither an orchestration of a polyphony as a unity, nor is it random 
circumstances repeated or replayed. This is how the Dividual becomes a 
relevant reference for us; a level of being generated through our production 
relations and processes, it demands a technique to embody it. The curatorial 
relies on a composition of sources, a model of relations and interrelations 
between ideas, between materials, between contexts, between subjectivities 
– all held by each of the elements and between them, as is the case with the 
Dividual.  
For Brecht all this is not self-evident. Working with his technique of Acting 
we can find hints for the level of being that involves the different parties 
(actor/character; self/society; gesture/performance and so on). A cluster of 
being, a being in plural, a contingent polyphony of divided-subjects. Brecht’s 
Betrayal is therefore a loyalty to this mode of politics. Brecht’s method 
entails a technique of the Dividual which I would suggest should inform the 
curatorial.  
The demonstrative power of curatorial sites of articulation makes sensible a 
relation that is the Dividual. This is done beyond mere display, beyond direct 
analogy, beyond illustration of concept in artefact or materiality in gesture. 
“The whole forms a knowledge, in the Hegelian fashion,” writes Deleuze, 
“which brings together the image and the concept as two movements each 
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of which goes towards the other.”236 The curatorial activates potentialities 
mixing the concrete action in politics and the acting in the realm of the 
political. It might therefore have insights to offer to our understanding of 
politics. This chapter aimed to denote the ways Brecht provides a method 
relevant to the curatorial. This was done in an attempt to position the 
curatorial as a rich and useful means for the rearticulating of politics.  
                                                          
236 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p. 161 
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This dissertation is informed by a variety of claims that were made regarding 
the political, but it wishes to insert these back into politics. The potentiality of 
this mode of interrogation is presented throughout this dissertation as a 
deploying of problematizations.  
Through an exploration of exhaustion of antagonisms, fictionalizing political 
traumas, the surfacing of “dead-ideas” that are either not-yet or no-longer 
available to us, and the extension of political action into Acting in politics, 
Betrayal is offered as an operative concept for politics today. 
This dissertation frames Betrayal in relation to a variety of curatorial 
strategies, namely formation, narration and agency – all qualities that have 
been discussed in this dissertation through a selection of historical figures. 
Written in the context of Israel-Palestine and the field of the curatorial, it 
proposes Betrayal through the field of the curatorial as the curatorial 
provides a setting for activating potentialities. In the three chapters of this 
dissertation,  Betrayal is developed through an active reading of the lives 
and work of these figures as method: Alcibiades son of Cleinias, a fifth 
century BC Athenian politician; the last book published by Sigmund Freud 
during his lifetime Moses and Monotheism; and Bertolt Brecht’s notion of 
Acting in relation to Hannah Arendt’s political Action. 
Alcibiades presents the formation of antagonism and its exhaustion, as a 
strategy for Betrayal that can move inside-out. Freud’s Moses proposes 
narration through anachronism, fictionalism as a form of Betrayal that can 
destabilize a dichotomy inwards, providing a structure that is a collapse. 
Brecht’s concept of Acting problematizes agency through demonstrative 
Acting which shifts the site of articulation of politics itself. All these strategies 
of Betrayal make it a proposal for an entanglement. 
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This dissertation is informed by Betrayal’s ability to formulate distant 
solidarities through the process of self-regioning. Contextualizing the 
proposal and discussion of Betrayal here in relation to the practices in the 
Middle East, implies a possible field of inquiry which opens up at this 
moment together with the demands it brings. As the curatorial is suggested 
here as activating potentialities, Betrayal becomes in itself an entry point for 
the curatorial as a site and event of demonstrating relations, making them 
sensible. 
 
From the Political Back to Politics 
 
“To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the 
way it really was.' It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up 
at a moment of danger"  
Walter Benjamin, thesis VI, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”237 
 
Historical knowledge is always uncertain knowledge (“the true picture of the 
past flits by,” Walter Benjamin writes in thesis V).238 There is a moment of 
understanding in the contemporary moment itself that relates to the past 
(“Origin is the goal,” he quotes Karl Kraus in thesis XIV).239 The curatorial 
proposes a model of actual politics for reactivating history. By constantly 
reactivating the relations of the concrete and abstract, the material and 
                                                          
237 Walter Benjamin, ”Theses on the Philosophy of History,” [1940] Illuminations, Ed.: Hannah 
Arendt, Trans.: Harry Zohn, Schocken Books, 1969, p. 255 
238 Ibid.  
239 Walter Benjamin, ”Theses on the Philosophy of History,” p. 261 
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immaterial, the present and the absent, the curatorial provides exactly for 
that demonstrative setting for politics to be reactivated. 
Considering Betrayal through Alcibiades, Freud and Brecht provides us with 
a movement between the Aristotelian framing of history as “what he did and 
what was done to him,” in relation to Alcibiades, to a Derridean ‘paraliterary’ 
where “It’s not history, but can’t be called not-history,” as Freud’s Moses 
might suggest, and Müller’s proposal that “the plot is a model,” with regards 
to Brecht’s theatre. This accumulation of relations which the curatorial 
explores, bares a direct meaning to history and politics.   
 
 
Betrayal and Political Power 
Through the explorations of this dissertation, Betrayal emerges as a set of 
strategies for providing possibilities for the actualizing of political 
potentialities. It makes actual the connectedness that is already in the given 
antagonisms, thus finding ways of destabilizing inwards and contaminating 
outwards these antagonisms. Hence, it is shifting the site of politics and the 
ways for Acting in it. Betrayal would be acting with no implied stage or arena 
– a force that operates through our actions. 
As the introduction of this dissertation set out to explore Betrayal as loyalty, 
we can consider what Betrayal would be loyal to. The chapters of this 
dissertation consider a loyalty to an open question of Athens and 
Jewishness and politics. This brings us already very close to a charismatic 
articulation by Alain Badiou who speaks of the fidelity to the fidelity. Badiou 
writes:  
“When you see that a sequence of politics of emancipation is finished, 
you have a choice: you can continue in the same political field, or you 
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can find the fidelity to the fidelity. It’s the same thing here: If the idea of 
the working class as a generic group is saturated, you have the choice 
of saying that there are only identities, and that the best hope is the 
revolt of some particular identity. Or you can say that we have to find 
something much more universal, much more generic. But probably 
without the representative generic group.”240 
The curatorial proposes constellations that activate potentialities. As a form 
of interrogation it seems to be offering new entry points which sometimes 
rely on expanded and abbreviated periodizations and territorializations. 
Betrayal operates within it between positions and oppositions. It is a gesture 
of enacting refusal by the plurality of engagements that are available already 
by a defined setting. Betrayal can be understood in the tradition of 
performative modes of thinking which try to go beyond antagonism, and 
deploy a set of entanglements. These manifest a fidelity to the fidelity. 
Betrayal provides us with a set of re-positionings from which to embark in 
this secret agency by which we are acting as agents of an order that is 
already gone and at the same time is yet to come. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
240 See: Interview with Alain Badiou, “The Saturated Generic Identity of the Working Class,” in: 
The Newspaper of the Platform Chto Delat? Issue 15: Reactionary Times, February 2007, 
See:  http://chtodelat.org/b8-newspapers/12-59/the-saturated-generic-identity-of-the-
working-class/ [retrieved 15.10.2015]  
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APPENDIX Alcibiades: his life and related dates  
 
450 BC Alcibiades is born 
446 BC Alcibiades’s father Cleinias, is killed in the battle of Coronea. 
Alcibiades moves to live with his maternal uncle Pericles 
431-404 BC  The Peloponnesian War 
432/431 BC The encounter between Alcibiades and Socrates which is 
depicted in Plato’s Alcibiades I supposedly takes place 
around this time and the encounter between Alcibiades and 
Pericles which is depicted in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 
supposedly takes place around this time 
430 BC The battle of Potidaea; Alcibiades fights in the infantry 
together with Socrates and receives a medal for his courage 
425/424 BC Alcibiades is appointed member of the committee inspecting 
the taxes Potidaea is obligated to pay to Athens 
424 BC The battle of Delium; Alcibiades fights in the cavalry 
421 BC The Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta 
420 BC The treaty with Argos, Elis and Mantinea which Alcibiades 
has promoted 
418 BC Sparta wins the battle of Mantinea 
417/416 BC The Ostracism of Hyperbolus; Alcibiades wins the horses 
races in the 91st Olympic games; Athens conquers Melos and 
the assembly votes to massacre all the men and sell the 
women and children as slaves; Plato’s Symposium 
supposedly takes place around this time 
415 BC The Sicilian Expedition headed by Alcibiades, Nicias and 
Lamachus; Sacrilege of the statues of Hermes; Alcibiades is 
called back to Athens to stand trial 
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414-412 BC  Alcibiades in Sparta 
413 BC The Athenian expedition to Sicily is defeated 
412 BC Encouraged by Alcibiades, Chios, Miletus and other 
subordinate cities of Athens revolt 
412/411 BC Rumors of Alcibiades impregnating the Spartan Queen 
Timaea. Alcibiades finds refuge in Sardis with Tissaphernes 
the Persian governor of Asia Minor 
411 BC The Oligarchy of the Four Hundred in Athens; Alcibiades is 
called back to lead the Athenian fleet in Samos; Athens wins 
the battle of Abydus 
410 BC The Peloponnesian fleet is destroyed in the battle of Cyzicus 
408 BC The battles of Chalcedon and Byzantium 
407 BC Alcibiades returns to Athens 
406 BC Alcibiades is removed from his position after the battle of 
Notium and leaves to Phrygia in the island of Asia Minor 
404 BC In Athens: Critias and the constitution of the Thirty Tyrants in 
Athens; Thucydides finishes History of The Peloponnesian 
War; Alcibiades is murdered 
399 BC Socrates is trialed and sentenced to death 
385-380 BC  Plato writes The Symposium 
371 BC Xenophon finishes his Memorabilia 
350-347 BC Plato writes Alcibiades I 
70-80 CE Plutarch writes Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans 
(Sources: Walter M. Ellis, Alcibiades, Routledge 1989; Edward Frederic Benson, The life of 
Alcibiades: The Idol of Athens, New York: D. Appleton & Co.1929; Debra Hamel, The Mutilation of 
the Herms: Unpacking an Ancient Mystery, Self-published, North Haven, CT, 2012; David Gribble, 
Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation, Oxford University Press,1999; Nicholas 
Denyer,  "introduction", in: Plato, Alcibiades, Ed.: Nicholas Denyer, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, pp. 1-26) 
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